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In just 30 years microfinance has transformed from a credit-based rural development 
scheme that has claimed to reduce poverty and empower poor women, to a $70 billion 
financial industry. In the process, the traditional NGO-led model has given way to 
commercialized institutions, resulting in an increased emphasis on profitmaking. This has 
also led to confusion in the sector around its mission: is it to alleviate poverty and 
empower poor women or simply to provide the “unbanked” with access to formal sources 
of finance? This research considers the main debates in microfinance with regard to its 
mission and presents empirical evidence on the effectiveness of microfinance. 
The study is based on the Pakistani microfinance sector, which provides an ideal 
opportunity for a comparative analysis of two distinct models of microfinance – the 
 v 
nonprofit microfinance institutions (MFI) and the microfinance banks (MFB). The 
research compares the depth of outreach, mission, practice, and borrower experiences of 
MFIs and MFBs, employing a political economy framework. The data includes 140 
interviews with policymakers, donors, senior, mid and low-level microfinance officers, 
and their clients; as well as observations of practitioner-client interactions, including the 
process of disbursement and collection, group meetings, and field visits with loan officers 
in urban Pakistan. It also comprises two district-level surveys: the microfinance outreach 
survey from the Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN) and the Government of Pakistan’s 
Social and Living Standards Survey (PSLM). The surveys are analyzed econometrically to 
test whether district-level socioeconomic differences affect patterns of outreach. 
This study broadens our understanding of the extent to which the local political economy 
shapes the outcomes of a market-based intervention, such as microfinance. It also provides 
an insight into the evolution of microfinance, specifically as framed by the global 
development discourse and subsequent public policy choices. Finally, the study provides 
an authoritative account of how institutional structure affects microfinance’s effectiveness 
as a tool for poverty alleviation, empowerment and financial access.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The focus on extreme poverty and the world’s poorest has sharpened at an unprecedented 
level since the 1990s (Morduch and Haley, 2002). Global development institutions, such 
as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and international financial 
institutions (IFIs), particularly the World Bank, have elevated poverty alleviation to the 
policy forefront (World Bank, 2013). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
ratified at the Millennium Summit by all 189 United Nations member countries, have 
been influential in translating the lofty goal of poverty eradication into measurable targets 
that can be monitored at the country and regional level. 
But progress on the MDGs has been uneven. For instance, the first MDG, which calls for 
halving extreme poverty by 2015, has already been met, but 1.2 billion people continue to 
live in extreme poverty. Similarly, while there have been dramatic improvements in 
access to healthcare, primary education, basic housing facilities such as sanitation and 
drinking water, wide disparities remain between and within countries. It is, therefore, 
unlikely that most MDGs will be met by the 2015 deadline (United Nations, 2013).  
The debate on the best interventions to alleviate poverty has consequently heated up. At 
the same time, the development narrative seems to have converged on the idea that 
development should be about poverty reduction but also be mindful of “the voices of the 
poor” (Narayan-Parker, 2000). This last is a reference to the bottoms-up, participatory 
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processes that allow for beneficiary involvement in the design, implementation and 
monitoring of the interventions that affect them (Rankin, 2002). In other words, 
successful interventions must reduce poverty and reduce inequality by empowering the 
marginalized, especially poor women.  
During the 1990s, as this concept of development began to gain currency, Muhammad 
Yunus, an economist in Bangladesh, was able to popularize a rural development scheme 
that involved lending small amounts of money to some of the poorest women and men in 
a village near Dhaka, Bangladesh. Even though Yunus’s scheme was not the first of its 
kind (Roodman, 2012) he soon became the iconic face of what became known as 
microcredit.  
Microcredit was originally meant to assist the tiny subsistence businesses of the poor. But 
the loans had to be repaid with interest, which was usually higher than the market rate. 
Despite this, Yunus reported repayment rates as high as 96 percent (Yunus and Jolie, 
1998), later symbolized by the catchphrase “the poor always pay back” (Dowla and 
Barua, 2006).  
The intervention was initially called microcredit and subsequently renamed microfinance, 
as other small-denomination financial services were added to the mix, such as 
microsavings, microinsurance and most recently mobile banking. 
Microfinance was soon dubbed the ideal development intervention. Studies indicated that 
it could effectively alleviate poverty, empower poor women (Pitt, Khandker and 
Cartwright, 2006; Khandker, 1998), and facilitate community engagement through group 
lending (Osmani, 2007). In such arrangements credit would be extended to groups of 
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between five and twenty, with each member jointly responsible for the loans of others. 
Members would usually be neighbors, friends or extended family (Gine and Karlan, 
2007). Group lending began to be known as solidarity lending and was considered a 
powerful platform for empowerment (Rankin, 2002). 
But microfinance’s popularity soon became its greatest challenge, at least from a 
developmental perspective. Its supporters have ranged from global development 
institutions, the IFIs, nonprofit foundations, governments, private and institutional 
investors. Defined as a market-based intervention, for more than a decade, microfinance 
has been under pressure to deliver on its promise of financial sustainability by phasing 
out reliance on subsidies and demonstrating commercial viability. This has often led to 
confusion within the sector with regard to its real mission. The zeal to achieve financial 
sustainability has led to a dilution of emphasis on both poverty and empowerment (Cull 
et al, 2008). 
This confusion has been heightened by recent research, which indicates that microfinance 
does not have a significant impact on either poverty or empowerment. The result has 
been a sharp shift in the narrative. The Microfinance Handbook, first published by the 
World Bank in 1998, but rewritten and re-published in 2013, serves as an authoritative 
guide on microfinance for donors, policymakers and practitioners. In its 1998 version, the 
Handbook describes microfinance as an intervention that spurs entrepreneurial activity 
and economic development, alleviates poverty and empowers women.  
The 2013 revised version, on the other hand, rejects these earlier claims and does not go 
beyond describing microfinance as a tool for building financially inclusive systems. The 
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Handbook argues that financial access is a right of the poor in the global South as much 
as it is taken for granted by those in the North. This mirrors the human rights-based 
approach to development, first put forward by the UN and subsequently adopted by other 
global development institutions, as well as much of the scholarship on the subject 
(Murphy 2006: 206; Gauri and Gloppen, 2012).  
But the Handbook explicitly states that only commercially viable microfinance operations 
can expand outreach sufficiently to meet the demand for credit and other financial 
services by the poor. These ideas are echoed by recent scholarship on the subject (e.g. 
Schmidt, 2010). On the other hand, there are ample warnings that commercialization in 
the sector can dilute the emphasis on poverty and empowerment (e.g. Morduch, 2000; 
Morduch and Haley, 2002; Cull et al, 2008).  
Thus, when it comes to microfinance there are two main issues at hand. The first has to 
do with how the sector perceives its own mission and the second relates to the mechanics 
of realizing this mission. The answer to the first often implies a response to the second. 
For instance, those that contend that the sector’s real mission is access to finance usually 
argue that only commercialized microfinance can expand outreach fast enough and 
efficiently enough to meet the vast unmet demand for formal financial services (Schmidt 
2010). 
But even if we go by the narrative of financial access, given the importance microfinance 
continues to receive by donors, policymakers and global institutions, it is critical to 
question the impact of access to finance on the lives of the poor. More specifically, has 
access to microfinance significantly improved the wellbeing of the poor, especially poor 
 5 
women? If the answer to the question is yes then this $70 billion global intervention 
(Sinclair, 2012) should continue to receive the support of the development community. 
But if this is not the case then financial access alone may not be a sufficient reason to 
support this rapidly expanding industry. 
The present study employs multiple research methods and a multidisciplinary conceptual 
framework to study these questions through an analysis of the Pakistani microfinance 
sector.  
There are several reasons why Pakistan makes a good case for this study. First of all, 
Pakistan has two dominant institutional models of microfinance – microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), which are incorporated as nongovernmental organizations (NGO), 
and the much more commercially oriented microfinance banks (MFBs). This makes for 
an ideal comparative study, especially since the market at present is roughly divided 
equally between MFIs and MFBs. Such a study would serve as the basis of an 
authoritative inquiry into the tradeoffs between the financial and developmental 
objectives of microfinance. 
Secondly, though Pakistan is a newcomer in microfinance, relative to Bangladesh and 
India, it is often referred to as a regional leader for having established the new-age 
version of microfinance institutions. The 2012 Global Microscope Report, a sector 
review published annually by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) calls Pakistan “one 
of the few countries in the world that has a separate legal and regulatory framework for 
microfinance banks and is generally considered to have one of the most enabling 
environments for microfinance regionally and globally” (EIU, 2012: 31). 
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In the same vein, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a policy and 
research center housed at the World Bank, calls Pakistan’s microfinance sector a 
“laboratory for innovation” (2011). The question is does this also mean better outcomes 
for the poor in Pakistan, in terms of financial access, poverty reduction and 
empowerment? The present study will address this question by comparing the mission, 
practice, outreach and client experiences of the traditional NGO model with the newer, 
more commercialized MFB model. 
Finally, as Pakistan faces serious political, economic and security challenges, its growth 
has faltered and poverty has risen to unprecedented levels. As a market-based 
intervention, microfinance is considered by some to be less susceptible to such political 
economy barriers to development (Swain and Floro, 2008). In fact, the literature on 
conflict and microfinance argues that microfinance, especially microcredit, can jumpstart 
economies during and post-conflict, by helping to establish and reconstruct local 
businesses (Nagarajan and McNulty, 2004; Manalo, 2003; Doyle, 1998). The present 
study will study the extent to which the local political economy influences the 
microfinance sector’s practice, outreach and client experiences in Pakistan. This includes 
a mini case study on microfinance’s experience in Karachi, Pakistan’s commercial and 
financial hub, but also its most violent city.  
The study employs multiple research methods. It begins with an econometric analysis of 
microfinance outreach at the district level, on a quarterly basis from 2007 to 2012. The 
purpose is to test whether socioeconomic disparities between districts affect patterns of 
outreach, and the extent to which these disparities affect MFIs and MFBs differently. 
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Outreach is defined as the number of people a microfinance institution serves. It can also 
mean the amount outstanding in an institution’s loan portfolio. The proponents of 
commercialized microfinance claim that its real mission is to provide access to formal 
sources of finance to the poorest. The econometric analysis is designed to test the 
relationship between commercialization and financial access. 
The findings are detailed in chapter 2. The subsequent chapters, that is, chapters 3, 4 and 
5 focus on the poverty alleviation mission of microfinance, while Chapter 6 considers the 
empirical evidence on microfinance and women’s empowerment in Pakistan. These 
chapters rely on findings from field research conducted between 2010 and 2012. The data 
includes 140 interviews with policymakers, donors, top, middle and lower-level 
microfinance practitioners, and currently active microfinance clients in Pakistan. It also 
includes observations of practitioner-client interaction during group meetings, 
disbursement and collection of loans, and visits to clients’ homes and places of business.  
Specifically, chapter 3 compares MFIs and MFBs with regard to their mission, practice 
and client experiences, in the light of social enterprise theory. Chapter 4 reviews the 
changing global development narrative and how that has influenced microfinance’s rise 
to fame, especially as concepts such as participatory development, the informal economy 
and social capital have gained traction in defining the process and desired outcomes of 
development. The chapter also reviews the political economy factors most salient to 
Pakistan’s microfinance sector.  
Chapter 5 considers how microfinance practice has evolved over time in Pakistan and 
analyzes the specific impact of the local political economy on microfinance institutions 
 8 
and their clients. Chapter 6 reviews the literature on gender, development and 
microfinance and considers the evidence on women’s empowerment through 
microfinance in Pakistan in terms of change, choice and power (Kulkarni, 2011), that is, 
it asks whether microfinance has been able to change the status quo by increasing 
women’s choices and granting them more power? To answer this the study analyzes 
empowerment as both a process and an outcome (Kabeer, 2001).  
 
A. Conceptualizing Poverty 
The main theoretical frame that ties each essay together is the capability approach, which 
is most often associated with the economist Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum, who have deeply influenced development theory and practice since the 1990s. 
The approach defines poverty as deprivation of the freedoms people value. People are 
poor when their opportunities are limited and the means to ensure their wellbeing do not 
exist for them (Alkire, 2007). This conceptualization of poverty and marginalization is 
used to analyze the experience of microfinance’s clients. 
 
B. What is Commercialized Microfinance? 
Microfinance is a set of financial services that targets the poor and the least well off. It 
includes but is not limited to microcredit, microsavings, microinsurance, and mobile 
banking. Microcredit continues to be the most popular microfinance product in many 
countries, including Pakistan. Throughout this text, the term microfinance will refer to 
formal microfinance activities, products and institutions. Informal microfinance 
activities, reviewed in Section I below, will collectively be referred to as informal 
borrowing or informal microfinance. 
 9 
Commercialization in microfinance is characterized by an emphasis on profitmaking. 
There is a fine line between achieving financial sustainability and profitmaking. Financial 
sustainability is the complete phase out of subsidies and requires the institution to 
generate enough revenue to cover all of its operational and nonoperational costs. Profits 
can only be earned once an institution is financially sustainable, so in that sense 
achieving financial sustainability is the first stage and earning profits the second.  
Both MFIs and MFBs can be commercialized institutions, but commercialization is more 
strongly associated with MFBs, for as banking institutions they have to be self-reliant and 
produce profits after achieving breakeven. Commercialization does not imply the 
charging of interest on microcredit, but very high rates of interest can be used by 
commercialized entities to earn profits, as discussed in Section I below.  
I now turn to the main debates and controversies in microfinance. 
I.	  The Microfinance Debates	  
Despite its popularity, microfinance has recently become a controversial intervention. 
The literature on microfinance includes heated debates, conflicting evidence, and 
controversial claims. This section reviews the main debates in the literature and examines 
the evidence for and against each one. The first deals with the claim that microfinance is 
a novel development scheme, the second considers microcredit interest rates, the third 
presents the dominant views on microfinance’s main purpose, and the fourth provides an 
overview of how this study will analyze the question of commercialization and its impact 
on microfinance’s effectiveness as a development intervention.  
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I.A. Is Microfinance Breaking New Ground? 
To say that microfinance provides the poor with access to finance would be misleading. 
The poor already have a variety of ways to borrow. Contrary to popular images of 
informal finance, the moneylender is only one source of informal credit. Others include 
friends and family, the middlemen that provide them with access to the market and the 
community general store where they make their routine purchases.  
In fact, borrowing between family members, neighbors and friends is so common that a 
study of rural Nigeria found that on average a typical household was a borrower and 
lender 2.5 times (Udry, 1994). Similarly, obtaining merchandise or supplier credit is 
standard business practice in the informal economy, though access can depend on non-
economic criteria, such as ethnicity (Biggs et al, 2002). Chapter 3 presents findings from 
this research that suggests that even currently active microcredit clients routinely tap into 
multiple sources of informal credit. 
Of course, credit is not the only informal financial service. Some form of informal 
savings clubs or rotating savings and credit associations (roscas), are available in most 
regions of the global South, and average participation rates are reported to be 
exceptionally high, ranging between 50 to 95 percent in countries such as Nigeria, Kenya 
and the Ivory Coast (Bouman, 1995). Roscas have traditionally been viewed as a savings 
mechanism for individuals with no access to formal savings or credit products (Levenson 
and Besley, 1996). But new evidence suggests that even when formal mechanisms are 
available, individuals, especially women, continue to use roscas for different reasons, 
such as protecting their money from their husbands (Anderson and Baland, 2002). 
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Similarly, the hawala or hundi system remains a popular mechanism for transferring 
money, particularly in the Middle East, South and East Asia. This usually consists of an 
informal agreement that allows for money to be transferred quickly, efficiently, cheaply 
and without the level of documentation formal money transfer schemes require (Suleri 
and Savage, 2006).  
Thus, the poor regularly tap into a rich and varied network of financial services. The 
literature on financial access and microfinance does not include these informal financial 
services within the microfinance umbrella. In fact, it considers informal finance to be a 
less than ideal mode of financial service delivery that is assumed to automatically 
disappear as soon as formal microfinance arrives on the scene.  
Microfinance seeks to distinguish itself from informal finance by arguing that it provides 
non-exploitative, predictable and transparent access to finance (Roodman, 2012). Critics 
of informal credit say that it is an unpredictable source of finance, it can be exploitative, 
and if the poor are borrowing from members of their own community then their lenders 
are likely to be poor also, which implies that the amount borrowed is limited to how 
much the lender can afford to give (Collins et al 2009).  
But the favorite microcredit narrative against informal finance centers round the image of 
a menacing and evil moneylender who charges such high rates of interest that the debt 
can never be paid back in full. While this is true of a good number of moneylenders 
across the global South as well as the North, where pay-day loan shops and credit card 
companies can be considered new age Shylocks, it is certainly not true of the entire 
spectrum of informal finance. In fact, a study of rural finance in China finds that 
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borrowing from friends and family does not bear any interest at all, which has made it 
hard for rural credit cooperatives to penetrate in the region. The authors of the study 
predict that these same social networks will also crowd out registered MFIs (Turvey and 
Kong, 2009). 
Scholars argue that informal credit is easy to access, is available in small denominations, 
for very short periods, and involves highly flexible loan agreements that are subject to 
change even during the duration of the loan depending on the borrower’s circumstances 
(Srinivas, 1993). In one study, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) looked at various slums in 
Hyderabad, India and discovered that even in areas with an active microfinance presence, 
only one-fourth of families were borrowing from microfinance institutions, though more 
than 50 percent remained clients of the local moneylender, despite having to pay higher 
rates of interest to the latter. They concluded that the moneylender’s flexibility on 
repayment made him a more popular choice. 
Similarly, it is also misleading to imply that before microfinance there were no other 
formal mechanisms to provide the poor with credit. Credit cooperatives, postal unions, 
savings banks, and government sponsored subsidized credit schemes predate microcredit 
and continue to exist in the South (Roodman, 2012). For instance, the World Council of 
Credit Unions reports that there are currently 55,952 credit unions across 101 countries 
(2012). This data does not include China, where the government runs an estimated 40,000 
rural credit cooperatives (Ong, 2013).  
But critics contend that government sponsored interventions are generally corrupt, 
inefficient and most of the credit does not reach the poor because of political connections 
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and bribery (Roodman, 2012; Braverman and Guasch, 1986). In comparison, as a private 
sector intervention microfinance is expected to be less susceptible to these problems. 
Chapter 5 presents a political economy analysis of microfinance and discusses the extent 
to which such representations are true.  
I turn now to another controversy, which relates to the rates of interest charged on 
microcredit arrangements. 
I.B. A Question of Interest  
Microcredit practitioners have always been defensive about the higher-than-market rates 
that they charge their borrowers. It is true that microcredit is more expensive than regular 
credit for the lender, because it costs more to lend in small denominations. The poor also 
usually live in hard to reach remote areas and microcredit quite literally is offered to the 
borrower at her doorstep, making it a labor-intensive operation. Finally, as the poor 
cannot offer collateral in a conventional sense and do not have readily available credit 
histories, the risk involved in lending to them as compared to lending to the non-poor is 
greater. If microcredit is to become a financially viable business these costs need to be 
factored into the interest rate.  
 When it comes to risk, however, the joint liability nature of the lending arrangement 
reduces the risk of default considerably. Risk is further reduced by the fact that due to the 
nature of the loan process, microcredit loan officers are familiar with the places where 
their borrowers work and live, making it hard for a would-be defaulter to evade 
repayment, as described in detail in Chapter 3. 
But it is also important to question the concept of financial viability, for microcredit rates 
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have often been higher than what would normally appear to be just enough to adjust for 
risk and to cover the cost of operations. For instance, the Mexican MFB Compartamos 
has charged its clients rates in excess of 100 percent (Rosenberg, 2007). Other examples 
include Badan Kredit Desa of Indonesia and BancoSol of Bolivia, the former is known to 
charge 55 percent nominal interest on its loans while the latter’s rates have ranged 
between 47.5 to 50.5 percent (Morduch, 1999).   
A recent survey of interest yields, which is the ratio of the total interest accrued over the 
life of the loan, finds that the current global microcredit interest yields average at 27 
percent. The lowest yields are in South Asia, where the cost of labor is the lowest and 
political considerations have put effective caps on rates, at least in Bangladesh and India. 
In regions such as Africa and Latin America yields are often higher, varying between 20 
and 50 percent (Rosenberg et al, 2013).  
But what about the contention that higher rates are necessary to support the high cost of 
microcredit operations? The same survey finds that of the 879 institutions surveyed 
across all Southern regions, a quarter earned more than 20 percent on shareholder 
investments, while 5 percent earned more than 40 percent in profits. The study shows that 
profits as a percentage of interest income have declined from 20 percent in 2004 to 10 
percent in 2011. Nevertheless, 10 percent is fairly significant for an intervention designed 
to reduce poverty. 
But the question of profits refers back to the broader issue of commercialization, which is 
one of the main themes of this thesis. The next section reviews the debates on 
microfinance’s developmental objectives. 
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I.C. The Mission: Poverty Alleviation or Financial Access? 
The idea that financial inclusion can overcome chronic poverty may have gained 
currency recently (Morse, 2000; Weiss, et al, 2003), but it is nested within an older 
narrative, known as the finance-growth nexus. More than forty years ago Goldsmith 
(1969), McKinnon (1971) and Shaw (1973) argued that financial development was 
necessary for economic growth. The main argument was that a healthy financial system 
would promote economic development by raising the level of domestic savings and 
investments, especially among financially constrained borrowers (King and Levine, 
1993; Claessens, 2006; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 1999).  
More recently, this theoretical framework has been employed to assess the impact of 
financial development on poverty and inequality across the global South (Li, Squire, and 
Zou, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). For instance, Bucchianeri, Burgess and Pande 
(2005) study the impact of the Indian government’s credit initiative that required 
commercial banks to open bank branches in rural areas and conclude that poverty 
decreases faster in areas where more bank branches have been opened.  
This literature introduces access to finance as an important, perhaps even necessary, 
ingredient of anti-poverty policies (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). Often referred to as the 
“democratization of finance” argument, its proponents argue that formal finance has the 
capacity to overcome the economic exclusion of the poor. Shiller, in describing access to 
finance as a moral imperative in his book The New Financial Order (2003: 2), argues that 
“we need to democratize finance and bring the advantages enjoyed by the clients of Wall 
Street to the customers of Wal-Mart”, because, “finance must be for all of us in deep and 
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fundamental ways”. In a similar vein, Ferguson notes in The Ascent of Money (2007: iv) 
“poverty is not the result of rapacious financiers exploiting the poor. It has much more to 
do with the lack of financial institutions, with the absence of banks, not their presence.” 
Such arguments parallel the “credit as a basic human right” proposition, first popularized 
by Yunus (2004) and now an integral part of the mainstream microfinance literature. 
At the same time, Ferguson’s (2009) claim that access to finance can overcome poverty 
and marginalization includes only the “industrious poor” (2007: iv). The question is, how 
many poor individuals are we to consider “industrious”? Traditional microcredit theory 
claims that most poor people are industrious, in other words, ready and willing to become 
entrepreneurs, particularly if they happen to be women (Yunus, 2004).  
The idea behind microfinance, at least as it was originally formulated, was to introduce 
formal financial services to those working in the informal economy, where by some 
estimates, the smallest businesses on average produce a marginal return on capital of 100 
percent per annum (Huegerich, 2012). A study of Pakistani microenterprises estimates 
that the average return on assets varies between 29 and 133 percent (Shorebank 
International, 2011). Of course, what is not mentioned in these studies is that the 
businesses of the poor are chronically short on capital and the difference is made up by 
intensive use of family and non-family, wage or unpaid labor. This means that measures 
such as return on capital and return on assets tend to conflate the true picture. 
Nevertheless, such studies have greatly influenced our view of the businesses at the 
“bottom of the pyramid” (Pralahad, 2005) and microfinance continues to be considered a 
necessary ingredient in the “inclusive growth” model (Khavul, 2010). In this model, 
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microenterprises serve to fuel economic growth and social transformation.  
But even scholars sympathetic to microfinance have begun to admit that not every poor 
individual is capable or even interested in becoming an entrepreneur. Instead, poor 
families need credit for day-to-day events such as sending their children to school, 
making home improvements and paying for funerals (Bauchet et al, 2011). Ogden and 
Morduch (2013), who run the Financial Access Initiative in New York, employ a rights-
based narrative to argue that there needs to be a shift away from a single-minded focus on 
entrepreneurship and formal financial services should instead be considered a basic right 
for all. 
But if the discussion so far seems more about the poor and less about their poverty, it is 
because this is exactly how academic inquiry into microfinance has turned the corner. 
The publication of the first randomized control trials of a microcredit intervention in 
Andhra Pradesh, India can be considered as the marker for this shift in narrative. In 2009, 
researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Poverty Action Lab 
published the results of this study, which showed that 15-18 months after microlenders 
frst began to operate in the area, access to microcredit did not increase consumption per 
capita and there were no measurable impacts on health, education or women’s decision 
making (Banerjee et al, 2009). 
The furor caused by the publication was understandable since prior to this the most 
influential scholarship on the subject was considered to be Shahidur Khandker’s. Using 
panel data fromm Bangladesh, Khandker (1998 and 2003), a World Bank economist, 
established that microfinance was associated with a significant reduction in poverty, 
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especially when it came to poor women. 
Banerjee et al’s (2009) study was not the first to find that the link between microfinance, 
poverty and empowerment was ambiguous. Morduch (1998) had earlier replicated 
Khandker and Pitt’s (1998) research and his study found that while microcredit was 
associated with a reduction in the consumption volatility of the poor, it did not increase 
overall consumption levels. Other studies have also confirmed that microfinance does not 
have a significant impact on the wellbeing or empowerment of the poor (Duvendack et al, 
2011; Karim, 2011; Isserles, 2003). 
It is little surprise then that microfinance’s supporters have now opted to promote it as a 
tool for financial access, rather than poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment. The 
argument is that access to financial services allows the poor to smoothen their income 
and consumption, manage their risks and build their productive and non-productive assets 
(Ledgerwood, 2013). 
At the same time, if there is no solid evidence against improvements in the poverty and 
empowerment status of its clients, can deep investments in microfinance by global 
institutions, governments of the South and charitable organizations continue to be 
justified? I return to this question in the concluding chapter after reviewing the evidence 
on microfinance’s experience in Pakistan in the chapters that follow.  
These chapters will examine the evolving nature of microfinance in Pakistan and how 
this has affected the various goals of microfinance proposed by its proponents. I turn now 
to the last debate to be considered in this section. 
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I.D. The Mechanism: Traditional NGOs or Commercialized Institutions? 
Commercialization in microfinance is no doubt a direct consequence of the pressure by 
global institutions and governments on microfinance institutions to achieve financial 
sustainability. But it is also the result of rising private debt and equity investments in the 
microfinance industry. Current investments in microfinance investment funds, which are 
global investment vehicles that direct the flow of funds to microfinance institutions in 
Southern countries, are estimated at $7.5 billion (MicroRate, 2013). This is only one 
source of investment, others include direct investments by private individuals and 
institutions. Online investments, through websites such as Kiva.org, are also popular.  
As a result of these developments, many of the older, more established institutions have 
already transformed into profitmaking institutions, while newer institutions are often set 
up as commercial ventures. In chapter 3, I analyze the impact of legal structure on 
microfinance’s mission, practice and borrower experiences. In chapter 2, I discuss the 
specific impact of institutional form on microfinance outreach at the district level in 
Pakistan, by comparing socioeconomic disparities between districts. In chapter 5, I 
discuss findings related to the impact of the local political economy on each institutional 
group. Finally in chapter 6, I discuss the impact of institutional form on women’s 
empowerment or lack thereof.  
The following section briefly reviews the evolution of microfinance in Pakistan, which is 
followed by an overview of the policy landscape in which microfinance must operate in 
Pakistan. 
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II. Microfinance in Pakistan – Historical Brief 
During the early 1990s two major Pakistani NGOs – the Aga Khan Rural Support 
Programme (AKRSP) and the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), introduced microcredit in the 
communities where they worked. The basic aim of both institutions is poverty alleviation 
through community development (Hasan and Raza 2011; Rauf and Mahmood 2009). 
Following the AKRSP’s success, other rural support programs (RSPs) were established in 
different parts of the country. There are now a total of 11 RSPs and all of them offer 
microfinance, that is, microcredit as well as microsavings and microinsurance (RSPN 
2011). By the late 1990s, 80 percent of all active microcredit clients were accounted for 
by the RSPs (Rasmussen et al 2004).  
Also in the late 1990s, institutions such as Kashf Foundation began to be established. 
These were different in that they were set-up exclusively as microfinance institutions, and 
many of them offered credit primarily to women. These MFIs followed the traditional 
group-lending model (Jaffer, 1999).  
But the 2000 Microfinance Bank Ordinance changed the dynamics of the sector and the 
first MFBs were established. Today there are a total of 11 MFBs and 24 MFIs registered 
with the Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN), the national association of microfinance 
institutions and banks, accounting for 2.53 million microborrowers (MicroWatch, 2013). 
Currently, 41 percent of total active microborrowers are accounted for by MFBs and the 
rest by the MFIs. In terms of the gross loan microcredit portfolio, MFBs account for 57 
percent of the total and MFIs 44 percent of the total (MicroWatch, 2013). 
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While both offer nearly the same service, there are important differences between MFIs 
and MFBs, the most salient of which are outlined in Table 1 below:  
	  
 
The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) regulates all MFBs under the 2000 Microfinance Bank 
Ordinance, but MFIs are registered under various acts, which means that they have no 
regulatory consistency. In terms of funding, it is hard to determine which type of 
institution experiences more constraints. At first glance it would appear that MFIs have it 
easier since they can get grants through individual arrangements with donors and 
charitable organizations, as well as soft loans from the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund 
(PPAF). The PPAF is a “social fund” established by the World Bank that acts as a 
wholesaler of World Bank sourced funds to microfinance institutions at below credit 
Table 1 Institutional Differences Between MFBs and MFIs 
 MFBs MFIs 
Legal Form Banking institutions NGOs, with one exception – Orix Leasing, 
a non-bank financial institution. 
Regulation Regulated by the State Bank 
of Pakistan (SBP) as per the 
Microfinance Bank 
Ordinance 
Can be registered under any of the 
following acts: Companies Act, Trust Act, 
Societies Registration Act or Voluntary 
Social Welfare Agencies Act.  
 
Funding Deposits, commercial bank 
loans, and specialized grants 
through the SBP and the 
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation 
Fund (PPAF). 
Soft lending from the PPAF, grants and 
subsidies from other donors.  
The largest MFIs have been able to raise 
funds from local commercial banks. 
 
Deposit 
Mobilization 
Yes Deposits collected must be deposited with 
licensed commercial banks, cannot be used 
to fund operations. 
Products 
and services 
Usually restricted to 
microcredit, savings, and 
mandatory life insurance for 
life of the loan, can also 
include health insurance. 
Microcredit, savings and insurance products 
- usually life insurance for life of loan, can 
also include health insurance. Many MFIs 
also engage in social mobilization and 
community building activities.  
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market rates. 
In contrast, MFBs have to raise their own money either through deposit mobilization or 
from commercial banks. But MFBs in Pakistan also have access to concessional facilities 
and grants through the SBP. These facilities are funded by the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Asian Development Bank. In addition, the 
PPAF has recently introduced a Program for Increasing Sustainable Microfinance 
(PRISM) Facility, which allows MFBs to seek concessional funding from it (Pakistan 
Microfinance Review, 2012). This is the first time since its inception in 1999 that the 
PPAF is no longer lending exclusively to MFIs. 
In terms of deposit mobilization, both MFBs and MFIs can accept deposits but only 
MFBs are allowed to use deposits to fund operations (Haq and Ahmed, 2010). MFIs have 
to deposit all savings collected from their clients with a licensed commercial bank. 
Deposits are an important source of funding for MFBs. In fact, MFBs are allowed to 
accept deposits from anyone, not just the poor. Therefore, while savings collected by 
MFIs represent savings by the poor, savings collected by MFBs cannot be considered just 
the savings of the poor.  
At the same time, the savings collected by institutions such as the National Rural Support 
Program (NRSP), which alone is responsible for 73 percent of rural savings (Microwatch, 
2013), cannot be considered voluntary savings. This is because the lending arrangement 
stipulates that at the time of disbursement 10 percent of the loan must be deposited in a 
savings account for the borrower. These are precautionary savings in case of default.  
Thus, despite the fact that there are currently more than 4.8 million so-called “micro-
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savers” that together account for more than Rs1. 25 billion ($250 million) in savings, 
these can neither be considered as the exclusive savings of the poor nor can they be 
considered strictly voluntary.  
Similarly, microinsurance in Pakistan is not a financial service that the poor voluntarily 
purchase. Most microfinance institutions require that 2 percent of the loan proceeds be 
put towards credit life insurance. This is meant to cover loan repayment in the event of 
the borrower’s death, and the policy’s main purpose is to cover the institutions’ portfolio 
risk (PPAF, 2012). 
Some institutions, such as the NRSP, also offer health insurance to their borrowers. Other 
health insurance programs include the government-run Benazir Income Support 
Program’s (BISP) microinsurance program, with eligibility determined through a means-
tested poverty scorecard. This program, however, is still in a pilot-stage, and most micro-
health insurance programs are limited to hospital visits and do not cover outpatient 
healthcare. 
Crop insurance is a new area of focus since the 2010 floods and both the PPAF and the 
government have recently piloted various microinsurance schemes for farmers, including 
an index-based crop and a livestock insurance program (PPAF, 2012). The results of the 
pilot though are not yet available. 
Overall, however, while there are currently 3 million microinsurance policy holders in the 
country (Microwatch, 2013), the data on microinsurance needs to be treated with caution, 
since the greatest proportion of currently outstanding policies are credit life insurance 
                                                
1 Rs. is short for Pakistani Rupees. The exchange rate used here is US$1 = Rs. 100 reflective of the official 
rate as of June 2013. 
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policies, which as mentioned above, are compulsory rather than voluntary and are mainly 
aimed at reducing the lender’s risk. 
Finally, social mobilization and community engagement, an important component of 
participatory development, has traditionally been a central focus of the microfinance 
movement (Rankin, 2002). The original group lending model is particularly well suited to 
community participation, as the stipulation of joint liability and mandatory attendance at 
group meetings is said to harness the community’s social capital, broadly defined as a 
community’s network of trust and engagement (Putnam, 1995: 67). While most MFIs in 
Pakistan continue to rely on group lending arrangements, MFBs are increasingly in the 
process of replacing group lending with individual lending, as detailed in chapters 3 and 
6. Of course, group lending has its own problems due to which several MFIs have 
recently modified their group lending models. This is discussed in detail in chapter 6.  
Further, while social mobilization has traditionally been considered an important 
component of MFI operations, the largest MFIs in Pakistan, including the NRSP and 
AKRSP have now separated their social mobilization activities from their microfinance 
operations by spinning off their microfinance portfolios into standalone MFBs. Thus, 
microfinance has become a less participatory intervention overtime, at least as practiced 
in Pakistan. Details are provided in chapter 5. I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  policy	  landscape,	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  how	  microfinance	  fits	  within	  the	  country’s	  development	  paradigm.  
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III. The Policy Landscape 
In July 2013 the Pakistani microfinance sector held its Annual Microfinance Summit. 
One of the main conference panels was titled “The grand debate in microfinance: whether 
growth in microfinance should focus towards poverty reduction or access to finance”. 
The title, which speaks for itself, symbolizes the confusion facing microfinance 
practitioners, policymakers and donors.  
The lack of clarity stems at the policy level, as is evidenced by a study of Pakistan’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The PRSP approach, initiated by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1999, forms the basis of a 
countrywide comprehensive poverty reduction strategy, for each country the IFIs lend 
assistance to (IMF, 2013). Pakistan’s first PRSP, PRSP-I, was developed in 2003 and the 
second, PRSP-II, in 2009 (Government of Pakistan, 2012).  
PRSP-I constitutes a four-part poverty reduction strategy, which includes policies to 
accelerate economic growth, develop mechanisms to improve governance and 
devolution, invest in human capital, and target the poor and vulnerable with direct 
transfers. Microfinance features prominently in the last category, that is, direct targets for 
the poor and vulnerable. The PRSP describes microfinance as a “viable tool” that has the 
potential to reduce poverty and empower women, but cautions that it must be scaled up in 
a sustainable fashion. Free markets and private capital investments in microfinance are 
described as the mechanisms that would enable the sector to achieve financial 
sustainability.  
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The PRSP also predicts that as microfinance expands its outreach in the country, social 
mobilization and participatory development will become a dynamic process. Thus, it is 
clear that the PRSP presumes that private investment and private actors will work 
through the market to reduce poverty. This market-driven ideology is not new to 
Pakistan, as detailed in chapter 4.  
In PRSP-II, published in 2009, there is a distinct change in tone and content, at least with 
regard to microfinance. Microfinance features in the second and eighth pillars of the nine-
pillar poverty reduction strategy of PRSP-II. The second pillar, titled “protecting the poor 
and the vulnerable”, corresponds to the fourth pillar of PRSP-I. Microcredit is included 
here as part of a broader social protection strategy for the “poorest and most vulnerable 
segments of society”. The most recent PRSP monitoring report, which provides data for 
the first quarter of fiscal year 2011-12, includes microloans worth Rs. 8,360 million in 
the “direct transfers to the poor and vulnerable” category. This is in reference to 
microcredit disbursements made through Khushhali Bank, the only quasi-public sector 
MFB in the country at the time. At the same time, the categorization of microcredit as a 
“direct transfer” is problematic since these loans have to be repaid with interest. 
Nevertheless, most of the discussion on microfinance in PRSP-II has moved to the eighth 
pillar, titled “capital and financial development”, where it is incorporated within a wider 
financial inclusion strategy. The document lauds the SBP’s efforts in promoting 
commercialization in the microfinance industry. PRSP-II also stipulates that the SBP 
should continue encouraging MFIs to develop commercially sustainable operations and 
eventually to enter the financial mainstream by transforming into MFBs. The shift in the 
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narrative regarding microfinance between the two PRSPs mirrors the shift in the global 
narrative on microfinance, as described in Section I above.  
It is also obvious that there is a clear policy preference towards MFBs, which may have 
already resulted in the neglect of MFIs. A major manifestation of this is that since 2000 
the largest MFIs have been compelled to spin off their portfolios, either in part or in 
entirety, into independent MFBs. Three of the 11 MFBs in the sector are MFI spin-offs 
and others may soon join the group.  
MFIs have several incentives for transforming into MFBs. First of all, transformed MFBs 
receive a 5-year tax holiday. Secondly, while commercial banks are reluctant to lend to 
most MFIs, the SBP’s partial risk guarantee to commercial banks on MFB loans makes 
commercial bank loans more easily available for MFBs.  
Another incentive is the SBP’s regulation on deposits, which prevents MFIs to use 
deposits to fund operations. Deposit mobilization, on the other hand, is an important, 
low-cost source of funding for MFBs. This serves to attract large MFIs, such as the 
NRSP, to the MFB sector. In the first quarter of 2011, the NRSP mobilized more than 51 
percent of total active savers for the microfinance sector (Pakistan Microfinance Network 
database, 2011). When NRSP spun-off part of its portfolio to the newly created NRSP 
Bank, which became operational in 2011, the savings were taken up in part by NRSP 
Bank and were used for the first time to fund microfinance operations.  
The SBP regulates MFBs through the Prudential Regulations2 for Microfinance Banks, 
which have been fashioned out of the Prudential Regulations for Banks, but especially 
                                                
2 A legal framework instituted by a country’s central bank in order to regulate all banking activity 
within the country. 
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relaxed in order to promote the MFB sector. As of December 31, 2012, the minimum 
capital requirement for a regular commercial bank was Rs.19 billion (US$190 million3), 
but for an MFB operating at the national level it was only Rs.800 million (US$8 million).  
In addition, MFBs, as mentioned in Table 1, have access to special development funds. 
These funds include the Financial Inclusion Program, the Institutional Strengthening 
Fund and the Improving Access to Financial Services Fund. Grants for setting up all, 
except the last of these facilities come from the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID). The last was set up with a US$20 million endowment from the 
Asian Development Bank (Akhtar, 2008). 
The SBP has also relaxed the prudential regulations to allow the MFBs to lend against 
gold jewelry as collateral, which the SBP defines as “zero risk lending”. Gold backed 
loans are now included in the portfolios of all major MFBs and this product has managed 
to overtake uncollateralized lending for the fastest growing MFBs.  
Finally, a key incentive that has led to the setting up of two new MFBs in the last year 
alone is the SBP’s branchless banking initiative. Capitalizing on the global mobile 
banking movement, the SBP issued a branchless banking initiative in 2008 and revised it 
in 2011. It called for the setting up of mobile bank accounts, referred to as “mobile 
wallets”. The 2011 revised guidelines for branchless banking include waiving all 
paperwork requirements for setting up electronic bank accounts, the removal of biometric 
information requirements for account opening and an upward revision on transaction 
limits (Pakistan Microfinance Review, 2011). The World Bank based Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor (CGAP) has called Pakistan a regional leader in mobile banking, while 
                                                
3 US$1=Rs. 100 as of June 2013 
 29 
the EIU includes Pakistan among the top five countries in the world for mobile banking 
(EIU, 2012: 12). In the quarter ending December 2012, 34.3 million transactions, worth 
US 879 million, were completed through the mobile banking network in the country 
(Chen, 2013). At the same time, the proliferation of mobile banking has so far only 
served a transactional purpose and neither credit nor savings products are as yet available 
through mobile banking facilities.  
Overall, however, there is no doubt that these incentives and initiatives have helped the 
industry grow and in a country where investment rates have been falling for the past five 
years, it has brought badly needed local and foreign private investment into the sector. In 
June 2012, the country’ largest MFB, Khushhali Bank was bought out by a consortium of 
local and international investors. Similarly, in 2012 the SBP issued three MFB licenses 
and these went either to private mobile phone company operators or private investment 
companies. 
Nevertheless, the pace of commercialization that has overtaken the industry has to be 
viewed from the point of view of the industry’s clients and those that get left behind due 
to the increased emphasis on low-risk, high return investments. This is the subject of the 
present inquiry, and in order to provide a frame for the discussion that is to follow in the 
next few chapters the following section provides an overview of the nature of poverty and  
underdevelopment in Pakistan. 
IV. The State of Underdevelopment 
Pakistan, a lower-middle income South Asian country (World Bank, 2012) of 179.2 
million, has four main provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
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(KPK). Also included within its territory is the tribal belt along the north-western border 
with Afghanistan - referred to as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the 
northern region of Gilgit-Baltistan, and Jammu and Kashmir, the territory in dispute with 
India. The data on these regions is sparse and it is, therefore, difficult to include these in a 
meaningful socioeconomic analysis.  
As of June 2012, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) stood at US$ 231.2 billion 
(World Bank, 2012), though the past five years have seen a general slowdown in its 
economy. Prior to this, during the first half of the 2000s economic growth hovered 
around 7 percent (Husain, 2009), but during the 2008-09 fiscal year it dropped to 0.4 
percent. Since then growth has only averaged at 2.94 percent (Economic Survey of 
Pakistan, 2013), despite the fact that the minimum rate needed to keep pace with the 
annual increase in the labor force in Pakistan is 7 percent (Rehm and Noshab, 2013).  
There are several reasons behind the current state of economic affairs, which are detailed 
in chapter 5, where it is also discussed why growth in Pakistan is not always consistent 
with poverty reduction. But in this section I review the actual state of underdevelopment 
in Pakistan, using the MDGs as a framework for understanding the nature and extent of 
poverty.  
The headcount ratio, an income-based measure, is a useful starting point for analyzing 
trends in poverty over a period of time. Pakistan’s headcount ratio indicates that the 
percentage of people unable to afford a basket of basic goods has risen from 24 percent in 
1997 to 36.79 percent in 2011 (Jamal, 2013). The first MDG calls for reducing poverty 
by half, using 1990 as a baseline. For Pakistan, this would require the headcount ratio to 
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fall to 21 percent by 2015, an unlikely scenario given the present trend.  
National averages gloss over wider regional disparities. For instance, while the poverty 
incidence in the nine largest cities of Punjab averages at 26.41 percent, the same ratio for 
the small towns of Balochistan is as high as 62.26 percent (Jamal, 2013).  
Progress on the rest of the MDGs has also suffered in the past five years, mainly due to 
the socioeconomic and political conditions reviewed in chapter 5. 
 
II.A. Hunger 
The first MDG’s second target calls for halving the proportion of people suffering from 
hunger between 1990 and 2015. For Pakistan this would mean achieving a ratio of 20 
percent or lower (UNDP Pakistan, 2013), but that seems an unlikely target to meet, given 
that 48.63 percent of the population currently faces food insecurity (World Food Program 
(WFP), 2013).  
The most vulnerable provinces in terms of food security are KPK and Balochistan. In 
KPK, 68 percent of the population in the tribal belt and 56.2 percent in the rest of the 
province is food insecure. In Balochistan, the food insecure population is estimated at 
61.2 percent (Arif, 2013). 
District-wise, 80 out of 113 districts have food insecure populations. The most vulnerable 
is Dera Bugti in Balochistan, where 82.4 percent of the population is food insecure. 
Latest estimates indicate that the average household in Pakistan spends 46 percent of its 
total budget on food, compared to 35 percent in India and only 7 percent in the US (Arif, 
2013).  
Persistent hunger and the malnutrition that accompanies it is a crisis in itself, for instance 
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51 percent of women and 62.5 percent of children under-five suffer from anemia in 
Pakistan (WFP, 2013), but hunger also affects other aspects of development such as 
education, health and economic growth.  
 
II.B. Education 
 The second MDG calls for achieving universal primary education by the year 2015. The 
three indicators that measure progress on this goal include (a) the net primary enrollment 
ratio (b) the school completion rate from grade 1 to 5 and (c) the literacy rate. According 
to the 2010-11 Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM), a 
national survey that tracks progress on MDG targets, net primary enrollment was only 56 
percent, as opposed to the 100 percent required to meet the related MDG. Of course, 
enrolment refers to the first day of the school year, not the last, which means the high rate 
of dropouts is not inclusive of it. It is estimated that only about half of those who enroll 
are able to complete primary schooling (UNDP Pakistan, 2013).  
Further, only about 58 percent of the Pakistani population is literate, as opposed to the 88 
percent required to meet the MDG target by 2015 (PSLM 2010-11; Pakistan Millenium 
Development Goals Report 2010). There are also wide gender and regional disparities in 
literacy, which is defined as the ability to write a simple letter and to be able to read a 
newspaper. By all accounts Pakistan is unlikely to meet its educational goals by the 2015 
deadline. 
II.C. Gender Equality and Empowerment 
The third MDG relates to gender disparity in education, employment and political 
participation (UNDP, 2013). Progress on gender parity in education is measured using the 
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gender parity index (GPI), which is a measure of women’s access to education relative to 
men’s. Pakistan’s GPI for primary school enrolment is 0.82 and 0.84 for secondary 
school enrolment, while the GPI for youth literacy is 0.78. Even though the GPI has 
improved overtime, it is highly unlikely that full gender parity in education will be 
achieved by 2015. 
The goal also includes gender disparity in terms of employment. According to the 2010-
11 Labor Force Survey, the overall female labor force participation rate is only 15.6 
percent.  
The political arena is where the greatest progress in reducing gender disparities has 
occurred. In the year 2000, a resolution was passed which raised the quota for women in 
provincial assemblies to 33 percent and 17 percent for the national assembly. The number 
of women contesting in the May 2013 national elections was also 130 percent higher than 
the number participating in the 2008 elections. 
But here again regional disparities are stark. In several districts of KPK and the federally 
administered tribal areas (FATA), women were barred from voting during the 2013 
elections, though in the districts of Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies of FATA women 
were able to cast their vote for the first time ever (The Nation, May-2013). Similarly, in 
the by-elections held on August 22, 2013 women were barred from voting in some areas 
of Punjab and KPK (Dawn, Aug-2013). 
 
II.D. Health 
MDGs 4, 5 and 6 relate to health disparities, specifically related to child mortality, 
maternal health, and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. Table 2 
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provides comparisons between actual status and the MDG targets for each indicator 
monitored under the three goals: 
	  
Table 2 Targets for MDG Goals 4, 5 and 6 
Health Measure Latest Available 
Figure 
MDG Targets 
2015 
Infant Mortality Rate (per 
1000 live births) 
75 (2006-07) 40 
Full immunization4 81 (2010-11) >90 
Incidence of diarrhea in 
children5 
11 (2010-11) <10 
Lady Health Worker 
coverage6 
83 (2008-09) 100 
Maternal Mortality7  276 (2006-07) 140 
Percentage births attended by 
skilled attendants 
43 (2009-11) >90 
Percentage getting prenatal 
care 
64 (2010-11) 100 
Percentage getting prevention 
treatment of malaria 
30 (2008-09) 75 
Incidence of tuberculosis per 
100,000 
181 (2008-09) 45 
*Sources: PSLM 2010-11, MDG Report 2010 
Despite the fact that most indicators have improved over time, the available figures make 
it clear that it is unlikely any of the targets under goals 4, 5 or 6 will be met by the 2015 
deadline. 
 
II.E. Environmental Sustainability 
The seventh goal pertains to environmental sustainability. Access to clean sources of 
drinking water is a particularly relevant measure in this regard for Pakistan. The 2010-11 
PSLM indicates that only 32 percent of the population had access to tap water while 
another 28 percent had access to water through a hand pump. Other sources include 
                                                
4 Percentage of fully immunized children 12-23 months based on record and recall  
5 Percentage of children under five who suffered from diarrhea in the last 30 days  
6 Coverage of target population (percent) 
7 Per 100,000 live births 
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motor pumps and wells but their usage is much lower. Access to a safe water source 
remains a challenge, especially for the poorest, due to both water scarcity and surface 
water pollution, which is a major cause of water-borne diseases in Pakistan (Pakistan 
Millenium Development Goals Report 2010). 
Availability of toilet facilities is another important measure of environmental 
sustainability. The 2010-11 PSLM indicates that 18 percent of the population does not 
have access to toilet facilities, and for districts such as Rajanpur in Punjab and Kohistan 
in KPK this percentage rises to nearly 70 percent. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimate that 91 million 
people in Pakistan live without proper sanitation facilities. 
Overall, as economic growth continues to struggle and the political will on addressing 
these issues remains weak, poverty rates are likely to keep rising. Nevertheless, the 
MDGs feature prominently in all major development blueprints in the country, including 
the Medium Term Development Framework (MDTF), the poverty reduction strategy 
papers (PRSPs) and the New Growth Framework.  
Taken together, these documents define Pakistan’s official development paradigm. It is 
important to note that the overarching development framework is based on the idea that 
free markets, privatization, and increased service delivery by NGOs and the private sector 
are the solutions to Pakistan’s development problems. This is discussed in more detail in 
chapter 4. This chapter concludes with a brief note on the main contributions this 
research aims to make. 
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V. Contributions and Research Significance 
There are three main ways in which the present study makes important contributions to 
the existing literature. First of all, it provides an insight into the evolution of 
microfinance, in light of the global development discourse and the public policy choices 
that have been made in this regard. It then uncovers how this evolution has played out in 
actual practice on the ground and its subsequent impact on the intervention’s clients and 
those that get left behind.  
Secondly, the study provides an authoritative account of how institutional structure 
impacts microfinance’s effectiveness as a development intervention, especially as 
traditional NGO microfinance institutions (MFIs) transform into microfinance banks 
(MFBs). Countries, including India, Sri Lanka and several African nations, are currently 
in the process of drafting regulations to convert their microfinance institutions into 
banking institutions that can be regulated directly by the central bank, in the hope of 
expanding outreach and achieving financial sustainability. This study can serve as a 
source of lessons learnt to these countries and others that may join in later, for it provides 
insights into how development processes and outcomes such as social mobilization, 
women’s empowerment and other aspects of individual wellbeing are affected when 
institutional structures are transformed. 
Finally, the study deepens our understanding of how the local political economy shapes 
and constrains development, even when the intervention is market-based and self-
sustainable. The role of microfinance in conflict-affected areas is examined in detail. In 
addition, the impact of an economic crisis, weak governance, corruption and culturally 
 37 
persistent gender disparities is discussed with respect to microfinance.  
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CHAPTER 2 
COMMERCIALIZATION AND FINANCIAL ACCESS 
 
For those that believe commercialization in microfinance is the only way to make 
meaningful social and developmental change, the evolution of microfinance from a 
welfare driven activity to a commercially viable banking business has been a “stunning 
success” (Schmidt, 2010). And indeed in just 30 years microfinance has grown to become 
a $70 billion dollar global industry that has reached 200 million individuals through 
microcredit alone (Sinclair, 2012). Proponents of commercialization insist that only by 
following sound banking principles can institutions reach the maximum number of poor 
people (Morduch, 2000). The development policy frameworks of countries such as 
Pakistan are built on such assumptions. Pakistan’s poverty reduction strategy paper 
(PRSP) states that only through the promotion of commercially sustainable microfinance 
operations can the dream of financial access become a reality. 
This has led to a push to commercialize, changing the nature of microfinance institutions. 
Traditionally the domain of NGOs, the sector has increasingly been taken over by 
commercial entities, such as specialized microfinance banks (MFBs). MFBs are banking 
institutions that differ from commercial banks only in that their target market includes 
low-income, financially constrained individuals.  
Empirical evidence on whether commercialization hurts or helps microfinance achieve its 
developmental objectives is mixed, with some studies associating commercialization with 
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a loss in mission (Cull et al, 2008) and others quite the opposite (Schmidt, 2010; 
Khandker, 2005).  
Most of the recent work on the subject though has been qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively driven (e.g. Augsburg and Fouillet, 2010). The few quantitative studies that 
have been conducted are mainly cross-country analyses (e.g. Zhao and Wry, 2011; 
Armendariz and Szafarz, 2009; Cull et al, 2008), though one major work has analyzed the 
specific case of rural Bangladesh (e.g. Khandker, 2005).  
The degree to which a microfinance institution serves poor clients is referred to as depth 
of outreach (Hoepner, Liu and Wilson, 2011). For the most part, quantitative research has 
not accounted for regional differences in depth of outreach within the same country, 
though this is critical in order to test the claim that increased commercialization provides 
access to finance to a greater proportion of the poor. The reason is that disparities within 
different parts of the same country, especially when it comes to the global South, are 
often quite stark. Thus, when institutions serve clients in the least well-off regions in a 
country, they are at least staying true to the professed mission of financial access, and 
vice versa.  
The present study seeks to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing district-level 
differences in microfinance outreach within Pakistan. The question that is addressed here 
is whether regional socioeconomic differences play a significant role in determining the 
supply of microcredit.  
Pakistan presents a unique opportunity for studying the impact of commercialization on 
the depth of outreach, as it currently has two distinct models of microfinance operating 
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side-by-side in the country: the microfinance institution (MFI) and the microfinance bank 
(MFB). MFIs are mostly NGOs, while MFBs are banking institutions and in Pakistan, as 
elsewhere, are regulated by the central bank. By March 2013, 12 years after the first MFB 
was established, 11 MFBs together accounted for 41 percent of total outreach, defined as 
the number of active borrowers, while the rest were MFI clients (MicroWatch, 1th Quarter 
2013).  
The data for this analysis comes from two district-level surveys, including an institution-
level microfinance outreach survey and a socioeconomic survey that covers multiple 
indicators of wellbeing. This is the first time the microfinance outreach survey is used to 
analyze differences in depth of outreach between MFIs and MFBs. In addition, the 
district level surveys cover all 113 districts of the four main provinces in the country, 
which provides a very granular level of detail that has not been captured by any other 
study on microfinance outreach before this.  
The surveys are used to construct a loan supply model that studies the impact of 
socioeconomic differences between districts on the probability that an MFI or an MFB 
will locate in a particular district. The model then analyses differences in average loan 
size between districts for each institutional group. Average loan size is often used as a 
proxy for the borrower’s poverty status, as detailed in Section I below, where the existing 
empirical evidence on the subject is reviewed. Section II presents the main trends in 
microfinance outreach in Pakistan for the last six years. Section III describes the data, its 
limitations and how it is used to construct the econometric model. Section IV presents 
key findings. And Section V concludes with a discussion based on the main findings. 
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I. Depth of Outreach: The Lay of the Land 
The discussion on commercialization in microfinance is quite recent and so far there are 
only a handful of studies that have analyzed its impact in detail. Perhaps the most well 
known cross-country study is by Cull et al (2008), which distinguishes institutions by 
their legal structure. The study concludes that for-profit MFBs are likely to offer larger 
loans using individual rather than group lending arrangements8, have fewer women 
clients, but are more efficient and make higher profits as compared to non-profit MFIs. 
Schreiner (2001) adds to the list by observing that commercialization has led to an 
increased preference to lend to urban rather than rural clients. 
Given the paucity of data on individual borrowers, especially for cross-country and cross-
institution studies, a commonly used proxy for the poverty of microcredit borrowers is 
average loan size. Smaller loans imply poorer customers, for institutions determine the 
size of the loan based on the borrower’s capacity to repay (e.g. Cull et al, 2008; 
Armendariz and Szafarz, 2009).  
My field research in Pakistan largely confirms this. The typical microcredit loan 
verification process includes a thorough analysis of the borrower’s existing income, total 
net worth and number of wage earners in the household. This information helps an 
institution determine the size of the loan for each borrower. During non-participant 
observations of the disbursement process, I observed several clients across institutions 
beg branch managers for higher loans and being refused on the ground that they did not 
make enough money to be able to repay a loan higher than was offered to them. 
                                                
8 Group lending in microcredit involves lending to groups of between 3 to 20 individuals 
simultaneously, with joint liability. The structure has evolved away from this in some cases 
recently as described in later chapters. 
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But Schreiner (2001) argues that loan size is only one aspect of the lending arrangement 
and should only be used within a proper context. Other aspects of a loan that Schreiner 
contends should be analyzed are interest rates, fees, guarantees, and whether the loan is 
disbursed individually or in groups. This is a valid argument but can only be properly 
addressed when using a much smaller dataset.  
Armendariz and Szafarz (2009), who advocate the use of average loan size to determine 
depth of outreach, point out that there is more than one reason for loan sizes to go up. The 
first is what microfinance institutions refer to as “progressive lending”, which means that 
as clients complete repayment of their existing loans and are able to demonstrate a clean 
repayment record, the institution moves them up to higher denomination loans. Thus, 
older clients are likely to have larger loans than more recent clients. By the same token, 
older institutions are more likely to have larger average loans than newer institutions, 
assuming their older clients have stayed with them.  
Another reason is cross-subsidization, that is, an institution may lend to wealthier clients 
in order to finance lending to poorer clients (Armendariz and Szafarz, 2009). This makes 
intuitive sense because it is operationally more efficient to lend to the less poor, in terms 
of unit cost per loan and the risk profile of the borrower.  
These explanations are consistent with the poverty alleviation mission of microfinance 
institutions. By this logic a dilution of an institution’s social and developmental mission 
must be defined as the tendency of a microfinance institution to lend to wealthier clients 
in such a way that it crowds out poorer clients (Armendariz and Szafarz, 2009). When 
this is observed it can only mean that the profit-making concerns of the institution have 
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won over its developmental objectives. 
This implies that average loan size may not be a sufficient measure of depth of outreach. 
Using an international dataset, Hoepner, Liu and Wilson (2011) show that the 
relationship between actual client poverty levels and average loan sizes is weak. Of 
course, these critiques come from studying cross-country data and the relationship is 
likely to be more controlled for an intra-country analysis. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that average loan size is only a proxy and no 
match for actual borrower statistics. For instance, gender ratios are important because 
microcredit is widely considered to be a tool for women’s empowerment. Section II will 
describe gender related trends across institutional groups in Pakistan, though the data 
used to construct these trends is not available at the district level and cannot be 
incorporated into the econometric model.  
Similarly, data on the poverty level of borrowers is unavailable at the district level. At the 
same time socioeconomic disparities between districts can be stark and are likely to be an 
important determinant of depth of outreach. Therefore, in addition to using average loan 
size per district, I also estimate the probability of a positive microfinance presence, given 
the socioeconomic profile of each district. This essentially provides us with a loan supply 
function.  
 
The Loan Supply Function of MFIs and MFBs 
A loan supply function is simply a theoretical model designed to help predict the extent 
to which different factors impact a lender’s decision to lend. The dependent variable in a 
loan supply function is usually either the probability an institution will extend a loan 
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(Ravina, 2008), the expected loan size (Ghosh and Tassel, 2008) or some other lending 
term, such as the interest rate, or a combination thereof (Ang and Willhour, 1976). 
Mansuri and Jain (2005), and McIntosh and Wydick (2005) argue that determining a 
microfinance institutions’ objective function is usually much more complex than for a 
regular profit-maximizing financial institution, as the former has competing objectives to 
balance off. An objective function defines an individual, group or institution’s 
optimization problem, reflecting a tradeoff between expected benefits and costs 
(Geoffrion, 1977). While an objective function is not necessarily a loan supply function, 
the latter can be considered a subset of the former. 
Jain and Mansuri (2005), and McIntosh and Wydick’s (2005) analysis demonstrates the 
tension in the microfinance sector between maximizing profits and client welfare. 
However, their analyses are limited to NGO MFIs and they do not specifically consider 
microfinance banks. In the present study, I construct two separate loan supply functions, 
one for MFBs and another for MFIs using two separate indicators of depth of outreach.  
The first is the probability that an MFI or an MFB will locate in a particular district, 
given the district’s socioeconomic profile, and the second is the expected value of the 
average MFI or MFB loan, again given the district’s socioeconomic profile.  
 
Dimensions of Wellbeing 
The socioeconomic profile of each district is created using multiple indicators of 
wellbeing. The economist Amartya Sen’s capability approach, which defines poverty as 
the lack of individual freedom or the opportunity to exercise a set of valued choices (Sen, 
1999), is used to select these indicators.  
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The capability approach has had a strong influence on the evolving concept of poverty 
since the 1990s. It has effectively shifted a single-minded focus on income-based 
measures of poverty towards a multi-dimensional conceptualization of deprivation. For 
instance, the United Nation Development Programme’s (UNDP) employs different 
dimensions of development, namely health, education and living standards, to construct 
the Human Development Index (HDI). Every year since 1990, HDI rankings for each 
country have been published in the UNDP’s Human Development Report (HDR).  
An alternative and relatively newer measure of poverty, also influenced by the capability 
approach, is the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). Here again the three dimensions 
of poverty are education, health and living standards, but living standards for the MPI are 
measured in terms of household assets and conditions, rather than GDP per capita as in 
the case of the HDI (Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003). 
To construct each district’s socioeconomic profile I will use the same three dimensions of 
wellbeing used by the HDI and the MPI. Differences in data availability will, however, 
influence the choice of particular indicators of health, education and living standards.  
The section below describes the main trends in microfinance outreach in Pakistan over 
the past six years.  
II. Trends in Outreach 
The Pakistan Microfinance Network’s (PMN) database, described in detail in Section III, 
provides information on different aspects of outreach. This data includes the ratio of 
rural-versus-urban outreach, male-versus-female borrowers, and individual-versus-group 
lending. These ratios are not available at the district-level and cannot be incorporated into 
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the econometric model. Therefore, in this section I review the main trends in this data. 
The first figure, shown below, separates outreach by province. Pakistan has four main 
provinces, with wide socioeconomic disparities described in more detail in the chapter on 
Pakistan’s political economy. Punjab is by far the most developed, but also the most 
highly populated province. Sindh is second in line, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) third, 
while Balochistan remains the least developed and most sparsely populated province.  
Figure 1 indicates that microfinance outreach in Punjab outpaces that of all other 
provinces combined. Outreach in Balochistan is close to zero and has not been able to 
pick up through the past six years. A detailed explanation of this trend is provided in the 
Chapter: Political Economy Influences – Evidence from Pakistan. Outreach in KPK has 
fallen in recent periods and much of this is due to the escalation in the conflict along the 
Afghan border.  
 
Figure 1 Microfinance Outreach by Province - Number of Active Borrowers 
 
 
This figure provides a first glimpse of how development and outreach are interconnected 
in the case of a country such as Pakistan. 
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The next three figures compare outreach by MFBs and MFIs. Figure 2 relates to rural-
urban differences. In the beginning of the data series, it is clear that MFIs have a much 
heavier presence in rural areas than MFBs. But by the end of 2012, MFBs have caught up 
to MFIs in rural areas, and MFI presence in urban areas has outstripped MFI presence in 
rural areas.  
Perhaps, the biggest contributing factor to this trend reversal has been the 2010 partial 
spin-off of the MFI, the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) into a standalone 
MFB, the NRSP Bank. As of the first quarter of 2013, the NRSP accounts for 15.8 
percent of the sector’s total number of borrowers and the NRSP Bank accounts for an 
additional 7.5 percent. Taken together, this represents the largest number of borrowers 
associated with any one institution or group (MicroWatch, 1st Quarter 2013). The sharp 
shift in the rural portfolio from MFIs to MFBs shown in Figure 2 coincides with the 
timing of the NRSP spin-off. 
 
Figure 2 Rural versus Urban Outreach - Number of Borrowers 
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Recall that the econometric model will use average loan size as a measure of depth of 
outreach. Gender is not a district-level indicator, therefore, it cannot be used in the model, 
but we do know that 80 percent of MFI borrowers and only 25 percent of MFB borrowers 
in Pakistan are women (MicroWatch, 2013). Figure 3 provides average loan size by 
gender for both MFBs and MFIs. It is clear that loan sizes for men are higher than loan 
sizes for women. Recall that the average loan size is simply the gross loan portfolio 
divided by the total number of borrowers. In 2009 when the data on portfolio size by 
gender first became available, MFI and MFB average loan sizes were roughly the same 
for men, as well as for women. At the time, the average loan for men was approximately 
US$40 higher than for women, for the sector as a whole. As described in chapter 6: 
Women, Development and Microfinance, gender gaps in loan size are not uncommon in 
microfinance sectors across developing countries.  
However, in the case of the Pakistani microfinance sector the trend in loan sizes by 
gender takes an interesting turn by the end of the data series in 2012. Figure 3 shows that 
while the intra-institution gender gap continues, the inter-institution gender gap closes 
almost completely in the case of female borrowers of MFBs and male borrowers of MFIs. 
On the other hand, the gap between the male borrowers of MFBs and female borrowers 
of MFIs has broadened rapidly overtime, as MFB loan sizes have gone up and MFIs have 
lagged behind in this regard. 
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Figure 3 Average Loan Size by Gender and Institution - In US$9 
 
 
Finally, Figure 4 below presents trends in outreach by lending methodology. Group 
lending constitutes the original microcredit arrangement. Group lending is associated 
with female targeted lending and a poorer target market, reviewed in more detail in the 
chapter titled Gender, Development and Microfinance. Figure 4 shows that while group 
lending far outpaces individual lending arrangements, for both MFIs and MFBs, there is a 
rapid rise in individual lending for MFBs, indicating a move towards less female-oriented 
lending and better-off clients. This result is consistent with Cull et al’s (2008) cross-
country findings described above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 US$1=Rs98.19 as of March 1, 2013 
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Figure 4 Gross Loan Portfolio by Lending Methodology 
 
 
We move now to a detailed analysis of district-level differences in outreach between 
MFIs and MFBs. The section below describes the two times series, their limitations and 
model construction. 
III. Data and Methodology 
 
Data for this study is taken from two time series in order to test for a possible relationship 
between socioeconomic development at the district-level and depth of microfinance 
outreach. The literature is conflicted on the locational preference of the more 
commercially oriented microfinance entities but a review of the qualitative findings 
detailed in the next four chapters lead me to expect that MFBs are more likely than MFIs 
to avoid the poorest districts. The two time-series used here are (a) the Pakistan 
Microfinance Network’s (PMN) outreach survey, and (b) the Pakistan Social and Living 
Standards Measurement (PSLM) survey. The following sub-sections describe each in 
detail.   
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A. Microfinance Outreach 
The PMN is a hub agency established by a network of local microfinance institutions and 
incorporated under the Companies Ordinance. Since 2006 it has collected data on 
microfinance outreach, which is extracted from quarterly forms submitted by each 
institution registered with the PMN. Taken together these institutions constitute 98 
percent of total microfinance outreach in the country10.  
The PMN consolidates and publishes this data in its quarterly bulletin MicroWatch. The 
more extensive dataset, which includes every outreach indicator for each institution since 
2006, was made available for this study through a negotiated agreement with the PMN. 
This will be the first time the dataset would be used to analyze district-level outreach 
differences between MFIs and MFBs.  
I construct the model using data from 24 quarters, that is, from the first quarter of 2007 to 
the last quarter of 2012. Pakistan’s four main provinces are sub-divided into 113 districts. 
And as of the first quarter of 2013, the microfinance sector has been able to reach a total 
of 92 districts (MicroWatch, 1st Quarter 2013).  
The PMN data is listed on the Microfinance Information Exchange (MiX), an online 
database of registered microfinance institutions across the globe. MiX is operated by the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), an independent policy and research 
center housed at the World Bank in Washington DC. MiX data has been used extensively 
in studies on microfinance outreach, including the influential study on depth of outreach 
by Cull et al (2008). 
                                                
10 Interview with Aban Haq, Chief Operating Officer, PMN (June 2012). 
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In addition, several academic publications originating from Pakistan have used PMN’s 
outreach data. Examples include Muhammad (2010), and Rauf and Mahmood (2009). 
International donor reports also use PMN data, for instance the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) 2008 publication and the UK Department for International 
Development’s (DFID) 2006 publication relied extensively on the PMN database.  As the 
primary databank of the microfinance sector in Pakistan, the PMN receives assistance 
from these institutions for capability building and institutional strengthening (DFID, 
2006). Thus, we can safely say that the PMN provides the most reliable and extensive 
data on microfinance outreach in Pakistan. 
But this data does not include information on borrower income or poverty status. 
However, as discussed above, there are other ways to measure depth of outreach, such as 
average loan size and district-level socioeconomic disparities.  
Since PMN collects district-wise data on the number of active borrowers as well as gross 
loan portfolio by institution, average loan size is easily computed by dividing the former 
with the latter. I compute this for every institution and then add up the district-wise 
quarterly outreach for MFBs as a whole and MFIs as a whole, to create two sets of panel 
data. The data is strongly balanced since outreach is either positive or zero. 
The second time series used in this analysis is the socioeconomic survey data collected by 
the Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan. 
 
B. Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey  
The Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM), published by 
the Federal Bureau of Statistics – a division of the Ministry of Finance – is a population-
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based survey of socioeconomic and living conditions. The survey is used to monitor the 
implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). The PRSP is a poverty 
reduction policy blueprint most developing countries are committed to developing, 
implementing and monitoring in order to remain eligible for foreign aid from 
international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
According to Pakistan’s PRSP, the country is committed to implementing 16 poverty-
reduction targets and monitoring 37 socioeconomic indicators, out of which the PSLM 
tracks 14 (Ministry of Finance, 2010). These targets are based on the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), ratified at the United Nations’ (UN) Millennium Summit 
by all 189 UN member countries, as a means to eradicating poverty across the global 
South.  
PSLM data is collected and published at the district and the provincial level. The 
provincial-level is conducted every year while the district-level is conducted every other 
year. So far, four district-level PSLM’s have been completed and published, including the 
PSLM 2004-05, PSLM 2006-07, PSLM 2008-09 and PSLM 2010-11.  
Since the PMN data is available quarterly, there is a period mismatch between the two 
surveys. This is dealt with using statistical imputation described later in this section. 
 
B. (i) Sampling and survey methodology 
The PSLM survey universe includes all urban and rural areas of the four provinces and 
the country capital, Islamabad, excluding military restricted areas. There are separate 
sampling frames for urban and rural areas. The urban area frame divides each city and 
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town into “enumeration blocks”, each consisting of 200-250 households. Each 
enumeration block is further divided into three categories: low, high and middle income 
(Ministry of Finance, 2010). 
The rural frame is based on the last population census conducted in 1998. In the 
provinces of Sindh, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), each district is defined as a 
strategic unit or stratum to develop the rural sampling frame. For the province of 
Balochistan, a larger geographical space, referred to as a “division”, is used to define 
each stratum, since it is the most sparsely populated province.  
The primary sampling unit (PSU) is the village in the case of rural areas and the 
enumeration block in the case of urban areas. The secondary sampling unit (SSU) is the 
household within each primary sampling unit. A total of 16 SSUs from each rural PSU 
and 12 SSUs from each urban PSU are included in the district-level survey. The 
following table provides the total number of rural and urban PSUs and SSUs:  
Table 3 Breakdown of PSLM Sampling Units 
Level Primary Sampling Units Secondary Sampling Units 
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
District 2333 3230 5563 27996 51680 79676 
   *Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan (2013) 
 
Indicator selection for the loan supply functions is informed by the capability approach, 
which was reviewed in Section I. The three dimensions of wellbeing used in the model 
are education, health and living standards.  
Since data on life expectancy, child and maternal mortality, the most commonly used 
indicators of health, is not available through the PSLM, I use the following indicators: the 
percentage of fully immunized children - based on parent recall and immunization 
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records, the percentage of pregnant women that received tetanus shots, and the 
percentage of births that took place in a government or private clinic. These indicators are 
meant to proxy infant and maternal health status. 
For measuring educational attainment, the UNDP’s HDI uses mean years of schooling 
and expected years of schooling, while the other measure of multi-dimensional 
deprivation, the MPI, uses average years of schooling and school attendance. Again this 
data is not available through the PSLM and the following indicators are used instead: the 
literacy rate for ages ten and older, primary enrollment rates for children between the 
ages of five and nine, and the percentage of the female population that has ever attended 
school. While literacy and enrollment rates are no longer considered ideal indicators for 
measuring actual educational attainment, the issue is data availability. The last indicator 
serves as an additional measure of gender-based disparities in education – an important 
dimension of the MDGs. 
Finally, for living standards the HDI uses income per capita, while the MPI includes 
measures of housing conditions and assets. The district-level PSLM does not collect data 
on income, but uses a subjective measure of economic wellbeing. It also includes data on 
housing facilities.  
The subjective measure is an economic perceptions indicator that asks respondents to 
measure their economic wellbeing relative to the year before. Responses are based on a 
five-point scale, with choices including much better, slightly better, the same, slightly 
worse and much worse. For this paper I add the “slightly worse” and “much worse” 
categories to create an indicator of subjective deprivation. In addition, I also include four 
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housing facilities indicators, including availability of tap water, availability of toilet 
facilities, availability of oil and gas for cooking purposes and the percentage of electrified 
households.  
 
Ratio of Urban Population 
Using Schreiner’s (2001) suggestion to include rural-urban differences, I also incorporate 
an urban population ratio into the model. Data for this comes from the 1998 census. Rural 
poverty in Pakistan is much more severe than urban poverty, which makes this ratio an 
important one to include in this analysis. Specifically, one-third of all rural households 
are extremely poor, but only eight percent of all urban households can be categorized as 
extremely poor (Naveed and Ali, 2012).  
The following table provides descriptive statistics for the main variables:  
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Average Loan Size - MFBs 
(in Rupees) 
13,119.73 6,494.36 0 53,502 
Average Loan Size – MFIs 
(in Rupees) 
10,836.25 4,634.93 0 37,168 
Economic perceptions – worse 
+ much worse 
0.3554 0.2045 0 1 
Percentage of urban population 
by district (1998 census) 
0.2213 0.1664 0 0.9475 
Indicators for Education: 
Literacy rate (10 and up) 0.5013 0.1495 0.0625 1 
Net primary enrollment (ages: 
5-9) 
0.5297 0.1522 0 1 
Percentage of females ever 
attended school 
0.3382 0.1826 0 0.81 
Indicators for Health: 
Percentage children fully 
immunized – based on record 
and recall 
0.7097 0.2183 0 1 
Percentage pregnant women 
received tetanus shot 
0.5345 0.2656 0 1 
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Percentage women delivering 
baby at private or government 
clinic 
0.3087 0.2017 0 1 
Indicators for Housing Utilities: 
Percentage homes electrified 0.84245 0.1905 0 1 
Percentage homes with tap 
water 
0.3136 0.2377 0 1 
Percentage homes with oil and 
gas avail. for cooking 
0.22 0.2444 0 1 
Percentage homes with toilet 0.7773 0.1819 0.13 1 
 
These indicators are used to develop loan supply functions for MFBs and MFIs, after 
performing a series of data manipulations, which are described below, but first I review 
the main limitations of the study related to issues of data availability and quality. 
 
C. Data Limitations 
Objections can be raised regarding the PMN dataset’s quality. The dataset constitutes 
self-reported data from each institution and despite the fact that the PMN runs regular 
quality checks, errors occur often, especially with smaller institutions that do not 
maintain the same level of quality control as the larger institutions. Therefore, in order to 
reduce the level of error, I have spent a considerable amount of time running trends on 
each institution’s data-series. The staff at the PMN has been extremely helpful and has 
gone over every outlier that I have pointed out to them and even gone back to check with 
the institutions in question to make sure the data was as error-free as possible.  
Data availability is a secondary, but nevertheless noteworthy issue with the microfinance 
outreach survey. As pointed out before the best measures of depth of outreach incorporate 
the borrower’s poverty status but this data is unavailable in the survey.  
Another important measure of outreach is interest, but again data on effective interest 
rates charged by each institution for the districts and time periods covered in this study 
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are unavailable for this study. All we know is that the average effective interest rates 
charged on microcredit are 35.9 percent (Shorebank International, 2011).  
As far as the PSLM is concerned, the only issue is data availability. For instance, income 
per capita is unavailable in the district-level PSLM and a subjective measure of economic 
wellbeing has to be used in its place.  
In addition, data on what are currently considered the ideal measures of health and 
educational status, such as actual time spent in school and infant and maternal mortality, 
is unavailable through the district-level PSLM. Instead less than ideal measures have to 
be used to proxy district-level socioeconomic development. 
Finally, I would have liked to incorporate conflict data into the model, since conflict has 
been a strong determinant of the extent to which microfinance has been able to reach the 
poor in Pakistan, as detailed in the Political Economy Chapter, but reliable district-level 
conflict data is hard to find. Currently, the most reliable source is the Armed Conflict and 
Event Dataset (ACLED), but they only have conflict data on Pakistan for the year 2008-
09, while data for the other years is currently in the process of being verified.  
Finally, there are other factors that should have been included in the model had the data 
on them been available. For instance, distance from the institutional headquarter is an 
important consideration for selecting the location of a branch, as are cultural 
considerations such as the segregation of the sexes and the stigma attached to women’s 
earnings in the remote districts of Pakistan, particularly Balochistan and KPK. It is a 
limitation of the model that it does not incorporate these factors. 
Nevertheless, the PSLM indicators used in the model do capture an important dimension 
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of the supply-side dynamics of microfinance outreach. The section below reviews the 
steps involved in preparing this data for analysis. 
 
D. Data Manipulations  
The first problem we have to deal with has to do with the period mismatch, since the 
PMN data is quarterly and the PSLM data is biennial. One simple approach for filling in 
the “missing” PSLM quarters is linear interpolation, which uses the first and last 
observed values between each missing period to make estimations. But linear 
interpolation presumes that the data moves in a smooth line, which is not a realistic 
assumption for the PSLM, which has a large degree of variation. Thus, a more 
sophisticated imputation technique has to be used here. The method I choose is referred 
to as single imputation employing stochastic regression.  
Generally speaking, imputation creates a balanced dataset in a way that minimizes bias. It 
does so by running a multivariate regression to produce conditional group means, 
medians or modes. Single imputation’s main limitation is that it assumes that imputed 
values are the same as observed values, which lowers standard errors and produces 
generous levels of significance, also referred to as over-fitting the data. In order to 
overcome this problem I artificially add random noise to the imputed series after running 
the regressions. The specific steps in the imputation process are detailed below. 
 
D. (ii) Single Imputation for Missing Values 
In the first stage, a regression model is developed with each socioeconomic indicator as 
the dependent variable and time and district serving as independent variables:  
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SEI = α + β1time + β2district + ɛ     Equation 2 
 
Where, SEI is the socioeconomic indicator, α the intercept term and ɛ the error term. β1 
and β2 are the coefficients of the independent variables. Missing data is imputed using 
mean values for each socioeconomic indicator from the regression. As mentioned above, 
using just the mean values to estimate the missing data will result in very high 
significance levels for all parameter estimates. 
To overcome this, artificial noise or randomness is added to the mean by randomly 
generating two continuous standard uniform distributions that vary between zero and one. 
The values generated from this distribution are also referred to as pseudo-random 
numbers. The distribution itself is stationary since its mean and variance do not vary 
overtime. This means that the series does not have a trend, that is, the past and present 
values of the series are not correlated, a phenomenon that would be called autocorrelation 
(Chatfield, 2004). This is an important attribute for a time series that is to be used for 
statistical modeling. Most statistical models require stationary series, and when this 
assumption is violated there is danger that the regression will show spurious correlations.  
By using the uniform distribution to create imputed values, we allow for the introduction 
of artificial noise, which reduces the problem of non-stationarity and over-fitting of the 
data.  
This involves taking the standard errors of time and district and multiplying them by the 
uniform distribution series and finally, adding them to the mean values estimated from 
the regression model. These steps are repeated for each of the 11 PSLM indicators 
included in this analysis. 
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D. (iii) Time Series Differencing  
While it can be assumed that we have adequately de-trended the rest of the 
socioeconomic variables by using the techniques described above, this may not be 
enough for the economic perceptions indicator. Recall that the economic perceptions 
indicator is correlated with the previous period, since it asks respondents to compare their 
present economic situation to the previous year. This results in the problem of 
autocorrelation. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that for this indicator we need to go 
one step further in order to make it a stationary series.  
One way to do this is to transform the indicator into a period-to-period difference series. 
If the series is first-differenced the change is calculated from one period to the next. 
Thus, if t1 denotes period one and t2 denotes period two, the first difference will be the 
difference in economic perceptions from t1 to t2. To test whether or not the series still has 
the problem of autocorrelation, I use the Levin-Lin-Chu test for unit root testing with 
panel data. The test confirms that the first-difference economic perceptions series is now 
stationary (output reproduced in Appendix A).  
The next step in the process is principal component analysis. 
 
D. (i) Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
PCA is a data-reducing technique used specifically when correlations between variables 
are suspected, making it redundant to use each variable separately. There is a high 
likelihood that the present set of indicators are correlated, for instance it is unlikely that 
the literacy rate is mutually exclusive of the percentage of women that ever attended 
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school.  
The PCA is also effective in reducing the observed number of variables to a smaller set of 
artificial indicators, called “principal components”. The PCA estimation equation is 
represented below: 
 Xi = ai1 F1 + ai12F2 + ………………… + aij + Fj   Equation 1 
Where, 
Xi is the ith development indicator,  
aij is the factor loading and represents the proportion of variation in Xi accounted for by 
factor j. 
And, Fj represents the jth factor. 
A statistical program, such as Stata, can be used to calculate a factor loaded composite 
index for the indicators. The first few factors account for the maximum variation. 
Eigenvalues measure the amount of variation observed in the actual data that is explained 
by each principal component. For this paper, I use factors that have eigenvalues of at 
least 0.5, that is, factors that explain at least 50 percent of the variation in the underlying 
indicators. I create three sets of principal components or factors: one for education, 
another for health and a third for availability of housing utilities.  
For education, the first factor alone accounts for 82 percent of the variation across all 
three educational indicators and is the only factor with an eigenvalue greater than 0.5. 
The factor loadings for this factor, referred to in the subsequent analysis simply as 
“education”, are provided below: 
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Table 5 Factor Loadings for Education 
Education Indicators  Factor 
Loading 
Literacy rate (age: 10 and up) 0.9543 
Primary enrollment rate (ages: 5-9)  0.8772 
Percentage of females ever attended 
school 
0.8834 
 
The table indicates that 95.43 percent of the variation in the education factor is accounted 
for by the literacy rate, 87.72 percent by the primary enrollment rate and 88.34 percent by 
the female school attendance rate. 
For health, I use two factors that together account for 92 percent of the variation in health 
status, these two factors each have eigenvalues greater than 0.5. 
	  
Table 6 Factor Loadings for Health 
Health Indicators Factor Loadings 
 Women Children 
Percentage children fully 
immunized 
0.1983 0.9599 
Percentage pregnant women 
receiving tetanus shot 
0.6941 0.6116 
Percentage women 
delivering baby at private or 
government clinic 
0.9556 0.1783 
 
We can see from Table 6 that the first factor titled “women” is defined by women’s 
pregnancy and delivery related variables, while the second is most strongly associated 
with immunization rates for children.  
For housing utilities, I use the first three factors that together account for 88 percent of 
the variation in the data and with eigenvalues greater than 0.5 in each case. The factor 
loadings are represented below: 
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Table 7 Factor Loadings for Housing Utilities 
Housing Utility 
Indicators 
Factor Loadings 
 Toilet & 
electricity 
Cooking fuel Tap water 
Toilet 0.6432 0.5386 0.0164 
Electricity 0.9240 0.1849 0.0834 
Cooking – Oil and Gas 0.2103 0.9361 0.1227 
Tap water 0.0587 0.0931 0.9927 
 
Table 7 indicates that the first factor, “toilet and electricity” is defined by the availability 
of toilets and electrification rates; the second, “cooking fuel” by availability of oil and 
gas for cooking fuel; and the third, by availability of tap water for household use.  
Finally, we move to estimating the regression model. 
 
E. Estimating The Regression Model 
 
There are two dependent variables, one for each loan supply function. The first is the 
probability of a positive microfinance presence and the second is average loan size. For 
each function the principal components of the district-wise socioeconomic indicators and 
the urban population ratio serve as the model’s independent variables.  
The model is referred to as a “corner solution”. In corner solution models, the dependent 
variable is continuous, and takes the value of either zero or some other positive number. 
As the name suggests, corner solution models refer to cases where the data for the 
dependent variable is truncated and “piles up” at a given value, but is continuous 
otherwise. Equation 4 and 5 show the statistical specification of corner solution models 
(Burke, 2009): 
yi = yi∗ if yi∗ > 0   Equation 4 
 73 
yi = 0 if yi∗ ≤ 0 
and, yi∗ =α+Xiβ+εi   Equation 5 
Where yi is the dependent variable and Xi the independent variable. 
For the loan supply function this means that the average loan size per district per quarter 
is either zero or higher, that is, there is no possibility of a negative loan size. This is 
essentially an institution-level maximization problem, as discussed in Section II. The 
maximization problem here consists of where to locate, based on the costs and benefits of 
operating in each district.  
The literature talks about transaction cost differences between lending to the poor versus 
the non-poor. In a similar fashion, there are significant cost differences between operating 
in more developed versus less developed regions and this is often an important 
contributing factor in the decision to locate. It is plausible that there will be times when 
not maintaining a presence in a particular district will be the optimal choice and in this 
case the average loan will be zero, which then is the corner solution. For other districts, 
the optimal choice will involve maintaining an active presence and the probability of 
positive outreach here will be greater than zero. The clustering at zero has to be for a non-
trivial part of the population in order for the model to give meaningful results 
(Woolridge, 2008). In this case, the MFB model has 30.46 percent clustering at zero 
while the MFI version has 38.75 percent clustering at zero. 
The simplest way to estimate the outreach model would have involved applying ordinary 
least squares (OLS), often the first model to be considered for establishing a linear 
relationship between a dependent variable and a set of independent variables. However, 
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the linearity assumption needed for OLS is violated in corner solution models, because a 
high proportion of the observed independent variables are associated with the dependent 
variable being equal to zero (Woolridge, 2009). Thus, a more sophisticated regression 
such as Tobit can be considered for estimating the loan supply function. 
Tobit models are used specifically to estimate the relationship between non-negative 
dependent variables and a set of independent variables. In other words, Tobit models are 
employed when the dependent variable is constrained and there is a clustering of 
observations at the constraint.  
Tobit essentially provides answers to two questions. The first is referred to as the 
participation decision. In the case of microfinance outreach, the participation decision has 
to do with the location of a microfinance branch in each district. The second question is 
the amount decision, which in this case refers to the average loan size for each district, 
given a positive presence. Tobit uses one mechanism to provide a single answer to both 
questions. This is a limitation of Tobit since ideally each question should be treated 
separately.  
Another limitation of Tobit is that it has the same assumptions as the OLS model. 
Specifically, the Tobit model will result in inconsistent results if the model’s error term εi 
is not normally distributed or if the error term is heteroskedastic. This is a major 
drawback. Thus, the choice of Tobit is problematic both from the theoretical and the 
statistical viewpoints. 
For the initial estimation, I tested the model using Tobit and plotted the fitted values of 
the regression against the residuals. The plot indicated that the error term was 
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heteroskedastic. A Lagrange Multiplier test also confirmed heteroskedasticity. But a plot 
of the error term indicted that it was normally distributed. 
The problem of heteroskedascity is effectively taken care of, as long as the error term is 
normally distributed, by employing a double-hurdle model, also called a two-tier model. 
The double-hurdle model is essentially a generalized version of the standard Tobit model, 
but is an improvement upon Tobit in that it has a separate mechanism for estimating the 
participation decision and the amount decision (Burke, 2009).  
The double-hurdle model has been found to produce significantly better estimates than 
the Tobit (Stewart, 2009). Double-hurdle models are designed to account for the presence 
of heteroskedascity but not for non-normality, which we saw from applying Tobit is not a 
problem with the current model. The double-hurdle model I use is called Cragg’s Tobit 
Alternative, operationalized by Burke (2009) and used in recent studies on various global 
development issues, particularly agricultural economics (e.g. Ghebru and Holden, 2013; 
Fernandez et al, 2009).  
The model is estimated in two steps. The first uses Probit to estimate the probability of a 
positive outreach and the second uses a truncated normal regression to estimate expected 
average loan values.  
Probit is a binary response model in which the dependent variable can take either one of 
two values. It is usually used to predict the probability of an event occurring or not 
occurring, in this case, whether or not there is an actual microfinance presence in a 
particular time and place.  
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A truncated regression is one where part of the data is missing. A truncated normal model 
is simply a truncated regression where the dependent variable is normally distributed. 
Combining these two processes gives us the Cragg double-hurdle model. As Buraimo 
(2010) notes, there are three components to Cragg’s Tobit Alternative: observed 
engagement, a participation equation and an engagement equation.  
The double-hurdle model is advantageous because it allows us to see how various factors 
impact each decision separately. The Cragg double-hurdle is especially useful because it 
has an option that allows for standard errors to be heteroskedascitic, as long as the 
observations are observable, which is the case with corner solution models in general. 
The specification for determining the marginal impact of each independent variable on 
the dependent variable is specified as follows for each tier (Burke, 2009): 
 
Tier 1: Probability (AV) = f (PCAe, PCAh, PCAhsg, U, EP)  Equation 6 
Tier2: AV= f (PCAe, PCAh, PCAhsg, U, EP)    Equation 7 
 
The model assumes that Tier 1 and Tier 2, that is, the probit and the truncated normal 
regression, are unassociated with each other and are estimated separately. Which makes 
sense since empirically we know that the decision to locate in a particular district is 
distinct from considerations affecting the average loan size, such as the socioeconomic 
status of the target market, the lending arrangement – group or individual – and 
institutional gender targets (Cull et al, 2008). In Pakistan, gender targeting is done mainly 
by MFIs, many of whom lend exclusively to women. MFBs, on the other hand, maintain 
modest gender targets if at all.  
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While the model does not have a variable that captures the impact of gender, the graphs 
in Section II describe trends in gender-based outreach for both institutional groups.  
The predict option in Stata is used after running the hurdle model to estimate the 
coefficients for each tier. The first tier estimates the marginal probability, that is, the 
partial effect of each independent variable on the probability that microfinance presence 
will be positive for each district and period. The second tier estimates represent the 
expected value of the average loan size associated with each independent variable. The 
Stata output with details on coefficient estimation using Stata’s predict function is 
provided in Appendix A. 
After estimating these coefficients, I test for the robustness of the model by separately 
running a Probit regression to confirm Tier 1 findings and a truncated regression model to 
confirm Tier 2 findings. The separate estimation results are identical to the Cragg model 
estimates. 
For the significance testing of Tier 1 estimates, Burke (2009) recommends running a 
Probit regression and using it to test for the significance of each Tier 1 parameter. For 
Tier 2 significance testing, Burke (2009) has developed a bootstrap routine. I run this 
routine with 100 iterations (results reproduced in Appendix A) and verify the results by 
also running a truncated regression. Finally, to test for the validity of the overall model 
specification I use a Wald test, which works by testing the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients associated with each independent variable are jointly equal to zero. The null 
in this case is rejected because the p-value is equal to zero, which confirms that each 
coefficient adds value to the model. Section IV presents findings from this model. 
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IV. Main Findings 
The table below summarizes the main results of the estimation. The column titled “Tier 
1” includes the partial effect of each independent variable on the probability of a positive 
microfinance presence. The column titled “Tier 2” represents the conditional average 
partial effect (CAPE) of each independent variable on the average loan value.  
	  
Table 8 Tier 1 and Tier 2 Parameter Estimates 
 MFBs MFIs 
Variable Tier 1 
(partial effect 
on 
probability) 
Tier 2 
(CAPE) 
 
Tier 1 
(partial effect 
on 
probability) 
Tier 2 
(CAPE) 
Education 0.049*** 
(0.003) 
-1142.15 
(0.783) 
0.084*** 
(0.000) 
-108.66** 
(0.012) 
Women  -0.0035 
(0.797) 
2361.15*** 
(0.000) 
0.0338* 
(0.048) 
397.13*** 
(0.009) 
Children 0.0145 
(0.215) 
697.81** 
(0.018) 
0.0358*** 
(0.003) 
-138.60* 
(0.077) 
Toilet and 
electricity 
-0.0118 
(0.288) 
831.48* 
(0.058) 
-0.0406*** 
(0.001) 
-373.88*** 
(0.005) 
Tap water -0.0089 
(0.399) 
-
1294.09*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0349*** 
(0.003) 
-509.21*** 
(0.000) 
Cooking fuel -0.0587*** 
(0.000) 
283.40** 
(0.020) 
-0.0743*** 
(0.000) 
-156.90*** 
(0.000) 
Economic 
perceptions 
(first diff.) 
0.051 
(0.670) 
1940.16 
(0.799) 
-0.143 
(0.936) 
-635.65 
(0.901) 
Urban  
population 
1.677*** 
(0.000) 
5451.50*** 
(0.000) 
1.628*** 
(0.000) 
-3963.50*** 
(0.000) 
*** represents significance at the one percent level, ** represents significance at the five percent 
level and * represents significance at the ten percent level. P-values are provided within 
parentheses next to coefficient estimates. 
 
The results confirm that the socioeconomic and demographic status of each district is a 
significant determinant of depth of outreach, for both MFBs and MFIs.  
The two indicators of outreach this model employs are the probability of a positive 
microfinance presence and average loan size. The findings suggest that MFIs are more 
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likely to locate in less developed districts than MFBs. The same is true for average loan 
size. In fact, MFI loans are on average higher in less developed districts than in more 
developed ones. 
The indicator that seems to have the strongest influence on both the decision to locate and 
the average loan size for MFIs and MFBs is the urban population ratio. The indicator that 
appears to have the least impact on outreach for both groups is the economic perceptions 
indicator.  
The sections that follow review the impact of socioeconomic and demographic 
differences between districts on each measure of depth of outreach. 
 
IV.A. Partial Effects on the Decision to Locate  
The education factor is strongly significant and appears to be positively associated with 
the decision to locate, for both MFIs and MFBs. As educational levels improve, the 
probability that an MFI or an MFB branch will open in a district is likely to increase. 
Health-related indicators, however, do not seem to be a good predictor of the probability 
that an MFB will open a branch in a particular district. On the other hand, the probability 
that an MFI branch will be located in a particular district is strongly associated with 
better immunization rates for children.  
Housing facility indicators do not seem to affect the decision to locate for the typical 
MFB, with the exception of the cooking fuel indicator, which has a small but negative 
association with the probability of a positive MFB presence.  
For MFIs, as housing facilities improve the probability of a positive institutional presence 
goes down. This is consistent with the heavy rural presence of MFIs, where such facilities 
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are largely absent.  
The urban population ratio indicates that both MFIs and MFBs are more likely to operate 
in districts where the urban population is a higher proportion of the total population. 
Since each district has a varying proportion of rural and urban populations, this does not 
undermine the earlier statement that MFIs as a group have a heavy rural presence. 
 
IV.B. Conditional Average Partial Effect on Average Loan Size 
The second depth of outreach indicator in this model is average loan size. Education 
seems only to affect MFI loan sizes, which go down by a small amount when education 
indicators improve.  
Indicators for the health status of a population, seem to have a much more significant 
impact on MFBs. A one unit improvement in women’s health-status increases average 
MFB loan sizes by Rs.2,361 and MFI loan sizes by only Rs.397, indicating that MFBs 
are much more sensitive than MFIs to this important socioeconomic indicator. 
Housing facilities affect average loan sizes of MFIs more than MFBs. The results indicate 
that MFI loans are on average smaller for districts with better housing facilities, which 
makes sense when considered with the results of the urban population ratio.  
In the case of MFBs, higher urban populations increase average loan sizes by Rs. 5,451, 
which is a sizeable value given that the mean average MFB loan size is only Rs. 13,120. 
But the relationship for MFIs is reversed. MFI average loans are lower by nearly 
Rs.4,000 for more urban districts as compared to less urban districts.  
While the MFB result makes intuitive sense, since urban populations are less poor and 
can handle higher denomination loans as compared to rural populations, the MFI result 
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requires closer examination. Recall from Chapter 1 that microcredit was first offered in 
Pakistan through the rural support programs (RSPs), which currently constitute 50 
percent of total MFI active borrowers (Microwatch, 2013). Thus, the fact that rural MFI 
loans are higher than urban MFI loans is simply evidence of “progressive lending”. Since 
loan sizes go up with each successive cycle, the newer and more urban MFIs are likely to 
have smaller average loans than the RSPs.  
Therefore, while the MFB results imply crowding out of the rural population, the MFI 
results indicate progressive lending, which is not inconsistent with the developmental 
mission of microfinance. Nevertheless, it is important to see how MFIs that are not RSPs 
perform on indicators of outreach. 
 
IV.C. The Case of Non-RSPs 
Table 9 below shows how the MFI group estimates change significantly when the RSPs 
are removed from the equation. The results indicate that the non-RSP MFI sector is much 
less likely to be affected by the socioeconomic differences between districts. The only 
indicators that can predict the probability of a positive MFI presence in this modified 
model are an increase in the urban population ratio, improvement in women’s health and 
a decrease in the availability of oil and gas for cooking. Similarly, only the urban 
population ratio and the cooking fuel indicator have a significant impact on average loan 
sizes for non-RSP MFIs.  
The results makes intuitive sense since we would expect NGOs to be a lot less sensitive 
than the commercially run MFBs to district level socioeconomic differences when 
making the decision of where to locate. Their location is more likely to be based on 
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considerations such as the founders’ social mission and existing social network, at least 
initially. The considerations for average loan size are also likely to be more varied, 
especially since many MFIs primarily target women and this variable has not been 
included in the model thanks to data unavailability at the district level. 
The only surprising result is that the urban population indicator remains a strong 
predictor of the probability of the non-RSP group’s presence in a particular district. 
Similarly, the urban population indicator suggests that urban average loans are much 
lower than rural average loans for the non-RSP MFIs. 
	  
Table 9 Tier 1 and Tier 2 Parameter Estimates for Non-RSPs 
 Non-RSP MFIs MFIs 
Variable Tier 1 
(partial effect 
on 
probability) 
Tier 2 
(CAPE) 
 
Tier 1 
(partial effect 
on 
probability) 
Tier 2 
(CAPE) 
Education 0.025 
(0.142) 
324 
(0.532) 
0.084*** 
(0.000) 
-108.66** 
(0.012) 
Women  0.0579*** 
(0.001) 
-67.04 
(0.841) 
0.0338* 
(0.048) 
397.13*** 
(0.009) 
Children -0.004 
(0.734) 
-354.81 
(0.104) 
0.0358*** 
(0.003) 
-138.60* 
(0.077) 
Toilet and 
electricity 
-0.191 
(0.208) 
-298.28 
(0.487) 
-0.0406*** 
(0.001) 
-373.88*** 
(0.005) 
Tap water 0.025* 
(0.080) 
-64.93 
(0.774) 
-0.0349*** 
(0.003) 
-509.21*** 
(0.000) 
Cooking fuel -0.056*** 
(0.000) 
-615.17*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0743*** 
(0.000) 
-156.90*** 
(0.000) 
Economic 
perceptions 
(first diff.) 
-0.030 
(0.824) 
210.66 
(0.932) 
-0.143 
(0.936) 
-635.65 
(0.901) 
Urban  
population 
1.14*** 
(0.000) 
-
4893.38*** 
(0.004) 
1.628*** 
(0.000) 
-3963.50*** 
(0.000) 
*** represents significance at the one percent level, ** represents significance at the five percent 
level and * represents significance at the ten percent level. P-values are provided within 
parentheses next to coefficient estimates. 
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V. Conclusion 
This study confirms that commercialization has compromised the financial inclusion 
objectives of microfinance. By examining the patterns of outreach and considering the 
impact of socioeconomic and demographic differences between districts on indicators of 
depth of outreach it is clear that the more commercialized institutions, that is, the MFBs 
have targeted the more urban, less vulnerable and better-off clients. While MFB clients 
on average receive larger loans than MFI clients; to a great extent, women, rural 
households and the poorest are crowded out of the MFB market. MFIs, on the other hand, 
are geared towards smaller loans, poorer borrowers, women, and rural areas. 
Nevertheless, the estimation results indicate that the non-RSP MFIs are much less 
sensitive to district level socioeconomic differences than the MFI group as a whole. 
These conclusions have important implications for public policy, especially since 
Pakistan’s PRSP clearly states that only by commercializing microfinance institutions can 
the sector’s financial inclusion objectives be achieved. This policy has been 
operationalized by offering several incentives, such as a five-year tax holiday, to the 
larger MFIs should they transform into MFBs. In addition, MFBs are offered grants, 
subsidized lending arrangements and loan guarantee facilities. These incentives have 
resulted in the MFB sector growing faster than the MFI sector in the past few years. But 
the results of this study suggest that the Government of Pakistan’s faith in 
commercialization as a vehicle of financial inclusion is misplaced. 
The study is also a useful starting point for analyzing the full impact of 
commercialization on the development goals of the microfinance sector. Qualitative 
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research findings, presented in the next four chapters, confirm and expand upon each of 
the findings provided here and allow us to create a much more nuanced picture of how 
the microfinance sector’s mission to alleviate poverty and reduce gender based disparities 
has been affected by the pressure to become financially sustainable. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, MISSION AND OUTCOMES 
 
The traditional microcredit model consists of group-based lending in which all members 
of the group are jointly liable for each other’s loans. Joint liability reduces the lender’s 
risk and the borrower is freed from the need to provide collateral. This model is often 
referred to as the “Grameen model” after the institution set up by Muhammad Yunus in 
Jobra Village, Bangladesh (Grameen Bank, 2011).  
As discussed in the previous chapter, commercialization has led to not just an evolution 
in the lending arrangements but also in the institutional structure itself. Initially, all 
institutions that offered microcredit were referred to as microfinance institutions or MFIs. 
Even now, the term persists in many circles as a blanket reference to any and all 
institutions conducting microfinance business, even though the organizational structure 
now varies widely and includes registered as well as unregistered nonprofits, private as 
well as public, bank and non-bank financial institutions (Basu, Blavy and Yulek, 2004; 
Jansson and Taborga, 2000).  
Institutional models often vary by country and region. For instance, in Bangladesh the 
Grameen-style nonprofit is still the most popular version (Karim, 2011). In India, credit 
and savings cooperatives called self-help groups (SHGs) work alongside commercial and 
nonprofit non-bank financial institutions (Reddy and Manak, 2005). In Indonesia, 
microfinance is offered by nonprofits as well as by the specialized microfinance “units” 
 90 
of local commercial banks (Meagher, et. al., 2006). In some Latin American countries, 
such as Bolivia and Mexico, microfinance has reached rapid scale mainly through the rise 
of microfinance banks (MFBs), which are essentially commercial banks conducting 
microfinance business (Schipani, 2012). The most prominent examples include Bolivia’s 
BancoSol and Mexico’s Compartamos. MFBs can also be found in Africa. In fact, 
Nigeria has 820 registered MFBs (Udoh, 2012). Kenya (Ryan and Seel, 2009) and 
Tanzania (Kanayi, 2010) also have active MFB sectors. Others, such as Ghana and South 
Africa, have preferred to stay with the traditional model, allowing their larger MFIs to 
grow into for-profit non-bank financial institutions. Microfinance in sub-Saharan Africa, 
on the other hand, has not graduated to independent commercially viable institutions 
(Ryan and Seel, 2009). Thus, the dominant institutional form in each country seems to be 
determined in part by the sector’s stage of development and in part by specific regulatory 
regimes (Meagher, et. al., 2006).  
In the case of Pakistan, the subject of this case study, the MFI and MFB models are at 
present equally dominant. This essay compares the mission, practice and borrower 
experiences of MFIs versus MFBs in Pakistan to broaden our understanding about how 
moving into the mainstream financial sector has affected microfinance’s effectiveness as 
an anti-poverty intervention.  
Previous studies have approached the subject either from the institution’s point of view 
(e.g. Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Rhyne, 2005; Christen, 2001) or the client’s (e.g. 
Karim, 2011; Sanyal, 2009; Banerjee et. al., 2009). What is missing from these 
assessments is a full account of the relevance of institutional form on microfinance’s 
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effectiveness as an anti-poverty scheme. This essay seeks to bridge the existing gap in 
three ways. First, by presenting a through comparative analysis of MFIs versus MFBs. 
Second, by analyzing how organizational structure impacts institutional practices, 
including client outreach and the institutional parameters of transparency, reliability and 
flexibility - especially relevant for microfinance (Roodman, 2012). Third, by considering 
how institutional practice impacts clients’ poverty related experiences.  
For this study, I determined qualitative research, specifically a case-study approach, to be 
the most suitable methodology. First of all, no quantitative dataset currently in existence 
can adequately answer questions of effectiveness from both the institution’s and the 
client’s point of view. Secondly, while research on microfinance has always been heavily 
quantitative, most recently, there has been recognition that more qualitative research is 
needed to understand the complexities of when, why and how microfinance works to 
achieve its developmental objectives (Roodman, 2011; Huda, 2012). 
This research employs semi-structured interviews and observations. A total of 88 key 
informant and practitioner interviews were conducted at the senior, middle and lower 
management levels, as well 52 interviews of currently active microcredit clients. The 
qualitative data also includes 12 day-long observations of client-practitioner interaction. 
The data is analyzed using a multi-disciplinary conceptual framework, informed by the 
fields of organizational theory and development economics. Organizational theory, 
specifically social entrepreneurship theory, frames the discussion on institutional form, 
mission and practice (Dorado, 2006; Battilana and Dorado, 2010), while borrower 
experiences are analyzed using the capability approach (Sen, 1999; Alkire, 2007).  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: first, a description of the study’s conceptual 
framework; second, a section on research questions, methodology, data and study 
limitations; third, a description of the main findings; and finally, a concluding section on 
discussion of findings.    
I. Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework draws upon social entrepreneurship theory and the capability 
approach. This study is concerned with the experience of institutions as well as 
borrowers. Social enterprise theory frames the discussion on institutions, while the 
capability approach is used to develop multiple indicators for analyzing the experience of 
borrowers. 
 
I.A. Microfinance Institutions as Social Enterprises 
The recent rise in critical research on microfinance has concerned itself with the apparent 
contradiction between the sector’s zeal to become financially sustainable and its original 
mission of poverty reduction (Nugroho and O'Hara, 2008; Morduch and Haley, 2002). 
Some call it “mission drift” (Augsburg and Fouillet, 2010) while others argue that in its 
sustainability-seeking commercialized form, microfinance actually ends up hurting the 
poor (Karim, 2011; Bateman, 2010). The push towards financial sustainability, though 
relatively recent, is quite strong. Not only are commercial MFIs and MFBs expected to 
become profit-making institutions (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch, 2008), donor 
driven nonprofits are also increasingly required to demonstrate financial viability while 
delivering on their social mission (Nugroho and O'Hara, 2008; Morduch and Haley, 
2002). One way to evaluate institutions on their poverty alleviation promise is by 
 93 
applying social enterprise theory. 
Social enterprise ventures (SEVs) are institutions that are designed to solve specific 
social problems (Bornstein, 2010; Johnson, 2000) in a financially sustainable manner 
(Dorado, 2006). Social enterprise theory analyzes, even promotes, the proliferation of 
SEVs in the social sector, a space once only occupied by nonprofits and the state (Phills, 
Deiglmeier and Miller, 2008). What distinguishes SEVs from other institutional forms is 
their dual emphasis on financial sustainability and solving social problems (Mair and 
Marti, 2006; Pomerantz, 2003). Theoretically, SEVs are distinct because whether they are 
nonprofit or for-profit in legal form, their social mission takes precedence over 
profitmaking (Dacin, Dacin and Matear, 2011). This social mission is nearly always 
related to poverty or empowerment in one way or another (Seelos, Mair, Battilana and 
Dacin, 2010).  
Social enterprise theorists have applied different categorizations to the growing number 
of SEVs. For instance, Peredo and McLean (2006) classify SEVs based on the strength of 
their mission, while Dorado (2006) categorizes based on forms of governance. Peredo 
and McLeon (2006) find that SEVs place different degrees of emphasis on their mission. 
At one extreme are institutions, which insist their social mission, and not wealth creation, 
is the central focus of their enterprise. If wealth is created it is only a means to an end and 
certainly not the requirement of social entrepreneurial activity (Dees, Emerson and 
Economy, 2002). Further along this spectrum are institutions, sometimes referred to as 
double bottom-line institutions (Davis, 1997). The double bottom-line refers to the 
simultaneous pursuit of financial and social returns (The Northland Institute, 2001). At 
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the far end are profit-seeking enterprises, which also seek a social end (Peredo and 
McLean, 2006).  
Dorado’s (2006) classification is based on forms of governance. She develops three 
distinct categories. The first is the non-profit SEV that employs a business model, the 
second the for-profit SEV for whom social goals are central, and finally the cross-sector 
SEV, an institution or even a movement which aims at solving a particular social 
problem. The profit motive is largely irrelevant for the third type and so is institutional 
permanence, if the problem for which it was created is solved or the goals met, the SEV 
is disbanded.  
These categorizations provide a useful classification system for the different types of 
microfinance institutions operating in Pakistan. The figure below maps Dorado’s 
categories onto the sector: 
 
Figure 5: SEVs and the Microfinance Sector in Pakistan 
 
 
 
Broadly speaking, Pakistani MFIs fit the non-profit SEV category. Most of them are 
nonprofits committed to providing low-income clients with financial services. Typical 
MFBs fit the second category. For-profit SEVs, also referred to as double bottom-line 
institutions or hybrids, are run like regular enterprises (Dorado, 2006). In the same vein, 
MFBs operate like ordinary commercial banks, the only difference being that they have a 
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mandate to provide financial services to the poor.  
Dorado (2006) describes the third type, that is, cross-sector SEVs as institutions for 
whom the profit motive is the least relevant. Even the development of a new organization 
is not the primary motivation for its entrepreneur, rather it is the creation of a path 
designed to alleviate a complex social problem. In the Pakistani case, the MFI Akhuwat, 
a zero-interest based microcredit NGO, fits this third category. Unlike other MFIs and 
MFBs, Akhuwat is unconcerned about earning economic returns, and depends almost 
entirely on individual charitable donations rather than lines of credit, soft loans, 
institutional grants or even interest on the loans it extends to its clients. Akhuwat’s path is 
aligned instead to the Islamic principles of brotherhood and generosity (Saqib, 2011) and 
yet it has been able to scale-up its operations successfully as described in Section III 
below.  
 
I.A.i. SEV Type and Institutional Mission  
Classifying microfinance institutions as social enterprises is not a new idea (e.g. Alter, 
2007; Dunford, 2000) but the question is can this categorization help us understand how 
these institutions perceive their own poverty alleviation agenda and how this gets 
translated into strategy and practice? 
Social enterprise theory tells us that SEVs realize that success cannot be measured in 
strictly financial terms, since one of their main aims is to solve a social problem (Mair 
and Marti, 2004). But it is also clear that not all SEVs are the same and it makes sense to 
see social enterprises along a spectrum determined by the degree to which they value 
their social mission (Alter, 2007; Dees, 1998). This also implies that by rigidly 
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classifying institutions into two groups, that is, MFIs and MFBs will not enable a 
meaningful comparison. Differences within groups are at least as important as the 
differences between them. Nevertheless, we can begin with making a simplifying 
categorization based on Dorado’s suggested classifications. On average, we can expect 
MFIs to emphasize the social objective of poverty alleviation more than MFBs, since 
MFBs as banking institutions are under much more pressure to generate profits. This is 
why many have expressed concern about the long-run sustainability of the social mission 
of commercial microfinance organizations (e.g. Rhyne, 2005; Christen, 2001).  
The case of MFBs created as spinoffs of larger MFIs needs to be addressed specifically. 
Battilana and Dorado (2010) describe the double challenge such institutions face - not 
only do they need to work hard to survive as new ventures, they also have to learn to 
balance the banking and development logics to avoid “mission drift”. The section on 
findings will shed light on this special case. But one key aspect of this study is how an 
institution’s mission and actual practice impacts its borrowers. Practice is measured in 
terms of client outreach, the institutional parameters of transparency, reliability and 
flexibility (Roodman, 2012), while findings related to borrower experiences are framed 
by the capability approach, which is briefly reviewed below.  
 
I.B. The Capability Approach and Client Experiences 
Assessing client level impact in microfinance has been both difficult and controversial. In 
the 1990s, research on the subject focused on quantitatively driven survey data and used 
ratios such as the proportion of repeat clients or repayment rates to establish success 
(Fenton, 2010; Cohen, 2002). Not surprisingly, the numbers were positive and 
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microfinance received glowing reviews, since growth was rapid and repayment rates 
extremely high (e.g. Pitt and Khandker, 1998).  
In 2009, the results of the first randomized control trials on microfinance demonstrated 
that while it did have a small but significant positive impact on entrepreneurship, it did 
not improve multi-dimensional indicators of poverty and wellbeing such as health, 
education or empowerment (Banerjee et. al., 2009; Karlan and Zinman, 2010).  
The concept of multi-dimensional poverty is informed by the capability approach. The 
traditional measure of poverty in economics has always been income, which has defined 
a uni-dimensional poverty line (Alkire and Sarwar, 2009). The capability approach 
moves the discussion on poverty away from a single-minded focus on income to one that 
incorporates inadequacy of food, clothing, shelter, self-esteem, employment 
opportunities, and market access (Sen, 2000).  
The theory has two essential elements: capabilities and functions. Capabilities are the 
freedoms people have to lead the kind of lives they value, while functions are the state of 
being or doing valued by the individual. Thus, the capability approach views poverty as 
deprivation of the freedoms people value (Alkire, 2007). People are poor when their 
opportunities are limited and the means to ensure their wellbeing do not exist for them.  
As a development construct, this theory has been instrumental in shaping the human 
development approach, a development paradigm that informs policy choice in several 
areas, including poverty (Fukuda-Parr, 2003).  
Thanks to the capability approach, the multidimensional view to poverty and wellbeing 
has entered the mainstream since the 1990s (Alkire and Sarwar, 2009). Academics 
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routinely turn to this approach to analyze development interventions (e.g. Tao, 2010; 
Ferrero and Zepeda, 2006). The question is how does this theory evaluate the 
effectiveness of microfinance? 
From the capability perspective, if financial exclusion means the poor do not have access 
to formal sources of credit then anything that helps them overcome this improves their 
capabilities. Thus, the theory can actually provide a rewarding framework for proponents 
of microfinance (see for example Cabraal, 2011; Mohindra and Haddad, 2005).  
On the other hand, the capability approach stresses that true development must enhance 
total individual wellbeing. In other words, the concern here is with combined capabilities 
(Nussbaum, 2002) rather than individual ones. This implies that if microcredit only 
improves access to formal credit, without a commensurate increase in other aspects of 
poverty such as health, and education, it may measure poorly against other poverty 
reducing interventions such as job creation in the formal sector, where employee health 
benefits and other opportunities for enhancement in wellbeing are also offered.  
One challenge in using the capability approach is figuring out how to operationalize it 
(Comim, 2001). Because of the rich array of desired capabilities Amartya Sen, its 
primary author, provides there are practical issues to consider such as which one to place 
above others, and how exactly to value a particular set of capabilities (Sugden, 1993). 
Alkire (2005) refers to this as Sen’s “fundamental or assertive incompleteness”. She 
defends him by saying that no one list of capabilities can be made relevant to every 
assessment or evaluation. She argues instead for a participatory approach in developing a 
list of capabilities, keeping the local context in view.  
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Using Alkire’s suggestion, I develop the following set of indicators to assess the 
experiences of microcredit clients in Pakistan. These include both economic and non-
economic measures. The economic measures include: setting up of a new business or the 
expansion of an existing business as a direct result of the loan; self-perception of 
improvement in economic wellbeing; and reduced reliance on informal borrowing. 
The choice of economic measures is based on the existing literature. As reviewed in 
chapter 1, the primary purpose of microcredit has been to allow the poor to set up a new 
enterprise or expand an existing one. The businesses of the poor across the global South 
are generally considered to be high return ventures (Field et. al., 2012), with an estimated 
average marginal return to capital of 100 percent per annum (Huegerich, 2012). If this is 
correct we should expect the perception of wellbeing among borrower households to rise 
significantly.  
The second indicator measures self-perception. Self-perception has become an 
increasingly popular measure of wellbeing in economics (see for example Cracolici, 
Giambona and Cuffaro, 2011; Hoyo and Seifert, 2002). Scholars argue that self-
perception of economic wellbeing should be included in economic analysis for the simple 
reason that perception is after all a key target of economic policy, even if it does not 
exactly measure actual welfare. Critics argue that non-economic factors, such as marital 
status, can affect self-perception as it relates to economic wellbeing, making it hard to 
determine the extent to which respondents’ perception of economic wellbeing is free 
from non-economic effects (Cuffaro, 2011). However, this problem is avoided here since 
multiple measures of wellbeing are employed. 
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Apart from spurring entrepreneurship, another major goal of microfinance is to reduce 
the reliance of the poor on informal sources of credit, such as borrowing from friends and 
family or the village moneylender (Collins et. al, 2009). The third indicator will measure 
the extent to which microcredit has reduced reliance on informal sources of credit among 
the borrowers in my sample. 
These three economic wellbeing measures should be able to inform us of the extent to 
which the institutions in my sample have been able to impact the lives of their clients. I 
also use three other measures of wellbeing, which include: the educational status of 
clients’ children, proxied by school enrollment and attendance; homeownership status; 
and other benefits of receiving the loan. 
These noneconomic benefits are intended to measure the extent to which microfinance is 
able to improve multidimensional poverty indicators for borrower households. Research 
shows that education is a priority for the poor, but poverty leads to high rates of dropout 
(Narayan, et. al.; 2000). Homeownership is also important, especially in large cities such 
as Karachi, where overpopulation and land grabbing has resulted in high rents, causing a 
great deal of economic hardship for the poor (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 
2011). 
Improvement in household spending and consumption smoothening (Banerjee et al, 
2009) is a more recent criterion of borrower wellbeing, but one that has become 
increasingly important as the “credit as a basic human right” proposition has gained 
ground (Ogden and Morduch, 2013). The last indicator titled “other benefits of receiving 
the loan” considers big-ticket consumption items such as financing a family wedding or 
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funeral through a microloan. 
Before presenting the main findings related to each of these measures, the section below 
reviews the main research questions, reviews the qualitative methodology, describes the 
sample, and the limitations of the research. 
II. Research Questions and Methodology 
This study considers the impact of institutional form on both institutions and clients. The 
first set of findings relates institutional form to mission and practice, while the second set 
extends it to the client sample. 
Data for the study was collected between December 2010 and June 2012, using semi-
structured interviews and observations (details provided in Appendix B). The data 
includes 140 interviews, 88 of which are with key informants in the sector and 
microfinance practitioners at the senior, middle and lower management levels, and 52 
with currently active microcredit clients.  
Apart from the interviews, the data also includes 12 day-long observations of client-
institution interaction. Observations were made of the loan process, including 
verification, disbursement, and collection; monthly and weekly group meetings; home 
visits and visits to clients’ places of business. 
Interviews with clients, loan officers and branch managers were conducted in Urdu (I am 
a native speaker), while interviews with senior officers at the MFIs, MFBs, SBP, PPAF 
and PMN were conducted in English, since that is the language of the elite (Lieven, 2012: 
131). The observation data was collected during, before and after the interviews.  
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II.A The Sample 
The institutional sample consists of 12 institutions, including eight MFIs and four MFBs, 
which as of the last quarter of 2012 represent 82 percent of the total number of active 
microcredit clients in Pakistan, accounting for 80 percent of the industry’s total gross 
loan portfolio (Pakistan Microfinance Network dataset, 2012). The institutions were 
identified using the Pakistan Microfinance Network’s (PMN) database. The PMN is the 
research and development warehouse of the microfinance sector. It has 28 member 
organizations, which together account for 98 percent of the sector’s total outreach 
(interview Aban Haq, 2012).  
The client sampling was purposive, that is, clients were identified using the institutional 
network. The justification for that is provided in the section on limitations below. The 
sample includes 50 urban clients from Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi, and 2 rural 
clients from Tando Allahyar, a rural town 40 kilometers from the southern city of 
Hyderabad. Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi were chosen because urban microfinance 
activity is most concentrated in these areas (MicroWatch, 2012). As of the fourth quarter 
of 2012, the total number of active borrowers in these cities was: Lahore - 195,111, 
Karachi - 135,426, Rawalpindi - 76,400 and Tando Allahyar – 10, 859. Lahore and 
Karachi have the highest outreach for any city or district in the country. Rawalpindi is 
also considered a high concentration city in terms of outreach, though there are other 
cities with higher numbers of borrowers. Rawalpindi was primarily a convenience choice, 
since it is Islamabad’s sister city – the capital of Pakistan, and the headquarters for PMN, 
PPAF and several MFIs and MFBs, and travel to Islamabad was essential for conducting 
 103 
key informant and senior practitioner interviews (see Appendix B). 
Tando Allahyar, on the other hand, though not a high outreach area is a rural town and 
included in this sample to get an idea of how rural microcredit may differ from its urban 
version. In case significant differences were found, a future study could focus on rural 
microcredit clients and their particular experiences. 
The section below discusses the limitations of the study, and describes how the threats to 
the validity of the sample have been addressed. 
 
II.B. Limitations 
In terms of the cities covered in the sample, Karachi and Tando Allahyar are located in 
the province of Sindh, while Lahore and Rawalpindi are in the province of Punjab. The 
other two provinces were not included in the present sample due to the separatist conflict 
in the province of Balochistan and the terrorist conflict in the province of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa. Due in large part to the threat of violence, microfinance outreach in these 
areas is at present very low, as shown in the outreach map in Appendix C. These regions 
shows up on the map in Appendix C as mostly grey, signifying little or no microfinance 
outreach.  
Another limitation is that 79 percent of the sample consists of female borrowers, while in 
Pakistan women represent only 58 percent of active microborrowers. The sample, 
therefore, can be criticized for not adequately representing the perspective of male 
borrowers.  
But perhaps the single most important limitation of the present study is limited funding. 
In response to this, I have chosen to concentrate most of my fieldwork to Karachi, where 
 104 
the cost of interviewing each respondent was the lowest due to the fact that this is my 
hometown. Since microfinance outreach in Karachi is second only to Lahore, by focusing 
on Karachi I was able to reach a wide range of borrowers, from multiple institutions. The 
table in Appendix B shows that 36 clients were interviewed in Karachi, 14 in Lahore and 
Rawalpindi combined and only 2 in Tando Allahyar. 
But fieldwork in Karachi was also problematic. The port city of Karachi is not just the 
country’s largest urban metropolis with a population of 21 million (Khan, 2012), its 
commercial and financial center, it is also home to the largest migrant population. This 
makes it is the most ethnically diverse city in the country. Karachi’s situation is 
characterized by tension between the different ethnicities in the city, which has resulted 
in a prolonged spate of violence and general lawlessness. This is discussed in detail in 
chapter 4. 
During the summer of 2012 when interviews were being conducted, Karachi was 
particularly tense with “target killings” having become a daily event in several parts of 
the city (Gayer, 2012; Gazdar, 2011). In Karachi, target killings refer to politically 
motivated murders. Between January and August 2012 these killings had claimed the 
lives of 1,725 people (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2012).  
The violence is the result of ethnic clashes between the Pathans, the Pushto-speaking 
migrants from the Northern province of KPK, and the Muhajirs, the Urdu-speaking 
descendants of the migrants from India, who arrived in Karachi at the time of the 
country’s independence from British controlled India in 1947.  
The ethnic tension was particularly problematic for this study since this type of violence 
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in Karachi is almost always concentrated in low-income Muhajir or Pathan majority areas 
(Ghazi, 2011), the very places where microfinance institutions and clients most often live 
and operate their businesses in. 
The institutions themselves have to take several precautions for the safety of their 
personnel. For instance, the branches of all institutions I visited in Karachi had armed 
guards at the entrance and the gate was padlocked even during daytime hours. In areas 
such as the town of Liaquatabad in the heart of Karachi and a Mohajir stronghold, the 
situation was particularly tense and the institution had to arrange for clients to come into 
the closest branch so the interviews could take place in relative safety.  
In other instances, I could only visit a client in her home, which also served as her 
workplace, when accompanied by a loan officer. This was mainly because of cultural 
considerations rather than issues of security. 
The following factors, however, reduce the threats to validity of this purposive sample: 
1. Most of the interviewees were clients who happened to visit the MFI/MFB branch 
the day of my visit, either for disbursement or collection, or those whose 
homes/workplaces were most easily accessible to the loan officer who took me 
around by foot, or those who were at the monthly or weekly group meetings 
attended that day by the loan officer – these meetings are typically pre-scheduled, 
determined by the start date of the loan cycle. This reduces the likelihood that the 
institution would only introduce me to their best clients. 
2. The sample includes borrowers from a varied economic background. It is widely 
accepted that the poor are not a homogeneous category, and their socioeconomic 
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backgrounds tend to vary widely (Kabeer, Huda, and Kaur, 2012). Thus, the poor 
neighborhoods covered in the sample include both the poorest neighborhoods 
where microfinance institutions operate as well as relatively better-off 
neighborhoods. For instance, in Karachi the poorest neighborhood covered was 
Ibrahim Haidery, while the least poor was Liaquatabad. Nevertheless, both were 
impoverished neighborhoods. 
3. The sample covers different branches of the same MFI or MFB within and across 
cities. For instance, the sample includes both Karachi and Lahore-based clients of 
Kashf Foundation. Similarly, the sample includes Tameer Bank’s clients from 
different branches within Karachi, such as Manzoor Colony and Liaquatabad. 
This ensures that differences in client experiences were not based on inter-
institution, inter-neighborhood, inter-city differences, or some combination 
thereof.  
There remains one limitation to this study, however, which the above factors do not 
mitigate. This relates to the fact that I have only interviewed currently active clients and 
there is no consideration of non-borrowers. This must be kept in mind when reading the 
section on findings below, which begins with a discussion of the sample institutions’ 
mission and practice parameters before detailing the findings related to the client sample. 
III. Findings 
The findings detailed below show that due to increased commercialization in the sector, 
MFBs have experienced a dilution in their mission. MFIs, on the other hand, on average 
emphasize poverty alleviation more than MFBs but institutional practice does not always 
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translate this mission uniformly down to the lowest management levels. Secondly, each 
MFI spin-off has handled its transition differently and it is hard to make a conclusive 
statement regarding mission dilution during transition and after. In terms of practice, 
while MFIs are generally more pro-poor, MFBs appear to offer more transparency and 
flexibility to their clients. Lastly, client experiences have been affected by institutional 
outreach and practice, but the experiences of MFI and MFB clients cannot be compared 
since they do not share the same socioeconomic characteristics, as detailed in the last 
sub-section of Section III. 
 
III.A. Institutional Form and Mission 
In this sub-section, I compare MFIs to MFBs in Pakistan and consider whether 
institutional form impacts their mission, as predicted by Dorado (2006). The broad 
distinctions between MFIs and MFBs were identified in Table 1 in chapter 1 but are 
discussed in more detail below, followed by the special case of MFI spinoffs, an analysis 
of organizational missions, the clients they target and the institutional parameters of 
transparency, reliability and flexibility.  
 
III.A.i. MFIs versus MFBs – Governance, Operational Costs and Staffing 
As described in an earlier section, Pakistan’s MFBs are licensed and regulated by the 
State Bank of Pakistan under the Microfinance Institutions Ordinance 2001. MFIs, with 
the exception of Orix Leasing’s microfinance department, are NGOs registered under one 
of the following Acts: (a) The Societies Registration Act, 1860 (b) Voluntary Social 
Welfare Agencies Ordinance, 1961 (c) Trust Act, 1882 or (d) Companies Ordinance, 
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1984 (Shah, 2011). None of these four acts explicitly provides MFI specific regulation in 
a manner comparable to the prudential regulations the SBP uses to monitor MFB activity. 
This distinction begets all other major differences between MFIs and MFBs in the 
country.  
For instance, many in the sector feel that MFI governance is weak and lacks 
accountability, since as NGOs most of them are practically unregulated (interviews: Head 
Microfinance SBP, 2011; Tameer Bank Head Operations, 2011; Chief Operating Officer 
PMN, 2012). The Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), as the principal lender to 
most MFIs, has tried to beef up its regulatory stance with the MFI by developing specific 
Appraisal and Monitoring Guidelines (Shah, 2011). However, these are only guidelines 
and cannot be enforced through any type of policy action. While the PPAF can threaten 
to withhold future funding, in most cases this does not occur as long as repayments on 
PPAF loans are made on a timely basis. Industry wide initiatives such as MicroWatch – 
PMN’s quarterly outreach bulletin, the newly setup electronic credit information bureau 
and Microeye – an online mapping tool used by MFIs and MFBs to keep track of the 
sector’s expanding branch network on a real-time basis – have served to make 
information on MFI outreach publicly available. 
But concerns over the sector’s management practices remain, especially after Kashf 
Foundation, one of the largest and most prominent MFI, was affected by a massive 
repayment crisis in 2008-09. The crisis was so severe that in April 2009, when the 
situation was at its worst, approximately 80 percent of Kashf’s clients had refused to 
repay their loans (Burki, 2009). The details of the crisis are discussed in chapter 5, but it 
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will be noted here that the crisis exposed major institutional weakness. It also showed 
that it is not just MFBs that are under pressure to scale-up their operations rapidly, 
instead several MFIs such as Kashf have used dubious means, detailed in chapter 5, to 
compete for clients in areas where multiple institutions are operating at the same time. In 
the process the institution’s clients have had to suffer. During interviews with Kashf’s 
clients in Lahore it was mentioned that during the crisis it would be normal for group 
members to go to non-paying clients’ homes and take away household items, such as 
television sets, and only return them once the loan was paid off.  
However, such practices were not just restricted to the MFIs. Tameer Bank, an MFB, 
experienced a similar setback during the mid-2000s when it tried to expand outreach 
quickly by relying on local community “agents”. Defaults and operational losses soared 
and it was only when Telenor, a multinational telecom operator with stakes in other 
microfinance institutions such as the Grameen Bank (Singhal, Svenkerud and Flydal, 
2002), stepped in and bought a 51 percent majority stake in the MFB, that the institution 
was able to regain lost ground. Tameer has since strengthened its controls, overhauled its 
verification process and most recently shifted 80 percent of its portfolio to lending 
against gold to reduce its reliance on clean or uncollateralized lending (interview Director 
Operations, Tameer Bank, 2012). 
One major difference between the MFIs and MFBs is in their cost structure. The NRSP 
which has just spun off part of its portfolio into a standalone MFB described how it 
would require just Rs.6,000 (US$64) to set up an MFI branch but an MFB branch would 
mean a heavier investment since banking regulations come with their own costs. For 
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instance, the SBP requires that each branch should have its own properly trained and 
certified risk management officer. In addition, extensive operational records and client 
information must be electronically available anytime for the SBP to review. Such costs 
reduce the institution’s flexibility and limit its ability to expand as rapidly as it could 
when it was an MFI (interview Program Coordinator NRSP, 2012). 
MFIs are also able to control their costs by keeping the salaries of their personnel quite 
low. While MFBs have to hire individuals with accounting and business degrees, 
especially for higher-level positions, MFIs make do with lower educational backgrounds 
and less experience. Salary structures, therefore, differ significantly between the two 
institutional groups. District Manager Karachi at NRSP’s Urban Poverty Alleviation 
Programme (UPAP) spoke about this when he said: “We can’t afford to hire a very 
educated staff – just a matriculate (10th grade) or intermediate (high school graduate). 
And since most of them are teenagers we end up with very high levels of staff turnover”. 
A similar observation was made by an Area Manager of the MFI, ASA Pakistan. Such 
hiring practices and turnover rates have direct implications for the weak management 
generally attributed to MFIs in Pakistan. At the same time, the pressure to increase 
outreach results in high turnover at MFBs (interview Head of Business Banking, Kashf 
Bank, 2012). 
Overall, while MFBs and MFIs are by no means homogenous categories there are 
significant differences between the two groups in terms of governance, operational costs 
and staffing patterns as predicted by Dorado (2006). Much of this has to do with the lack 
of regulatory authority over MFIs, but it is also due to the fact that MFIs don’t have 
 111 
access to important sources of funding such as mobilized deposits, institutional 
strengthening funds from the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and the SBP’s guarantee facility through which commercial banks 
are able to lend to MFBs.  
The important question is how do such differences affect institutional missions across the 
sector?  
 
III.A.ii. Microfinance Institutions and their Mission  
In Section I, I hypothesized that the first type of SEVs, that is, NGOs with a business 
model, are likely to emphasize their social mission more than the second, that is, for 
profits with a social mission. In this section I relate findings on institutional missions to 
test this hypothesis.  
Khushhali Bank, the first MFB to be established in Pakistan in 2000, has a model of 
outreach that involves partnering with local nonprofits in the communities where it has a 
branch network. This is why Khushhali has been referred to as a quasi-NGO. But in June 
2012 a consortium of local and international investors acquired a majority stake in the 
Bank (Bloomberg, 2012). It is expected that in the coming months it will transform to a 
much more competitive and commercially driven entity (interviews: Executive Vice 
President Khushhali Bank, 2012; Senior Joint Director SBP, 2012; Associate Financial 
Services Group, PPAF, 2012). This is likely to have a big impact on the sector as a 
whole, as Khushhali with a presence in 72 out of 113 districts, has the largest branch 
network of all MFBs in Pakistan. Moreover, Khushhali is the largest microfinance 
institution in the country, accounting for 19.1 percent of total active borrowers in the 
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sector (Microwatch, 2012).   
The other MFBs in the sample include Tameer Bank – the largest institution in terms of 
gross loan portfolio (17.6 percent of the sector total), FMFB and Kashf Bank. While 
FMFB states that its primary mission is poverty alleviation, the main focus of the other 
two is achieving financial sustainability (interviews: directors and senior management at 
all three institutions, 2010-12).  
FMFB is a spinoff of AKRSP and continues its operations as an Aga Khan Foundation 
subsidiary, a transnational Foundation with a strong commitment to social service based 
on the religious philosophy of the Aga Khan, the Imam11 of the Ismaeli community, a 
minority Muslim sect. The strength of the institution’s mission is demonstrated by the 
fact that all seven officers of this institution who were interviewed, ranging from the 
CEO to the loan officers, clearly stated that poverty alleviation was the institution’s 
primary mission. Observations of institution-client interactions also show that 
institutional practices are closely aligned to this agenda. 
Of course, affinity to the institutional mission across management levels is hard to 
measure. But among the MFIs in the sample the institution that stands out is Akhuwat, 
which is a zero-interest based MFI. At Akhuwat a spirit of volunteerism and commitment 
to the institution’s philosophy of brotherhood and generosity was clearly demonstrated in 
the staff at all organizational levels at Akhuwat’s Lahore operations, much more than at 
any other institution in the sample. Akhuwat has remained relatively insulated from the 
sector-wide winds of change brought on by the recent emphasis on commercialization for 
it depends on individual charitable donations, rather than assistance from international 
                                                
11 Spiritual leader 
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donors and the PPAF. It has managed to keep its operational costs extremely low by 
relying on volunteers and places of worship as venues for disbursement (Akhuwat, 2012).  
In Lahore I visited an Akhuwat client for an interview, during which I was offered a cold 
drink to beat the searing Lahore heat, but the Akhuwat officer next to me was not. The 
client sensed my unasked question and said “I have been Akhuwat’s client for 12 years 
but never has any officer from this organization accepted anything from us as a gift of 
appreciation, not even a glass of cold water”.  
In Figure 1 in Section I, Akhuwat is classified as a cross-sector SEV, as it does not fit the 
other two categories, that is, the nonprofit SEV with a business model or the for-profit 
SEV with a social mission.  
Apart from Akhuwat, the MFIs, NRSP and its sister organization - the Urban Poverty 
Alleviation Programme (UPAP), Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee’s (BRAC) 
Pakistan operations, Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), and Thardeep Rural Support Programme 
stated that poverty alleviation and a commitment to social change was their primary 
mission.  
Kashf Foundation’s stated mission is development through women’s empowerment. The 
Bangladeshi MFI, Association for Social Advancement’s (ASA) Pakistan operations 
considers poverty alleviation as its primary goal, but stresses that success only comes 
through commercially viable operations. The MFI, Orix is an exception as it is not an 
NGO but is a division of the non-bank financial multinational institution, Orix Leasing. 
Orix Pakistan is perhaps the classic double bottom-line institution from Dorado’s 
perspective, as it places an equal emphasis on financial sustainability and the social 
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mission of microfinance. Orix admits that as it is not an NGO and employs a business 
approach to microfinance, its ties with its clients are not as close as those of other MFIs 
(interview Orix Pakistan CEO, 2011).  
However, observation data indicates that the social mission is not always translated into 
actual practice due to competing demands on MFI officers. For instance, during visits to 
various NRSP branches, I was informed by loan officers and branch managers alike that 
clients are asked to make their monthly repayments a few days ahead of the actual due 
date so that if payment is delayed by a day or two, the loan does not have to be termed 
“pass due”. Not surprisingly, when I visited the regional office of NRSP in Karachi, the 
Director proudly showed me his loan-book, which clearly showed that less than one 
percent of his portfolio was “pass due”. 
For the cross-sector SEV, Dorado’s third category, the profit motive is least relevant. As 
mentioned earlier, the MFI Akhuwat is classified as a cross-sector SEV. Akhuwat’s 
institutional philosophy is based on four principles: (a) zero-interest microcredit (b) 
arranging group meetings at “indigenous” venues, which is a reference to places of 
worship, usually mosques (c) volunteerism, senior management works strictly on a 
voluntary basis but paid staff is also asked to adopt a social service attitude and (d) 
reciprocity, it is strongly encouraged that current and past borrowers become part of 
Akhuwat’s donor pool. In 2010, former borrowers provided a total of Rs.15 million 
(US$159,575) in donations (Candland, 2011). As Akhuwat does not accept grants or soft 
loans from institutional donors it is able to keep its mission from getting diluted by a 
donor-driven agenda. 
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Dorado (2006) predicts that cross-sector SEVs are likely to be short-lived initiatives. The 
zero-interest based microcredit model is also considered impractical (Roodman, 2012, pg. 
183) and there are concerns regarding its sustainability (Tedschi, 2006). Akhuwat, 
however, continues to grow despite such expectations. For instance, at the end of 2006 it 
had just over 7,000 borrowers, but by the fourth of 2012 its total active clientele had risen 
to 104,600, with a gross loan portfolio of over Rs.1,156 million (US$116million). 
Akhuwat direct presence is spread over 27 districts, across three provinces, and it has 
helped at least one other institution replicate its model in Sindh, the only province where 
it does not have its own branches (PMN, 2012; interview CEO Akhuwat Karachi, 2010).  
An important reason for Akhuwat’s growing popularity is its zero interest model. This 
has put serious pressure on MFIs operating in the same areas. In Lahore I met at least two 
borrowers that were active clients of other microfinance institutions who said they would 
like to switch over to Akhuwat, as it does not charge interest. Branch managers from 
other MFIs operating in Lahore and Rawalpindi also expressed concern that Akhuwat 
was gaining advantage over them because of its zero interest policy.  
Overall, however, it is evident that MFBs are generally less likely than MFIs to place 
poverty alleviation over their financial sustainability objectives, with the exception of 
FMFB. And amongst the MFIs in the sample, Akuwat seems to have the most undiluted 
focus on poverty alleviation.  
 
III.A.iii. Spinoffs and Mission Drift? 
Section I mentions the risk of mission drift in MFI spinoffs that have shed their NGO 
status. There are currently three such entities in Pakistan’s microfinance sector – FMFB, 
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Kashf Bank and NRSP Bank. The description above for FMFB demonstrates that such a 
mission drift has not occurred, but for Kashf Bank, a spinoff of Kashf Foundation, the 
outcome is quite different. While Kashf Foundation lends only to women and states that 
it is committed to gender empowerment, 95 percent of Kashf Bank’s lending is to men, 
and the Bank targets borrowers from a higher socioeconomic class than the Foundation 
(interviews: senior management at Kashf Foundation and Kashf Bank, 2012). This is a 
clear departure from the Foundation’s original mission and confirms Battilana and 
Dorado’s hypothesis.  
NRSP Bank’s transformation, which began in 2010, is still in process. Senior 
management admitted that they have slowed down the divestiture of the microfinance 
portfolio from the MFI to the MFB after realizing that an MFB has much less flexibility 
for expansion than an MFI (interview Program Coordinator NRSP, 2012). Still, even 
though both the MFI and the MFB cater to rural borrowers, the gender profile of the two 
is drastically different. While men make up only 24 percent of the total borrowers at 
NRSP, they constitute 88 percent of total borrowers at NRSP Bank (PMN data, 2012). 
Male borrowers are usually associated with higher loan amounts and better 
socioeconomic status (Agier and Szafarz, 2010), which implies that at least some mission 
drift has occurred with the transformation, partially confirming Battilana and Dorado’s 
hypothesis.  
Given these differences in mission, is there a way to distinguish MFIs and MFBs based 
on their pattern of client outreach? The section below describes this in some detail, 
though district-level outreach differences between MFIs and MFBs were analyzed 
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econometrically in chapter 2. 
  
III.A.iv.  Outreach - Targeting the Less Vulnerable  
The Economic Survey of Pakistan 2007-08 places the national poverty line at an 
individual annual income level of Rs.11,400 (US$121) (Ministry of Finance, Pakistan). 
This is the same definition used in Pakistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)  
(United Nations Development Programme, 2012). In contrast, in the 2007 Prudential 
Regulations for Microfinance Banks, the SBP defines a poor individual as one whose 
annual income is less than Rs.150,000 (US$1,596). Even more striking are the 2011 
revisions in the Prudential Regulations where all mention of the word “poor” has been 
removed, and income eligibility has been increased to Rs300,000 (US$3,192) (SBP, 
2011; SBP, 2007).  
This changing emphasis is reflected in a sector wide discussion on borrower 
characteristics, symbolized by the “poverty pyramid” referenced during interviews by 
several practitioners and the SBP’s Microfinance Director, and as prominently displayed 
at PMN’s office in Islamabad. The pyramid first appeared in a publication by the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a microfinance research institute housed 
at the World Bank (Hashemi and Rosenberg, 2006). 
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Figure 6: The Poverty Pyramid 
 
            *Source: Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN) 
Practitioners use the pyramid as a reference point in arguing that microcredit is best 
aimed at those just above or below the poverty line, while other financial products such 
as microsavings and microinsurance can be used to target everyone except the extremely 
poor. To date, however, there has been little success with these products in Pakistan, as 
discussed in chapter 1. 
A related phenomenon is the evolving segmentation within the sector, with MFBs being 
increasingly encouraged to target clients above the poverty line, leaving MFIs to serve 
those below the line (interview Aban Haq, 2012; Shah, 2011).  
Additionally, in mid-2012, the SBP passed legislation allowing MFBs to target clients in 
the small medium enterprise (SME) sector12 by increasing the microcredit loan ceiling to 
Rs.500,000 (US$135,439). The original regulation had placed the ceiling at Rs.150,000 
(US$1,631) and stipulated that 80 percent of an MFB’s loan portfolio must consist of 
                                                
12 An SME is larger than a microenterprise in terms of number of employees, sales volume and balance-
sheet size (Inter-American Development Bank, 2003) 
13 US$1=Rs.100 as of June 2013 
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loans less than Rs.100,000 (US$1,064) (Berrada, 2012; SBP, 2007). The new regulations 
expand MFB options for scaling up to higher-income borrowers. It is expected that MFIs 
will fill in the gaps thus created by serving the lower-income clients (Shah, 2011; 
interview Aban Haq, 2012; interview DFID and World Bank Consultant for Pakistan, 
2012). 
How have these policy “nudges” affected actual practice in the sector? The table below 
shows the targeted socioeconomic status of borrowers by institution:  
Table 10 Microcredit Targeted Borrower Profile 
Institution Targeted Socioeconomic Status 
Tameer Bank 
(MFB) 
Just above the poverty line. Existing business required (at least 2 years business 
tenure). 
FMFB (MFB) The poorest but with demonstrated repayment capacity. Bank assists in getting 
market access for clients in certain areas (pilot phase). Group majority must be 
homeowners. 
Khushhali Bank 
(MFB) 
Existing business required (at least 2 years business tenure). Group majority must be 
homeowners. 
Kashf Bank (MFB) Higher income clients than Kashf Foundation’s (see below). Existing business 
required (at least 2 years business tenure). 
Kashf Foundation 
(MFI) 
The working poor, earning up to Rs.25,000 a month (a typical lower-middle-class 
salary). Existing business required (at least 6 month business tenure). 
Orix (MFI) Working poor: existing outside employment for the borrower or male household 
members required. 
OPP (MFI) Around the poverty line, existing business required in its direct lending operations. 
For the indirect lending portfolio, criteria determined by the local MFIs OPP 
partners with. 
NRSP and UPAP 
(MFI) 
Categorized as the poorest in the community, but with demonstrated repayment 
capacity. At least one woman in a group of three needs to be a homeowner.  
Thardeep (MFI) The poorest of the poor. 
Akhuwat 
Foundation (MFI) 
Categorized simply as poor but with demonstrated repayment ability. 
BRAC Pakistan 
(MFI) 
“Middle” poor. Existing business not a requirement. Never married women not 
eligible. 
 ASA Pakistan 
(MFI) 
“The economically vibrant poor” or those living around the poverty line. 
 *Source: Based on practitioner interviews 
 
The table describes how each institution defines its own borrower criteria. Some of it is 
based on lending methodology and practical considerations. For instance, the 
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homeownership criterion is important when targeting low-income clients. Practitioners 
stress that renters move houses often in low-income neighborhoods, and if they happen to 
leave in the middle of a loan cycle it is hard to track them down to ensure loan 
repayment. In a group lending arrangement where there is joint liability, if one or more of 
the group members are homeowners they can be called upon to pay for the absent client. 
However, the criteria for selecting clients are also based on the value the institution 
places on its social mission relative to its concern for financial sustainability. Among the 
MFBs in the sample, Tameer and Kashf Bank clearly target higher-income clients, while 
FMFB targets the lowest income clients in the sample.  
The MFIs in the sample also vary in their targeting approach. While Thardeep states that 
it targets “the poorest of the poor”, BRAC, ASA, OPP and Orix target the higher income 
poor, which are referred to by these institutions alternatively as “the working poor”, the 
“middle poor” or the “economically vibrant poor”.  
Interview data also shows that FMFB and Thardeep are the outliers in their respective 
groups when it comes to ensuring on time repayments. FMFB staff, especially at the 
branch level, talked about giving clients a “grace period” in the event of a genuine 
emergency. Clients of FMFB’s Korangi Branch in Karachi stated that the staff allowed 
them to make late payments because of the law and order situation paralyzing Karachi.  
Thardeep’s Director of Microfinance for rural Sindh indicated a similarly soft stance on 
loan utilization and repayment. Branch staff and clients at other institutions, on the other 
hand, described the strict loan repayment policies the staff was required to enforce to 
maintain credit discipline among clients. 
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All MFBs, except for FMFB, required that first-time clients have an existing business. 
The reverse was true for MFIs, where no institution except Kashf Foundation had an 
existing business requirement. 
On average, however, the socioeconomic status, homeownership stipulation and business 
tenure requirements demonstrate that very few institutions target the poorest. The 
emphasis is on targeting clients that already have a basic skill set, existing business or 
employment and who are leading less precarious lives than the poorest. A recent study of 
microfinance outreach in rural Punjab also confirms that microfinance institutions refrain 
from targeting the poorest households and focus instead on the less poor (Ghalib, 2012).  
Finally, the section below analyzes the institutional parameters of transparency, reliability 
and flexibility. 
 
III.A.v.  Institutional Practice Parameters 
It is helpful to remember that when microfinance first entered the scene it took its place 
somewhere along the middle of a spectrum, one end of which consisted of informal 
networks of savings and finance the poor have always used, including friends and family, 
informal store credit from the community’s general store, buying and selling on credit 
from the middlemen for their small businesses, and of course the infamous moneylender. 
At the other end were commercial banks, who since the sixties have been asked to 
dedicate part of their portfolio for concessional lending to the poor, but who have always 
managed to find ways to evade such regulations (Ahmed, 2010). Informal sources of 
finance are usually non-transparent, unreliable, but very flexible (Roodman, 2012). The 
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question is how does microfinance measure up against these parameters?  
In the Microfinance Banks Prudential Regulations, the SBP stipulates that MFBs make 
full disclosure of the important terms and conditions of the products they offer, including 
lending and deposit rates, in a manner easily accessible and understandable to their 
clients (SBP, 2007). MFIs that are member organizations of PMN have also signed on to 
the PMN Code of Conduct for Consumer Protection with stipulations similar to the 
Prudential Regulations (Haq, 2009). However, critics argue that such codes require self-
regulation, which is less reliable than regulation in ensuring transparency, especially 
when it comes to pricing (Mazer, 2012). 
One aspect of transparency peculiar to microfinance is the mental absorption capacity of 
its clients (Roodman, 2012). More than one practitioner mentioned this during interviews. 
They insisted that because of low levels of literacy, clients did not always fully 
understand the terms of the loan and even when they did most of them were liable to 
forget soon afterwards (interviews: Business Development Manager, FMFB Islamabad, 
2012; Branch Manager Kashf Karachi, 2012).  
This was also confirmed during interviews when clients were asked details regarding the 
credit life insurance policies they were required to purchase upfront. Responses were 
limited to “we were told if something happens to us the debt would be taken care of”. 
When asked about the pricing of this mandatory insurance product the response would 
often be a vague silence or simply “I don’t know”.  
In terms of reliability, however, most MFIs and MFBs seem to be doing rather well. Most 
clients appeared to know their loan amounts, the monthly repayment sum, repayment 
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dates and group meeting times. Borrowing informally from friends and family is often 
one of the most unreliable sources of finance but one of the first the poor try to access 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). In addition, much of the economic lives of the poor are 
based in the informal economy, characterized by informal, unwritten contracts 
(Roodman, 2012). During interviews, several clients appreciated having access to a 
“bank” that provides them with a reliable source of credit. The reference to “bank” was 
for both MFIs and MFBs.  
Flexibility is the last parameter in this analysis. The moneylender, though exploitative 
and lacking transparency, is usually highly flexible, for he truly understands the high 
incidence of unexpected emergencies, such as sudden death and illness, in the lives of the 
poor. As there is no enforceable written contract, if he tries to exact payment when the 
client is facing an extreme hardship he risks losing his entire future stream of income 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). MFIs and MFBs, on the other hand, are much less flexible. 
They insist on timely repayment, a fact that most borrowers mentioned in their 
interviews. This finding is discussed in more detail in the section on client experiences.  
Another aspect of institutional flexibility is the number of different products on offer. 
Until recently, most MFIs and MFBs in Pakistan had just two main products: the equal 
monthly installment (EMI) loan for urban consumers, and the bullet loan for rural 
consumers, based on harvest dates. Recently, however, MFBs have begun to offer 
additional credit products. For instance, FMFB and Tameer Bank now offer higher 
denomination housing loans, that can go up to Rs.500,000 (US$5,319). Apart from the 
microenterprise loan, Tameer also offers a motorcycle loan, in addition to a new line of 
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agricultural products. However, Tameer’s reliance on collateralized lending, against the 
household’s stock of gold jewelry, has already increased to 70 percent of its total 
portfolio. 
FMFB also offers a “low- salaried non-tax paying loan” and a “pensioner’s loan”, in 
addition to its regular EMI enterprise loan and bullet agriculture loan. Kashf Bank and 
Khushhali Bank have a more restricted product portfolio, though they too have recently 
introduced the gold backed loan and the housing loan, following the SBP’s revision of 
the Microfinance Bank Prudential Regulations.  
MFIs, on the other hand, offer fewer choices. Most of them offer group-based loans only 
for enterprise development. Exceptions include ASA and Akhuwat. ASA has recently 
begun to offer larger denomination SME loans. Akhuwat, on the other hand, has nine 
different loan categories targeting specific vulnerable groups, based on its social change 
agenda. These include the enterprise loan, the “liberation” loan intended to pay off an 
existing moneylender related debt, an education loan, a health loan, a housing loan, and a 
marriage loan (interview Assistant Manager Akhuwat, 2012; Akhuwat’s website, 2012).  
These findings suggest that MFBs are more transparent than the average MFI, both 
appear equally reliable, but are low on the flexibility scale as compared to informal 
sources of finance, though one aspect of flexibility, that is, the product line is slowly 
becoming more diverse, at least for MFBs. 
The following section presents findings related to the client sample. 
 
III.B Client Wellbeing Indicators  
The sample includes 32 MFI clients and 20 MFB clients, of these 41 were women and 11 
 125 
men. The average loan size for MFI clients in the sample was US$308.51 and for MFB 
clients it was US$306.63. At first glance, MFI loan sizes appear higher than MFB loans. 
However, if we take out the outliers from the MFI and MFB pool, the picture appears a 
bit different. An Akhuwat client in his 12th loan cycle had a loan of US$800, which is 
nearly US$400 higher than the second highest loan amount in the MFI category. 
Removing this loan from the pool, the MFI average goes down to US$254. Similarly, in 
the MFB sample, a US$532 loan is an outlier because it is the only gold collateralized 
loan in the sample. Removing this loan, the MFB average goes down to US$292.55. 
Now, the average MFB loan is nearly US$40 higher than the average MFI loan in the 
sample, which is, as we would expect, given the discussion in the previous section. 
The following table provides the break-up by lending methodology:  
 
Table 11 Sample by Lending Methodology 
 
Group Individual Total 
MFI Loans in Sample 30 2 32 
MFB Loans in Sample 10 10 20 
Total 40 12 52 
 
As expected, MFIs are more likely to offer group loans than MFBs. The 10 group loans 
in the MFB sample are from Khushhali Bank, Tameer Bank and FMFB, but not Kashf 
Bank since it only does individual lending. The analysis below presents detailed results 
from client interviews and observations of client-practitioner interactions. 
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III.B.i Economic Indicators of Wellbeing 
The three economic indicators defined in Section 2 were self-perception of an 
improvement in economic wellbeing, expansion of business and reliance on informal 
borrowing.  
 
Figure 7: Self Perception - Improvement in Economic Wellbeing 
 
The chart shows that 21 percent, that is, a total of 11 clients felt an improvement in their 
economic wellbeing while 31 percent, that is, 16 clients said their wellbeing did not 
improve and 48 percent, that is, 25 clients were noncommittal in their responses. Those 
that felt their economic wellbeing had improved were involved in different types of 
microenterprises including welding, running a kiryana14 store, making machine parts, 
running a sewing training center for women, making sea-shell jewelry and ladies 
tailoring. Of these, seven were MFI clients, while four were MFB clients. The first seven 
were clients of the following MFIs: two from NRSP’s Urban Poverty Alleviation 
Programme (UPAP) – one from Karachi and the other from Lahore, one from the 
Bangladeshi MFI ASA’s Karachi-based branch, one from Kashf Foundation’s Lahore-
based branch and two from Akhuwat’s Lahore-based clients. The other four clients were 
                                                
14 Kiryana literally means the corner store 
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all from the MFB Tameer Bank, and all of them were Karachi-based, having taken loans 
from two different branches of the Bank.  
It is important to note that not all of those who felt their economic wellbeing had 
improved attributed it to microfinance. For instance, one of ASA’s clients felt things had 
improved since she had taken on a job as a housemaid. Her husband could only find work 
sporadically, and working as a housemaid finally provided the family with a steady 
source of income. It was this income that gave her the “courage” to take on the 
responsibility of a microloan. Job insecurity is almost always the top concern for the poor 
(Narayan, et. al., 2000).  
Similarly, a Kashf Lahore client was satisfied with her economic situation because she 
was able to manage the ups and downs of market demand thanks to the three different 
types of home-based work she had taken on, including ladies tailoring, flag sewing, and 
making shutters for commercial shops, while her husband also had a steady job as a 
commercial driver.  
Clients who felt their wellbeing declined, expressed various reasons for feeling this way. 
The two rural clients from Tando Allahyar described how the recent floods devastated 
their crops and pushed the price of their livestock down. They bought the livestock with 
the loan and expected to be able to sell at a profit. When this did not happen they suffered 
losses but still had to pay the loan off.  
Karachi-based clients blamed the ethnic violence in the city as a primary reason for the 
fall in the demand of their products. Similarly, Lahore and Rawalpindi-based clients 
expressed that the frequent power outages in the city caused a large drop in their output. 
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This is discussed in more detail in chapter 5 where the impact of the local political 
economy on client wellbeing is analyzed. 
The next indicator tells us how many clients were able to expand their business directly 
as a result of the loan they received. Out of the 52 clients in the sample, only 11 said they 
expanded the business with the loan, while two others said the loan enabled them to buy 
raw material in bulk, which reduced the unit cost of their input. Of the 11, six were from 
MFIs while five belonged to MFBs. All five MFB clients were Tameer Bank’s Karachi-
based clients. Two MFI clients mentioned that the business expansion allowed them to 
afford school for their children, and two other clients said they were able to make major 
home improvements because their business improved as a direct result of the loan – one 
was an MFI client while the other was an MFB client.  
Half of the six MFI clients were in their 4th cycle, the others were 3rd, 5th and 12th cycle 
clients. The biggest loan was Rs.75,000 (US$798), which belonged to the 12th cycle 
client of Akhuwat. Three of Tameer’s clients were in their 2nd cycle, while the other two 
were 3rd and 4th cycle clients. Their loan sizes varied between Rs.20,000 (US$213) to 
Rs.40,000 (US$638). 
The last economic indicator measures reliance on informal sources of credit. Of the 52 
clients in the sample, 10 mentioned that they often had to borrow informally, from friends 
and family, to make their loan repayments on time. Six of these were MFI clients while 
four were MFB clients. A Karachi-based MFI borrower, who taught young girls in the 
community to read the Quran, said that she would borrow often to make on-time 
payments. Sometimes she would borrow from her students to repay the loan, and if her 
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students didn’t have the money they would borrow from their family and friends to lend 
the needed sum to their teacher.  
When asked what would happen if payment was not made on time a few mentioned 
having to pay late fees, but several also mentioned the humiliation of having loan officers 
turn up at their doors and make a fuss until the neighbors found out. They described 
paying the loan on time as a matter of “izzat”, meaning honor. This is one way 
microloans are different from regular loans. Not having financial collateral to fall back 
upon, loan officers use social pressure to elicit payment. 
But if social capital doesn’t work there are other alternatives. One of Tameer Bank’s 
branch managers in Karachi explained this: “if a client cannot repay we approach his 
guarantors. The client feels embarrassed and is usually able to pay by borrowing from 
someone. If that is not possible we offer an emergency loan, that is, a loan backed by the 
household’s gold jewelry.” 
Client interviews show that borrowing from one another to repay loans is routine and not 
out of the ordinary. Several mentioned borrowing from parents or siblings to make 
payments on time. Another mentioned that it was usual for the family to miss meals in 
the days leading up to the repayment date. 
And then there is the informal credit offered by the middlemen the clients deal with in 
their businesses. An MFB client remarked “the market can give credit anytime but the 
Bank only gives you a loan once (a year)”. She was referring to the suppliers’ credit that 
the wholesaler would give her when she was short on cash and needed to buy material. 
The “market” is the middleman. The middleman is both the buyer and the seller for the 
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small home-based producer. A woman making seashell jewelry or embroidered fabric 
would buy her material from the middleman, he would provide her with a sample which 
would show her how to make the product, and once it was ready she would sell the 
finished product back to him. The middleman would make a profit not just from the 
higher retail price charged on the product but also on this informal credit arrangement. 
The client, who is often short on cash, is dependent on the middleman, and this 
dependency becomes even more acute because the middleman is inconsistent with the 
timing of his payment to the small producer. Several clients reported that the “market 
people” often held back payment, but would give credit whenever needed. 
While this is a description of the urban middleman arrangement, a similar practice occurs 
in rural areas where the middleman sells seeds and fertilizer, but is also the buyer of the 
crop and livestock. FMFB Karachi’s Regional Manager described how group lending was 
being used to break the hegemony of the middlemen over their clients, but only to an 
extent as described in chapter 5. The success of this could not be ascertained at the rural 
level since the client sample was mostly urban. The middleman arrangement in urban 
areas so far does not appear to have changed at all with the advent of microfinance. 
Practitioners also recognize that the loan amount they approve is often not enough to 
meet the credit needs of the poor. For instance, NRSP’s Programme Coordinator referring 
to their rural operations admitted that while a single cow costs around Rs.60,000 
(US$640) his MFI can only lend between Rs.10,000 (US$106) to Rs.20,000 (US$213) to 
the farmer, and he has to borrow the rest from someone else.  
MFB loans on average are higher, but the repayment capacity of the borrower does place 
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a limit on loan size as discussed in chapter 2. MFB activity in rural areas remains limited, 
with the exception of FMFB and NRSP Bank.  
 
III.B.ii Non-economic Indicators of Wellbeing 
The three non-economic indicators reviewed in this section are education, 
homeownership status and all the noneconomic benefits accruing from the loan. 
The responses on education are from clients that either had school-aged children 
currently or whose children had passed their schooling years. Out of the 52 clients in the 
sample, there were 23 responses from MFI clients and 12 from MFB clients. The 
responses, shown in the table below, indicate that the majority of the children had or were 
attending school:  
Table 12 School Enrollment - Client's Children 
 MFI MFB 
Never attended school  2 1 
Some attended school, others dropped out early 2 2 
Attend school when times are good, not when times are hard 1 0 
Older children with college degrees, or currently in college 2 2 
All children attend school 16 7 
Total 23 12 
 
On average, the 12 MFB clients mentioned in the table above were in their 2nd cycle. All 
of Tameer Bank’s clients that responded to this question said “yes” to their children 
attending school and two of this MFB’s clients mentioned that some of their children 
were also attending college.  
Client and practitioner interviews, however, indicate that the educational status for MFB 
clients in general and Tameer Bank’s in particular, are the result of targeting less poor 
clients, rather than due to a significant improvement in economic status through 
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microcredit. Similarly, those with children that had either received a college degree or 
were currently attending college, were the least poor clients. This is also obvious when 
one considers the fact that in Pakistan the higher education system enrolls only about four 
percent of the population in the corresponding age bracket of 17 to 23 years and, as with 
other developing countries, higher education is directly correlated with socioeconomic 
status (World Bank, 2009). 
For the MFIs, Kashf Foundation and Akhuwat’s clients seemed to be doing better on the 
schooling indicator as compared to NRSP’s UPAP and the Bangladeshi MFI BRAC’s 
Karachi Branch. But note that NRSP and its sister organization, UPAP, target the poorest 
people in the communities they operate in. With reference to his clients’ educational 
outcomes, UPAP’s District Manager Lahore said: “their interest in educating their 
children is low and the expense is high so they don’t emphasize education and therefore 
remain dependent on daily wages. Most families you meet earn daily wages and only find 
work 3-4 days a week.”  
Even though this study is restricted to urban clients, practitioner interviews indicate that 
the situation in rural areas is more dismal. FMFB’s Area Manager Sindh, recalls the 
responses of his rural client’s when they are advised to put their children in schools: “we 
can’t afford to put our children in schools. If we do who will provide the labor on our 
land?” 
The second non-economic indicator of wellbeing defined in Section 2 was 
homeownership status. Information on this indicator was provided by 24 clients, and is 
shown in Table 13 below:  
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Table 13 Homeownership Status of Clients in Sample 
 Homeowner Renter 
MFIs 10 4 
MFBs 7 3 
Total 17 7 
 
The table indicates that homeowners far outnumber renters for both MFIs and MFBs. 
This, however, is no coincidence since MFI and MFB practitioners confirm that 
homeowners are given priority over renters in urban areas, since renters move houses 
often and it is hard to keep track of them. Recall that in Table 10 in Section III.A 
homeownership is an important criterion for client selection. For instance, Khushhali 
Bank requires at least one homeowner in a group of three and at least three in a group of 
five (interview: Branch Manager, Rawalpindi, 2012). 
Clients who were renters mentioned that one of the stipulations of their loan agreement 
was that their landlord must act as the loan guarantor. At least one interviewee mentioned 
that landlords demand payment from clients who ask them to provide guarantees on their 
loans. If this can be confirmed as a common practice, it should be included as a hidden 
cost of the loan.  
These homeownership statistics also show that higher income clients greatly outnumber 
lower income clients, since renters are almost always less well-off than homeowners, 
especially in a country like Pakistan where homes are usually purchased on a cash basis 
(Baharoglu and Kessides, 2002: 128). This is why the SBP has allowed MFBs to offer 
housing loans, but these loan amounts are higher denomination and usually unaffordable 
for those living below or at the poverty line.  
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No client in the sample mentioned being able to realize a homeownership goal as a direct 
or indirect result of microfinance. However, two clients mentioned that the loan helped 
them towards home improvements, which brings us to the last noneconomic wellbeing 
indicator, that is, other benefits accruing from the loan.  
Table 14 Other Self Reported Loan Uses 
Loan Use Institution Number of 
Clients 
Financed sister’s wedding Khushhali Bank – 
MFB 
1 
Sent son to Dubai to seek better-paying 
job 
Kashf – MFI 1 
Co-purchased a motorbike with a friend Kashf – MFI 1 
Paid off an old debt  ASA – MFI 1 
Paid off outstanding utility bill ASA – MFI 1 
Purchased Eid clothes for family members ASA – MFI 1 
 
Table 14 presents the big-ticket consumption items clients in the sample mentioned were 
paid for by their loans. The majority of these were MFI clients. Of course this does not 
mean that clients who did not detail their loan usage only applied the credit received 
towards their businesses. 
III.B.iii Borrower Findings and Study Limitations 
Framing these client related findings against the limitations of this study, specified in 
Section II, I find no systematic differences between the urban clients from Karachi, 
Lahore or Rawalpindi.  
On the other hand, the experiences of the rural clients in the sample appear to differ from 
that of their urban counterparts. For instance, the homeownership pattern in rural areas is 
such that except for the landless sharecropper everyone else is a homeowner, even if 
being a homeowner means living and working on the same narrow piece of land. The 
landless sharecropper is generally among the poorest and is, therefore, not eligible for 
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microfinance.  
Similarly, interview data shows that sending their children to school is much more 
important for urban parents than to rural parents, especially when it comes to female 
children. This is corroborated by the fact that while the national literacy rate is 58 
percent, rural literacy rate is only 49 percent and rural female literacy is only 35 percent 
(Ministry of Finance, Pakistan, 2011). 
Thus, the client related findings from this study largely represent urban microfinance and 
a separate study would is required to sufficiently incorporate the experience of rural 
microcredit clients. 
IV. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper confirms the hypothesis that the pressure to earn commercial profits has 
weakened the poverty alleviation agenda for most MFBs. MFIs, in comparison, appear 
more committed to their social mission. Part of the reason is that MFIs are operationally 
more flexible and are able to keep their operational costs low, thanks to fewer regulatory 
requirements, which allows them to expand outreach to poorer clients, who are in general 
more expensive from the institutional point of view.  
However, the findings also suggest that the distinctions between the two institution types 
are to a large extent policy driven. For instance, recent policy changes have nudged 
MFBs to target individuals over the poverty line and the lower end of the SME sector, 
while MFIs have been expected to fill in the gaps thus created, by targeting those below 
the line.  
The case of spinoffs is interesting, as each institution has dealt with the transition in its 
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own way. For instance, FMFB, the first spinoff, has remained strong on its poverty 
alleviation agenda, while Kashf Bank seems to have moved to the other extreme, 
shedding its social agenda almost completely to achieve commercial success.  
The sector as a whole has become more committed to achieving financial sustainability. 
This has meant that most MFIs and MFBs now target the less poor or even the non-poor; 
most MFBs and some MFIs do not lend to start-ups; at least one MFI asks its borrowers 
to pay a few days ahead of the actual due date so that repayment rates can look good; and 
most MFBs have stepped up lending against gold – a clear departure from the original 
non-collateralized microfinance model.  
The research finds Akhuwat, a zero interest based MFI, to be the sector’s clearest outlier. 
It mainly seeks social change and poverty alleviation and has little interest in becoming 
commercially viable. However, there are other institutions such as FMFB, an MFB, and 
Thardeep, an MFI, for whom the poverty alleviation agenda takes precedence over 
seeking financial returns. 
On the whole, the sector appears more reliable and transparent than informal sources of 
finance, but the order is reversed when it comes to flexibility. Institutions do not make 
allowances when life events or environmental conditions make it hard for borrowers to 
repay on time and clients either end up having to borrow informally, skipping meals to 
repay on time or having to face loan officers demanding payment in a manner clients 
report as humiliating. 
In terms of wellbeing, only 21 percent in the client sample report feeling that their 
economic situation has improved. Similarly, only 21 percent report that they were able to 
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expand their businesses because of the loans they received. Many clients report that their 
reliance on informal borrowing has not reduced, since loan sizes are often inadequate for 
business investments such as buying livestock. But a major reason for continued reliance 
on informal borrowing is because clients often have difficulty making loan repayments 
on time.  
In terms of non-economic indicators of wellbeing, the educational status of clients’ 
children was found to be better than the national average. The majority have school-aged 
children attending school. The homeownership rate is also high for the sample. However, 
the discussion on socioeconomic targeting suggests that the real reason for the strength of 
these results is that microfinance institutions do not target the poorest, in fact many target 
those over the poverty line.  
What conclusions can we then draw about the impact on poverty of microfinance? 
Clearly, the microfinance sector has experienced mission drift and is no longer serving 
just the poor. Those that are being targeted are either just below or over the poverty line, 
and even they have not experienced a vast improvement in their lives. It would, however, 
be wrong to say microfinance offers no benefits to its clients. It is a reliable source of 
formal credit and has helped some expand their businesses, and others have used it for 
consumption smoothening. While this may not result in poverty reduction through the 
expansion of entrepreneurship amongst the poor as hoped for by the original promoters of 
microfinance (Yunus and Jolie, 1998), it nevertheless provides the poor with an 
additional source of credit to bridge the ever-widening gap between their incomes and 
expenditures. This is especially true in Pakistan where the harsh economic climate has 
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made it harder for the poor to make ends meet, as detailed in chapters 4 and 5. 
In terms of which institutional structure serves the poverty mission better, MFIs on 
average seem to be doing more for the poor than MFBs. However, it is difficult to 
provide a definitive answer to this question, as MFIs often have weak controls, 
inexperienced staff and have used dubious practices to expand outreach. Finally, 
Akhuwat, the only zero interest based institution in the sample, appears most focused on 
its mission of poverty alleviation and social change. These conclusions largely confirm 
Dorado’s (2006) expectations that for-profit SEVs will have the most diluted emphasis on 
their social mission, that cross-sector SEVs will be most focused on their social 
objectives and that non-profit SEVs will fall somewhere in the middle. Of course 
exceptions, such as the MFB FMFB also exist. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MICROFINANCE: POLITICAL ECONOMY INFLUENCES AND CONSTRAINTS - 
A LITERATURE REVIEW	  
 
Political economy narratives regarding the global South often characterize the state as a 
corrupt, inefficient and apathetic entity represented by a bureaucratic structure that does 
more harm than good (Candland, 2001; Morduch, 1999). To make matters worse, such 
states often wield power against their own citizenry, and dole out favor and patronage 
where and when they please (Cheema, Khwaja and Qadir, 2006; Desai, 2010). In these 
societies, inequalities become inter-generationally entrenched, the consequences of which 
are borne by both the disadvantaged individuals and society as a whole. Individuals suffer 
social, economic and political exclusion, and society from lost human capital (Guinier, 
2001). 
True development, on the other hand, as the current discourse on global development 
suggests, is a vibrant process in which people actively mobilize for institutional, political, 
economic and social change (McMichael, 2012). In advanced countries, this is possible 
through participation in social movements and by exercising the right to vote (Mitlin and 
Bebbington, 2006; Desai, 2010). But when such agency-granting tools are not readily 
available, as is the case in many Southern countries, individuals must instead rely on their 
networks of trust and engagement, collectively referred to as their social capital (Putnam, 
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1995: 67). Social capital is the readiness of the members of a community to cooperate 
with each other and their willingness to participate in civic endeavors together (Desai, 
2010). Modern development theory considers social capital, especially as defined by 
Putnam above, to be an essential building block of the South’s development process 
(Rankin, 2002). 
Given the context of a hostile state and the urgency of participatory development, it 
follows that a successful intervention should have the following ingredients: the ability to 
bypass the state machinery; enabling, empowering and engaging its constituents, ideally 
by employing the community’s social capital; and ensuring self-sustainability.  
It is no wonder then that when microfinance hit the global stage in the eighties and 
nineties, it quickly garnered broad-based support for it fulfilled all the above three 
conditions. As an intervention that provides access to credit to those that live on the 
fringes of society, it was said to reduce both poverty and disempowerment among 
vulnerable groups, specifically women (Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 2006; Khandker, 
1998). It was also asserted that it allowed communities to come together through group 
lending arrangements, which enabled participation in collective action (Osmani, 2007). 
And the best part was that the process was self-contained and sustainable without a long-
term need for government or donor support (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). 
However, 30 years and more than 200 million clients later, members of the development 
community have begun to reassess their unqualified support for microfinance. Much of 
this stems from microfinance’s evolution from a modest rural-development intervention 
to a commercialized financial activity, trying to achieve rapid scale. This trajectory of 
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change has important implications for the ultimate beneficiaries of the intervention and 
this essay reviews the process through which microfinance came to be regarded as an 
essential tool for poverty reduction and empowerment, as well as its subsequent 
commercialization, globally and in Pakistan. It will also analyze the political economy 
constraints within which microfinance must operate. To frame the analysis Pakistan’s 
current social, political and economic situation will be reviewed in order to provide a 
spatial and temporal context to the discussion. This analysis will then be employed to 
contextualize Pakistan’s microfinance experience in the chapter that follows. 
The first section of this essay traces microfinance’s movement into the development 
mainstream, while the second provides a brief overview of Pakistan’s development 
history. A third and final section details the salient features of Pakistan’s political 
economy from the perspective of the microfinance sector and its clients. This section also 
includes a review of the complex political economy of Karachi, the city from which 
nearly 70 percent of this study’s client sample was drawn. Karachi is Pakistan’s 
economic and financial capital, and unfortunately its most violent city as well.  
I. The Political Economy of Global Development 
 
While development is generally understood to be the priority of the state, it is not the 
business of the state alone. Global development institutions, including the World Bank, 
the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) and international development agencies, 
such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), are important 
stakeholders in the development process both at the global and the local level. They wield 
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considerable power in shaping the development experience across the global South.  
Among these, it is the international financial institutions (IFIs), that is, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that have most often been criticized for 
relying on archaic models of growth (Easterly, 1999). Models, such as the “big push” 
theory of development, emphasize large-scale investment projects for achieving rapid 
economic growth (Saad-Filho, 2010), and use measures such as GDP per capita to 
calibrate development (Pender, 2001). Poverty reduction is not the principal concern 
here, and some increase in inequality is considered unavoidable in the early phase of 
development (Saad-Filho, 2010), though in the later stages it is expected that the benefits 
of growth will trickle down to the masses (Menon, 2007). Unfortunately, there has been 
little evidence of an actual trickle down, and the experience across the South has not been 
one of inclusive growth (Melville, 2002; M’Cormack, 2011). Inclusive growth is defined 
as one where benefits are shared across sectors and by a large proportion of the 
workforce (M’Cormack, 2011).  
Not surprisingly, IFI policies have been deeply unpopular in the South. A recent example 
is the structural adjustment program that has accompanied international debt 
restructuring, beginning in the eighties (Saad-Filho, 2010). Structural adjustment calls for 
privatization, restricted government spending, removal of price and other subsidies, and 
trade and financial liberalization. The difference between these and the earlier “big push” 
models is that structural adjustment programs are much more pro-market and anti-state 
than the latter (Pender, 2001).  
By the 1990s it was clear even to the IFIs that their policies had failed on several 
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accounts. Structural adjustment programs, for instance, were found to have either a 
negative or a net zero impact on growth (Easterly, 2006); were associated with rising 
unemployment thanks to privatization conducted in nascent markets (Stiglitz, 2002); 
were said to lead to a growing sense of insecurity among people in recipient countries 
who felt they had no control over their own lives (Stiglitz, 2002) which led to rising 
levels of political instability (Hsieh, 2009). 
As the evidence against these policies mounted, the 1990s ended up as a decade of 
intense debate and reorientation within the World Bank. This was also a time when the 
human development approach began to influence development thought. Mahbub ul Haq 
and Amartya Sen, the formulators of the approach argued that the aim of development 
should be to enlarge people’s choices and to create an enabling environment for them to 
lead fulfilling lives (UNDP, 1990). These ideas were crystalized in the first Human 
Development Report (HDR), published in 1990 by the UNDP.  
Sen went on to extend his conceptualization of development as the enhancement of 
human capabilities with Nussbaum and others. Capabilities were defined as the freedoms 
people value and their capacity to exercise these freedoms were referred to as functions 
(Alkire, 2007). These ideas expanded the concept of development to include all possible 
aspects of human well-being, including health, education, gender equality, self-esteem, 
political and economic participation (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2002; Alkire, 2007).  
Development, thereafter, came to be defined as a set of practices that increased the 
capacity of individuals to control their own lives (Murphy, 2006:30). This shift was 
instrumental in relativizing GDP growth as just one aspect of development, giving 
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prominence instead to the more holistic idea of individual wellbeing (Pender, 2001). 
Finally persuaded by these shifts in the narrative, the World Bank began to reconsider its 
own development discourse (Saad-Filho, 2010). The experience with structural 
adjustment had made the need for a broad based buy-in abundantly clear and the Bank 
signaled that involvement in the development process by all stakeholders would become 
an important policy focus. Social mobilization and community participation became the 
cornerstones of its new development policy. These were defined as active engagement of 
the partners and the beneficiaries of development in determining the priorities, processes 
and ends of development (Shah and Baporikar, 2012; Cornwall and Brock, 2005).  
In the 2000s, the Bank and its partners unveiled an inclusive growth paradigm (Saad-
Filho, 2010), which called for “equality of opportunity, in terms of access to markets, 
resources and an unbiased regulatory environment for businesses and individuals” (World 
Bank, 2009: 2). As part of the inclusive growth agenda, the Bank established various 
“social funds” across a number of developing countries, through which it began to invest 
in micro-projects, in partnership with local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
public or private sector entities.  
A key characteristic of these funds is that they are demand-driven, that is, projects are 
funded based on proposals prepared by local organizations (Abbet and Covey, 1996). 
Over time, IFI funding for local projects through these funds has grown significantly, 
indicating a move towards a more participatory development process, and one that relies 
on local institutions for support and service delivery (World Bank, 2002). This 
symbolizes a move away from the previous one-size-fits-all prescription of liberalization, 
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privatization and unfettered markets, towards a stronger commitment to indigenous 
poverty reduction and empowerment programs (Stiglitz, 2004). It is estimated that the 
World Bank has invested more than $85 billion over the past decade on development 
assistance for participatory projects (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). 
At the same time, critics argue that these funds have distanced the state further from the 
social sector, and may not represent as much of a change from the Bank’s free market 
philosophy as often assumed (Chakrabarti and Dhar, 2013). Many NGOs also complain 
that funding often goes to private contractors, rather than local institutions, who have a 
deep knowledge of the communities being served, and that contractor-based projects run 
the risk of being a lot less participatory (Abbot and Covey, 1996).  
Finally, new research on participatory development indicates that civil society failure is 
as likely to occur as market or government failure, since NGOs are also susceptible to 
problems of coordination, asymmetric information and pervasive inequality. More 
importantly, donor driven large-scale participation projects are not as effective as organic 
participation, which occurs spontaneously to solve social issues. This research also finds 
that the poor often benefit less from participatory processes than the non-poor, as do the 
less-literate and those living in more remote and isolated localities (Mansuri and Rao, 
2013). 
Nevertheless, the shift in the development discourse and the increasing importance of 
micro project financing had had important implications for the microfinance sector.  
 
 A. Microfinance and Participatory Development 
In the eighties, microfinance was mainly a grassroots movement that sought to alleviate 
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poverty by providing access to credit (Kabeer and Mahmud, 2010). By the mid-nineties, 
development had a put on ‘a human face’ (UNDP, 1999), that is, it had come to be 
understood in terms of individual freedom and wellbeing. Sen referred to this as 
individual agency, that is, giving people control over what they valued and had reason to 
value (Alkire, 2008). As social mobilization or community development, became the new 
mantra of participatory development, microfinance began to achieve new prominence. It 
appeared to be an ideal alternative to the basic needs approach to poverty alleviation 
(Rankin, 2002), where the poor were seen as passive receivers of social services that were 
reduced to a commodity-like status (Fukuda-Parr, 2003).  
It was in this capacity that microfinance became the intervention of choice across Latin 
America and South Asia, and later in Africa, Eastern Europe and the Caribbean. In 
several countries, the World Bank helped develop nascent microfinance sectors through 
its Social Funds. In Pakistan, the World Bank established the Pakistan Poverty 
Alleviation Fund (PPAF) in 1999. Chapter 1 describes how the PPAF wholesales funds to 
microfinance institutions at below credit market rates. As part of its original lending 
criteria, the PPAF would fund institutions that participated in social mobilization and 
institution building at the village and city union council15 level (World Bank, 2013). 
But exactly how does social mobilization work through and with microfinance? The 
answer to this lies in two important concepts that rose to prominence in the past two 
decades, that is, the informal economy and social capital (Rankin, 2002; Elyachar, 2002; 
Morduch, 1999). The following sections review the importance of each for the 
microfinance movement. 
                                                
15 Union councils are the smallest administrative units at the city level in Pakistan.  
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 B. The Informal Economy, Public-Private Partnerships and Microfinance 
The informal economy has been subject to multiple interpretations in the past few 
decades. During the fifties and the sixties, it was referred to as the traditional sector that 
included craftsmen, petty traders and casual workers who were expected to disappear as 
traditional economies transformed into modern capitalist economies, employing the 
models of rapid growth described in the previous section (Women in Informal 
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WEIGO), 2013). This idea was dispelled in 
the early seventies as the first international labor organization’s (ILO) World 
Employment Mission to Kenya reported that the informal sector had not only persisted, 
but had expanded to include larger, more profitable enterprises (ILO, 1972).  
During the eighties it came to light that during a recession the informal sector would 
expand to absorb unemployed labor from the shrinking formal economy across the global 
South (Tokman, 1992; Lee, 1998). As the world economy globalized during the nineties 
and became increasingly competitive, the informal sector grew as result of a host of new 
developments. These included decentralization and flexible specialization, moving 
production offshore to places where labor laws were lax and employment was piecemeal 
and based on short-term contracts, without benefits (WEIGO, 2013). 
As the nature of informality evolved, its definition went through several rounds of 
changes. Arthur Lewis (1954) is credited for having proposed the original notion of the 
informal economy as the traditional sector and predicting that it was a temporary 
phenomenon, which would disappear as economies modernized. Even though such a 
transformation never took place (Hossein, 2012), the idea that the informal sector was 
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marginal and separate from the formal sector continued to hold sway (ILO, 1972) until 
globalization eventually changed production and employment conditions in the world 
economy. 
Today our understanding of the informal sector is much more nuanced. Much of it stems 
from the work of women’s movements such as the Self Employed Women’s Association 
(SEWA) and WEIGO. They have defined the informal economy as consisting of a range 
of informal enterprises and informal jobs that fall outside the purview of government 
regulation and protection. These include self-employment in informal enterprises, 
employment in informal jobs and home-based workers (Chen, 2007). Particular attention 
is paid to the vulnerability and poverty of informal workers, as well as the gender 
segmentation within the informal economy.  
Research shows that the informal economy constitutes the poorest section of society, 
made even more vulnerable by the contractual and variable nature of this type of 
employment. These jobs do not provide health and safety legislation, nor is there any type 
of risk protection, such as insurance or pension benefits (Bertulfo, 2011; ILO, 2013).  
Women represent the largest component of the informal economy, and for women the 
informal sector is the primary source of employment (Chen, 2000). For instance, it is 
estimated that women constitute 80 percent of home-based workers in South Asia 
(Doanne, 2007). Figure 1 describes the relationship between poverty, vulnerability and 
gender within the informal economy. 
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Figure 8 Segmentation in the Informal Economy 
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The figure indicates that women dominate the bottom of the pyramid, where earnings are 
lower and employment conditions most precarious. In addition, much of home-based and 
casual wage work remains unremunerated. Finally, in comparison with the formal sector, 
average earnings in the informal sector are lower and the gender-based wage gap higher 
(Chen, 2000).  
Most importantly, from the point of view of the development community, the informal 
sector employs the majority of the workforce in developing countries. For instance, 
household surveys in sub-Saharan Africa indicate that two-thirds of non-farm 
employment can be attributed to the informal sector (Sparks and Barnett, 2010). In 
general, it is understood that the relative size of the informal economy correlates 
Low	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inversely with countries’ income levels (Pina, et al, 2012), but even for those higher up 
the development ladder, the informal economy continues to play a prominent role. For 
instance, in Bolivia the informal economy accounts for 67 percent of total employment 
and in India, approximately 86 percent (Tannuri-Pianto et al, 2004; Chen, 2001).  
The dissemination of such research has been instrumental in persuading the IFIs that the 
informal economy is not something external to the “real” economy (Elyachar, 2002). It is 
also argued that by focusing on the informal economy the gender problem can be 
addressed, as feminist scholars have long objected that the benefits of development have 
bypassed women, especially in the present age of globalization (Parpart et al, 2002: 3).  
In this context microfinance has been identified as an ideal tool to assimilate the informal 
economy into the mainstream (Elyachar, 2002), for the clients of microfinance are the 
operators of informal enterprises and home-based work.  
In order to collaborate directly with the microfinance sector, the IFIs and the international 
development agencies such as the UNDP and USAID have had to change their modus 
operandi. From dealing exclusively with the state, as has been their norm, the IFIs have 
now moved into the NGO realm, giving birth to the concept of public-private 
partnerships.  
These partnerships are defined as collaborations between impoverished communities and 
the private sector, which includes NGOs, mediated by the state for localized social 
service delivery (Elyahchar, 2002). The implicit assumption is that the public sector is 
lacking both in will and ability, and that the private sector, by employing a business 
model for social service delivery will be naturally much more efficient. Scholars have 
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argued though that when the private sector is driven by the profit motive there will be an 
inherent conflict with the welfare-driven needs of the community (Miraftab, 2004). 
But when it comes to NGOs, the international development community often takes it for 
granted that they are much better at service delivery, compared to the inefficient, bloated 
and corrupt state (Kabeer, 2010). At the same time, there is no agreement in the current 
scholarship on whether NGOs are the ideal vehicle for promoting development (e.g. 
Moore and Putzel, 1999; Davis and McGregor, 2000; Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, 2006). 
In fact, research by Mansuri and Rao (2013) finds widespread evidence of civil society 
failure, especially with respect to participatory development projects.  
 Kabeer (2010) is more optimistic and contends that there is an ongoing tussle between 
the competing ideas of market and state within the NGO sector, and argues that affinity 
with the local community will depend on which idea wins in a certain time or space. In 
other words, the nature of the local institution will determine outcomes at the community 
level. This certainly applies to the microfinance sector, which includes institutions that 
vary along a wide spectrum, with one extreme driven only by social motives and the 
other mainly by profits. The findings presented in the previous chapter largely confirm 
this.  
This is why the state is required to play an active role in such partnerships (Miraftab, 
2004). In fact, the effectiveness of participation is enhanced by a pre-existing cooperative 
infrastructure, which can only occur where there are functional state institutions (Mansuri 
and Rao, 2013). In actual practice though, these partnerships are designed to limit state 
involvement. This is true for microfinance, where the necessity of dealing with state 
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actors is easily bypassed (Fine, 1999), because microfinance is said to depend not on 
government support, but the community’s social capital (Rankin, 2002).  
 
 C. Microfinance, Social Capital and Empowerment 
Social capital refers to the informal networks of trust and reciprocity that exist within a 
community (Putnam, 1993). In line with the idea that development must be participatory, 
the World Bank (2001) has declared that it is the task of development to identify, use, and 
invest in a community’s social capital. Yunus (1998) and others have similarly claimed 
that the very success of microcredit rests on the efficiency with which the community’s 
social capital is harnessed. The original group-lending methodology of microcredit was 
specifically designed to harness the power of social capital. Groups are based on trust and 
members strive to maintain “group solidarity” as continued eligibility for future loans 
depends on the group’s repayment performance (Khandker, 2012). In this way, the 
community’s social capital becomes the linchpin of microcredit operations, allowing it to 
lower operational costs, reduce repayment risks and, at the same time, empowering those 
it serves, at least theoretically. 
The group-lending model involves extending credit to groups of between five and twenty, 
with each member responsible for the loans of others in the group. Members are usually 
neighbors, friends or extended family (Gine and Karlan, 2007). Early research on the 
subject provides a rich narrative on how group lending empowers women by creating 
peer mentoring and a support network. Since the intervention is targeted mostly at 
women and transactions are usually conducted without the intermediation of men 
(Hashemi, Schuler and Riley, 1996; Bernasek and Stanfield, 1997, Bernasek, 2003), it 
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becomes especially important for regions such as South Asia, where economic 
participation rates for women are low and they are seen as the life long dependents of 
men (Kabeer, Huda, and Kaur, 2012).   
Further, as group lending requires regular attendance at weekly or monthly meetings, 
women who might otherwise be socially isolated, are able to defend their attendance as a 
social and household level obligation. Attending these meetings is, thus, argued to have 
its own intrinsic value (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997) and has been referred to as 
empowerment through mingling (Osmani, 2007). In this way, mere participation in the 
group borrowing process was, and often continues to be, seen as a proxy for 
empowerment. But critics point out that this has led to an unjustified focus on the poor as 
agents of change and survival, ignoring the structural causes of poverty and inequality 
(Rankin, 2002).  
Secondly, in actual practice the financial sustainability imperatives of microfinance 
institutions often end up reducing the collective power of the group to the point of merely 
serving to reduce the institution’s own risks and costs (Rankin, 2002). When the bottom-
line is at stake, social mobilization is often too time and resource intensive. In such cases, 
social capital can be used exploitatively, as shown by accounts of borrowers in rural 
Bangladesh who would confiscate each others’ belongings or participate in “house 
breaking” when faced with a delinquency (Karim, 2011). This is referred to as financial 
discipline through peer pressure (Yaron, 1991). 
Joint liability programs are also notoriously inflexible, disregarding the precarious nature 
of poverty (Gine and Karlan, 2007; Roodman, 2012). It is this inflexibility that is thought 
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to contribute to repayment problems in an intervention where zero default is taken for 
granted (Dowla and Barua, 2006). Recent research has pointed out incidents of group 
“unzipping” in Bangladesh, India (Gine, et al, 2011) and Uganda (Wright and Rippey, 
2003). “Unzipping” refers to an en masse default of all members of a borrowing group, 
either as a result of an excessive debt burden or because of an exogenous shock that 
affects all or most members (Rutherford, 1999). 
Most recently, group lending has been on a gradual phase-out. Grameen Bank, the 
institution that popularized the group-lending model, now allows renegotiation of loans 
on an individual basis (Gine and Karlan, 2010). Similarly, the Bangladeshi microfinance 
giant, the Association for Social Advancement (ASA) has done away with joint liability 
contracts and maintains the group lending structure only for coordination purposes (Gine 
and Karlan, 2010). Thus, the solidarity aspect of microfinance lending arrangements has 
become less important with time, especially as microfinance enters the age of 
commercialization. Group lending is generally considered more conducive for small loan 
sizes, female creditors and the very poor (Khandker, 2012), aspects of microfinance not 
necessarily consistent with commercialization.  
But even before microfinance became an attractive business proposition, international 
development institutions were attracted to it because of the promise of sustainability that 
it offered. 
 
D. The Financially Sustainable Intervention 
Financial sustainability is often referred to as one of three elements in the “critical 
triangle of microfinance”, the other two being outreach and impact (Zeller and Meyer, 
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2002). This simply means that unlike other development interventions, such as public 
works, microfinance does not need long-term donor or state support, in order to deliver 
social benefits on a permanent basis (Littlefield, Morduch and Hashemi, 2003; Morduch, 
1999). As eschewing subsidies and achieving financial sustainability becomes the 
dominant philosophy in microfinance, successful institutions increasingly need to 
demonstrate that they are following good banking principles (Morduch, 2000). It is often 
argued that only sustainable institutions can efficiently deliver on the poverty alleviation 
account (Schmidt, 2010). The idea being that such institutions are able to reduce costs 
and expand outreach simultaneously allowing for maximum impact.  
As microfinance comes of age, its popularity with socially responsible investment funds 
and individuals interested in both a social and a financial return on their investments has 
risen. Private investments are often funnelled through investment vehicles known as 
microfinance investment funds or MIVs. There are presently over a 100 MIVs in 
business, with assets worth approximately US$7.5 billion (MicroRate, 2013). From the 
point of view of such public and private investors, microfinance presents a “rare” 
opportunity to “have your cake and eat it too” (Economist, 2010).  
From the development perspective, critics have pointed out that the emphasis on 
sustainability has often pared microfinance down to a strictly financial dimension of 
poverty alleviation. When institutions reward their officers based on the number of loans 
disbursed, rates of repayment, and design procedures and products specifically to reduce 
administrative costs, staff has little incentive to go the extra mile to build collective 
consciousness through social mobilization (Rankin, 2002). 
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The discussion now will shift from the global to the local. The following section briefly 
reviews Pakistan’s development history and how microfinance came to evolve as a 
commercially driven development intervention in the country. 
II. Pakistan’s Development History 
Pakistan, a South Asian country of nearly 177 million, is classified by the World Bank as 
a lower middle-income country (2012). Its four main provinces are Punjab, Sindh, 
Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). In addition to these, there is Kashmir, 
which remains a disputed territory with India; Gilgit-Baltistan, an amalgam of seven 
districts to the North - a de-facto province that does not enjoy full constitutional rights; 
and the border region between KPK and Afghanistan, referred to as the federally 
administered tribal areas (FATA). 
In Pakistan, an estimated 58.7 million currently live below the poverty line (Naveed and 
Ali, 2012). Figure 2 below is a representation of relative poverty in the four main 
provinces, using the multidimensional poverty index (MPI), which is based on Sen’s 
capability approach. The index is constructed using 2005-06 survey data on housing, 
education, access to water, access to sanitation facilities, access to electricity, asset and 
land ownership, and empowerment. The index defines poverty as deprivation in at least 
three of these areas (Masood, et al, 2012). The figure indicates that Punjab is the least 
deprived province in aggregate terms, while Balochistan is the most deprived.  
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Figure 9 Province-wise Analysis of Multidimensional Poverty 
 
*Source: Masood, et al (2012) 
 
The UNDP’s 2013 Human Development Report (HDR) ranks Pakistan 146 out of 186 
countries based on the multidimensional human development index (HDI). The index 
employs indicators of income, education and health status to measure development. 
Pakistan’s HDI ranking places it in the low human development category. While this 
presents an overall dismal picture, regional disparities are starker. For instance, 
approximately 21 percent of Pakistani households can be categorized as extremely poor, 
but most of these live in rural areas. Specifically, among the extremely poor are one-third 
of rural households and only eight percent of urban households. A provincial analysis 
shows an even more skewed rural-urban picture. In Balochistan, 74 percent of rural 
households are poor, while in Punjab only 28 percent of rural households are poor 
(Naveed and Ali, 2012).  
Development theorists have found various reasons for Pakistan’s continued state of 
underdevelopment, including the persistence of colonial legacies (Ahmed and Khan, 
 168 
2009); passive engagement with the IFIs (Shah, 2013); half-hearted attempts at applying 
structural adjustment programs (Ahmed, 2011); corruption (Siddiqui, 2012); ethnic 
divisions (Easterly, 2001); and a politically repressed labor movement (Candland, 2007). 
Developmentally, Pakistan’s early years were characterized by a state controlled import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) regime, on the premise that a strong industrial base 
was essential for development and in order to modernize, dependence on agriculture must 
be reduced (Hussain, 1999). The implementation of this policy was financed through 
substantial foreign aid and economic planners were soon rewarded with high rates of 
growth, averaging around six percent. During this period, usually associated with the 
sixties, Pakistan was globally showcased by the IFIs as a country that was “doing 
everything right” (Zaidi, 2010).  
At that time it was generally believed that these rates could only be achieved by faithfully 
following a growth-led-development paradigm of “functional inequality” that involved 
the concentration of capital, allowing only a minimum to be set aside for social welfare 
(Candland, 2001). The expectation was that	  the	  benefits	  of	  such	  growth would 
eventually trickle down and equalize the initial unequal distribution of resources. 
However, Pakistan performed poorly on this aspect of development, earning it the 
dubious title of a country with “growth without development” (Easterly, 2001). The 
adoption of the functional inequality model also meant that human development 
outcomes suffered as growth rates rose, particularly during the sixties. Of course, there 
were other factors that contributed to rising inequalities, such as the dominance of an elite 
that did not wish to support human capital investments in the masses (Easterly, 2001), 
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and rent seeking by local industrialists and feudals (Husain, 1999). 
One example of this was the Green Revolution in agriculture during the sixties, which 
increased crop yields two-fold, through the use of new fertilizer and seed technology 
(Husain, 1999). But the benefits remained limited to a few regions only, for access to 
credit became a substantial hurdle for smaller farmers, further deepening rural 
inequalities (Islam, 1996). 
Despite the fact that a democratic government with a socialist agenda ruled the country 
during most of the seventies, this was an era of rising poverty thanks to neglect of the 
agricultural sector and widespread nationalization of the social, economic and financial 
infrastructure in the country, which depressed incomes and investment (Husain, 2009). 
By contrast, the eighties were a period of rapid economic growth, averaging around 6.6 
percent annually, spurred by the Afghan war and an influx of foreign aid (Husain, 2009). 
Poverty declined but inequality increased during this decade (Arif and Farooq, 2011).  
Towards the end of the eighties, Pakistan was again faced with an economic recession 
and turned to the IMF for financial assistance. The IMF asked the country to adopt 
structural adjustment, which called for deregulation, liberalization and the privatization of 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) (Shah, 2013).  
Comparing the structural adjustment experience in Pakistan to that of India, Candland 
(2007: 108-122) argues that while in India workers unions were effectively able to block 
the privatization of SOEs, in Pakistan the government was able to divest from most SOEs 
despite widespread protests by workers unions. The critical difference that led to such 
divergent outcomes in the two neighboring countries is that India is characterized by 
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political party-based unionism, while labor movements in Pakistan have been unable to 
find a voice in formal politics (Candland, 2007: 3).  
Thus, it is hypothesized that the present state of the development sector in Pakistan is a 
direct result of a repressed labor movement that was never allowed to gain a political 
foothold in the country. In other words, when the IFIs pressurized the state to adopt 
market-based development policies in the 1990s, there was no politically significant 
social movement that could provide enough of a counter-pressure.  
In the late 1990s, the World Bank approached the State Bank of Pakistan and asked it to 
develop a regulatory framework that would promote a bank-led model of microfinance, 
that in the process would end up deemphasizing the existing NGO-led model. There was 
no opposition to this idea, as the free market, financial liberalization and privatization 
development paradigm was already well entrenched in the country. This experience is in 
marked contrast to that of other South Asian countries, particularly India and Bangladesh, 
where microfinance is mainly the business of NGOs and self-help groups, barring some 
non-bank financial institutions in a few Indian states. This is not to say, however, that 
these institutions have not run into periodic trouble for pushing the market-led agenda too 
far (Karim, 2011; Kinetz, 2012).  
Interestingly, at the same time that the State Bank of Pakistan was preparing the rules on 
bank-led microfinance, the World Bank established the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation 
Fund (PPAF) in 1999. Through the PPAF, the World Bank contends to have helped 
develop more than 80,000 community organizations, implement 16,000 community 
infrastructure projects, provide more than 232,000 people with enterprise and skill 
 171 
development training and provisioned more than 1.9 million microcredit loans (PPAF, 
2012). But since 2012, the PPAF has also begun to extend its financial assistance to the 
microfinance banks (MFBs), which symbolizes the coming full-circle of the process of 
market-led development. 
Thus far, we have reviewed the processes of global and local development and how they 
have affected microfinance’s rise to prominence as a new age development tool. The 
narrative shifts now to a discussion of the specific political economy factors that affect 
microfinance’s effectiveness as a tool for financial access, poverty alleviation and 
empowerment in Pakistan. This analysis will provide the frame for the empirical findings 
detailed in the next chapter.  
III. The Salient Features of Pakistan’s Political Economy 
Like most Southern countries, Pakistan faces a complex political economy, which makes 
poverty alleviation an especially difficult task. At the same time, rarely has it faced as 
many crises on as many fronts as it does so now. Some suggest that as a market-based 
intervention, microfinance is less vulnerable to local political economy constraints than 
other development programs (Swain and Floro, 2008). But this makes intuitive sense only 
to an extent, since microfinance actors must navigate the same space as the rest of the 
citizenry.  
What follows is a discussion of the political economy factors most salient to the 
microfinance sector, from the point of view of the institutions and their clients. These 
include the security crisis that has enveloped the country since the 9/11 attacks in New 
York; the existing pattern of governance, power and patronage in the country; the 
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faltering economy and the economic devastation in the wake of the 2010 and 2011 
floods. Gender-based disparities are another component of the country’s complex 
political economy, but these are covered in detail in Chapter 6. The last part of this 
section consists of a brief review of Karachi’s unique political economy. This will help 
contextualize findings from the client sample in the following chapter, as nearly 70 
percent of the microcredit clients interviewed for the study are Karachi-based. 
 
 A. Security Crisis:  
In the post 9/11 era Pakistan has become a frontline state in the War on Terror and has 
dealt with the worst security crisis in its history. From 2003 onwards, approximately 
16,210 civilians have been killed in terrorist violence along with 4,990 security forces 
and a total of 25,867 “terrorists”16 (Institute of Conflict Management, 2013). In the first 
three months of 2013 alone, there was a weekly average of 70 incidents of terrorism, 
violence and unrest in the country – mainly concentrated in KPK, Balochistan and 
Karachi (Center for Research and Security Studies, 2013). 
In addition, between June 2004 and April 2013, US drone strikes have killed between 
2,541 and 3,533 in KPK. Of these, between 411 and 884 have been civilian deaths, and 
between 1,173 and 1,472 among the injured (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2013). 
Apart from the fatalities and injuries, drone strikes and Taliban insurgencies have had a 
considerable impact on the daily lives of ordinary citizens in KPK and other areas.  
Economic losses for civilians include damages to homes and places of business, loss or 
disability of a key breadwinner, medical costs incurred in caring for victims and the 
                                                
16 The “terrorist” figure is disputed, since official figures conflict with the accounts of families 
and eye-witnesses. 
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psychological issues that come with the constant threat of death. These are significant 
costs, more so for people living in the tribal regions, since underdevelopment and poverty 
is already at its worst here (Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckley, 2012). 
The overall security situation has cost the economy US$67.93 billion from 2001 to 2011. 
These costs include compensation for affectees, losses to infrastructure, exports, foreign 
investment, industrial output, tax collection, and other costs associated with uncertainty 
(Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2011).  
In the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) alone it is estimated that out of 2254 
industrial units, a total of 1660 units have closed down due to the war, leading to a loss of 
44,000 jobs. This in turn has lowered spending on social sectors, including health and 
education, both locally and nationally, despite the much greater need for reconstruction in 
the affected communities. Several hundred educational and healthcare facilities have 
been either completely or partially destroyed by the Taliban during continuing waves of 
violence. In KPK, 427 schools have been either fully or partially damaged and 63 percent 
of the fully damaged schools have been girls’ schools. In addition, 63 health facilities, 
representing 29 percent of the total, and 30 percent of area water supply schemes have 
been damaged (Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), 2010). 
Balochistan, Pakistan’s other western province is also currently enveloped in a major 
wave of insurgency. It is the country’s poorest province, but has the largest landmass and 
is rich in mineral, and oil and gas resources. Tensions between the center and the 
provincial have always existed. Episodes of major outbreaks of violence include the 1948 
insurgency, the insurgency of the sixties and the insurgency of the seventies (Alamgir, 
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2012). These insurgencies are the result of what the people of Balochistan perceive to be 
the federal government’s policy of expropriation, marginalization and dispossession 
(Grare, 2006). The latest insurgency has also resulted in a major escalation of violence in 
the province. The figure below provides a breakdown of violence-related fatalities for 
each province: 
 
Figure 10 Province-wise Breakdown of Fatalities in 2012 
 
* Data Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (2013) 
 
The figure indicates that while violence related fatalities were high in all provinces other 
than Punjab in 2012, the highest number of civilian deaths occurred in Sindh. Most of 
these were accounted for by the violence in Karachi. 
The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) tracks fatalities across Pakistan. It 
refers to the recent surge in violence in KPK as “religio-terrorism”, the violence in 
Balochistan as “nationalist-separatist”, and the violence in Karachi as “ethno-political”. 
In June 2013 alone, the Center recorded 222 violence related deaths in Karachi, which 
represents 36 percent of the total violence related death toll in the country (CRSS, 2013). 
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Karachi is a special case within Pakistan, and has its own complex political economy. 
Given that the bulk of the client sample is from this city it deserves special attention and 
will be dealt with separately in a later section. 
 
Microfinance and Conflict  
A small body of literature developed at the turn of the century, dealing specifically with 
microfinance’s experience in conflict and post-conflict zones, such as Haiti, Eretria, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and the West Bank and Gaza. The main argument was 
that microfinance, especially microcredit, could serve as a useful tool to jumpstart 
economies during and post-conflict, by aiding in the establishment and reconstruction of 
local businesses (Nagarajan and McNulty, 2004; Manalo, 2003; Doyle, 1998).  
The research did provide a note of caution to donors and practitioners, warning that they 
should not expect to achieve financial sustainability in the short-term, as the costs and 
risks of operating in such an environment, were much higher than in non-conflict regions. 
The research also warned that “successful” implementation of microcredit programs in 
these areas depended on the underlying socio-economic conditions, including a minimum 
level of political stability (Bruett et al, 2004). This implies that while sustainability-
seeking microfinance may make some difference in conflict-affected areas, it is not 
necessarily a pathway out of poverty. More than anything else, political stability depends 
on the state and existing patterns of governance and power in a country, which in turn 
affect the development and implementation of social policy, as discussed below.  
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B. Governance, Power and Patronage 
Low-income settlements across Pakistan are characterized by choked sewerage lines, 
neglected water supply schemes, “ghost schools”17 and abandoned healthcare centers 
(Baqir, 2006). The state for the most part has failed to provide basic services, especially 
to the poor.  
The system lacks a systematic, clearly articulated framework (Gazdar, 2011; Asian 
Development Bank, 2002), resulting in a range of overlapping, mismatched social 
welfare schemes that are either the result of ad hoc responses to particular problems at 
different points in time (Government of Pakistan, 2009) or based on the 
recommendations of international donors, rather than on an actual assessment of local 
needs (Jamal, 2010).  
The ad hoc nature of the system is manifested in several ways. First of all, there is no 
systematic targeting of vulnerable populations. A World Bank study (2007) found that 27 
percent of the recipients of a monthly cash transfer scheme and 37 percent of those 
receiving rehabilitation grants happened to be non-poor. The implementation of social 
policy occurs with little coordination between agencies and departments, resulting in a 
lack of focus and duplication of efforts (Bari et. al, 2005).   
Pakistan also spends fewer resources on its social sector than even some of the poorest 
sub-Saharan countries. For instance, in 2012 less than one percent of GDP was spent on 
health and less than two percent on education (UNDP, 2013). This ends up severely 
                                                
17 Ghost schools are registered as public schools but are not active educational institutions, though 
teachers may be drawing salaries and the school grounds being used as stables or grazing grounds 
for cattle (Khan, 2013).  
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restricting the financial and institutional capacity of the various institutions administering 
development schemes, which means that benefits are spread so thinly across the target 
population that the impact is negligible (Sayeed, 2004; Bari et. al., 2005; Jamal, 2010).  
These problems are symptomatic of the larger issue of governance. Governance is 
defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s 
social and economic resources, which presumes the ability to turn public resources into 
positive human development outcomes (Asian Development Bank, 2002).  
Unfortunately, Pakistan’s governance capabilities have weakened considerably in the past 
few years. The World Bank’s World Wide Governance Indicators show that the country 
does not fare well compared to others in the region. Table 15 below provides scores on 
six governance indicators including: voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption:  
	  
Table 15 World Wide Governance Indicators - Pakistan 2011 
 Governance 
Score (-2.5 to 
2.5) 
Regional 
Average 
 
Standard 
Error 
Voice and 
Accountability -0.83 -0.52 0.11 
Political Stability -2.69 -1.36 0.25 
Government 
Effectiveness -0.82 -0.57 0.19 
Regulatory 
Quality -0.61 -0.43 0.16 
Rule of Law -0.90 -0.58 0.13 
Control of 
Corruption -1.00 -0.61 0.16 	  	  	  *Source: The World Bank Group, 2012 
 
Pakistan’s performance is below regional averages on all indicators of governance. Even 
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more disturbing is the downward trend in these indicators over time. For instance, 
political stability was given a score of -1.14 in 2000 but by 2011 it had declined to -2.69. 
Corruption also worsened from -0.82 to -1.00 over the same period (The World Bank 
Group, 2012).  
Weak governance is associated with higher levels of poverty and underdevelopment. For 
instance, when apathy is combined with corruption in public sector bureaucracies, it leads 
to problems such as illegal service delivery, which can only be afforded by those with a 
minimum level of resources (Baqir, 2006; Haq and Zia, 2009). Corruption in Pakistan is 
systemic in all branches of the government: the executive, judiciary and legislature (Haq 
and Zia, 2009). According to Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions 
Index, Pakistan is the 37th most corrupt state out of a total of 176, with a low score of 27 
against a possible 100. 
Even though Pakistan was never a corruption free state, it was not until the 1990s that 
corruption became endemic rather than isolated, petty and sporadic. This was ironically 
also the first democratic decade in the country’s history, even though changes of 
government occurred several times (Husain, 2009). The dismissals of all but the last 
government in this decade were based on charges of corruption and mismanagement. It 
was during this decade that corruption became associated with the highest level of 
political participation (Khan, 2007; Noor, 2009). This becomes dramtically clear when 
considering tax evasion. A recent study reported that 61 percent of policymakers did not 
pay taxes in the years they contested elections (Cheema, 2012). 
But perhaps the worst fallout of corruption is that ordinary citizens have to encounter it 
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on a daily basis (Khan, 2007). A 2006 Transparency International Survey asked 
respondents whether they had to face corruption when dealing with different public 
institutions. The percentage of respondents that said “yes” when asked about the police 
was 90 percent, power 70 percent, judiciary 77 percent, land revenue 91 percent, taxation 
84 percent and customs 88 percent (Transparency International Pakistan, 2006).  
During the 2010 floods, that killed approximately 1800 and displaced nearly 20 million, 
the impact of corruption on the poor and the vulnerable was made acutely clear. Fear of 
misuse of aid money by corrupt officials kept badly needed international aid away from 
the country’s desperate millions (Rashid, 2010; Nelson, 2010). This was not surprising 
since most evaluations of the country’s social welfare schemes have found evidence of 
corruption, embezzlement, nepotism and patronage (e.g. Sayeed, 2004; World Bank, 
2007; Jamal, 2010).  
Participatory development in such an environment becomes difficult if not impossible. In 
his anthropological study of rural Pakistan, Lyon (2002: 186) describes how poor 
villagers in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) exhibit a fundamental belief that the 
state exists only to serve the interests of the rich and powerful.   
An unsympathetic state, low institutional quality, little opportunity for political and civic 
inclusion, all work in tandem to subvert the agency of the poor (Cheema, Khwaja and 
Qadir, 2006; Desai, 2010; Baqir, 2006). This results in a permanent state of 
disenfranchisement and poverty even during periods of growth, inevitably leading to 
higher levels of inequality (Candland, 2007). 
While the discussion so far has concentrated on corruption and the concentration of 
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power by the state, there is another hypothesis worth reviewing with regard to the pattern 
of power and patronage within Pakistan. This theory states that power in Pakistan is not 
just concentrated in a relatively small elite minority, such as the top echelons of the 
bureaucracy and the military as commonly hypothesized	  (Jalal, 1990; Haqqani, 2004; 
Ziadi, 2011; Rashid, 2011), but is distributed asymmetrically through ties of kinship, 
caste and political relationships and even the very poor can gain some favors through 
such “human resource networks” (Lyon; 2002; Lieven, 2011: 213). These networks are 
informal and involve personal interactions. 
These networks can be considered as a special type of social capital, which Putnam refers 
to as “bonding social capital” (2003). While Putnam calls this the super glue that holds 
societies together, there is evidence that the presence of such networks leads to higher 
levels of corruption (Harris, 2007).  
Such patterns of patronage are most commonly found in societies fractured along ethnic, 
social and political lines (Jehangir, 2012). Pakistan’s four main provinces represent its 
four dominant ethnicities– the Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochis and the Pakhtuns. In addition, 
there are the Muhajirs, the families that migrated from India to Pakistan in 1947 and who 
settled mainly in Karachi, Hyderabad and other urban areas in southern Sindh. Within 
these dominant ethnicities lie a much more complex web of caste, religious groupings 
and sub-ethnicities. Lieven (2011: 11) describes this as a “wheel within a wheel, an 
identity within an identity, which in turn overlaps with another identity”. Rising levels of 
economic inequalities have only resulted in intensifying these divisions (Islam, 1996).  
All other problems, such as poor governance and corruption, as well as the current 
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security crisis, can be attributed to the fractionalized state of its people (Lieven, 2011: 
11). Thus, instead of looking at the state as the unpredictable and unreasonable aggressor, 
this line of reasoning contends that anyone with the slightest bit of power plunders the 
state for patronage and favor. Lieven (2011) points out that favor is distributed through 
kinship ties, weakening the state but maintaining the power of the feudals in the 
countryside and owners of industry and capital in the cities. This is corroborated by Craig 
and Porter’s (2003) account of how “elite capture” prevented attempts at reform of the 
bureaucratic machinery during the last military government’s devolution of power in the 
2000s.  
But understanding the role of power and patronage in relation to social service delivery is 
not an easy task. For instance, the traditional view is that the feudal landlord in Pakistan 
represses the masses by keeping basic resources, such as access to education, away from 
them (Herring, 1979; Shah and Shah, 2012). Gazdar (2001), on the other hand, paints a 
more complex picture. He describes how landlords compete with one another to get the 
most out of a meager pot of public resources, such as funds for building schools for locals 
in their areas. Admittedly, the purpose is political patronage rather than public service 
and these power struggles end up damaging public resources. Thus, while local politics 
can often secure some services for the poor, they are the result in most cases of 
misappropriation and misallocation for the sake of securing and maintaining political 
support and loyalty.  
As a private sector intervention, microfinance should theoretically be able to bypass such 
issues of weak governance, corruption, and misappropriation. Microfinance practitioners 
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insist that this is indeed the case. At the same time, a deeply entrenched culture of 
corruption and patronage does have an impact on the sector’s performance as described 
in the following chapter, but we turn now to the economic crisis facing the country. 
 
C. The Economic Faultline:  
To most observers, Pakistan’s fragile security and political problems are its biggest 
issues. But there has been a gradual awakening to the fact that its economic downslide in 
the past five years may be the country’s biggest challenge yet (Stokes, 2013). During the 
past five years, inflation-adjusted economic growth was only 2.9 percent (Stokes, 2013), 
compared to the 7 percent needed to keep pace with the annual rise in the labor force 
(Rehm and Noshab, 2013).  
The recently released World Economic Forum’s 2012 Global Competitiveness Index 
ranks Pakistan 138 out of 142 countries, in terms of the macroeconomic environment. 
This speaks to what has been termed as a “very, very critical economic crisis in the 
country” (Rashid, 2012). 
Growth has faltered due to the security crisis and the increasing frequency of natural 
disasters, discussed below, but the main cause is generally understood to be weak 
governance and corruption.  
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Figure 11 Composition and Trends in GDP Growth 
 
*Data source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2011-12, Ministry of Finance, Pakistan 
 
It is clear from Figure 2 that net investment has been negative for the past five years. Net 
exports, which are gross exports less gross imports, have also had a choppy history since 
2005. Private and government consumption have taken turns to keep the economy going 
during this period, but without a steady increase in investments and exports, the country 
cannot expect to achieve a growth rate that can match the needs of a growing population. 
The current population growth rate is 2.03 percent, thanks to which the country is the 
sixth most populous in the world (Pakistan Economic Survey 2011-12). 
But macroeconomic fundamentals have rarely been as precarious as in the past five years, 
resulting in negative rates of investment and exports as shown in Figure 4. Consumer 
inflation too has been consistently above 10 percent, though the most recent official 
estimate puts it just below double digits (Khan, 2013).  
In addition, the state’s budget deficit is 8.5 percent of GDP and the government’s debt to 
GDP ratio is currently at 62.5 percent (State Bank of Pakistan, 2013), which has crowded 
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out private investment. Lending to the public sector appears less risky than to the private 
sector, which is an important factor behind the negative rate of growth in private 
investment in the country.  
In fiscal year 2012, exports contracted by 2.8 percent, partly due to falling investment 
levels and the rest due to the chronic energy shortage. The power shortage is estimated to 
have cut annual economic growth by up to 4 percent over the past few years, and forced 
shutdowns of hundreds of factories, paralyzing production, investment, and employment. 
The current power shortfall is 7,000 megawatts, against a total generation of 10,500 
megawatts (Khan, 2013). The crisis is the result of inefficient fuel-mix choices; 
insufficient revenue to support generation thanks to an already burdensome public debt, 
non-payment of energy and tax dues that are again symptomatic of weak governance; and 
a lack of political will to revise power subsidies (Kugelman, 2013; Kessides, 2013).  
The power crisis has important implications for microfinance clients since as small 
business owners they cannot afford private power generation and must depend on the 
national grid for all their energy needs.  
 
The 2010-11 Floods 
In addition to these economic woes, Pakistan has also recently faced major natural 
disasters, which have resulted in a heavy toll on its human and physical infrastructure. 
These disasters include the 2005 earthquake that killed approximately 73,000 people (The 
Guardian, 2005); and the annual floods since 2010 that have killed hundreds and 
displaced millions.  
The 2010 floods were especially damaging for the microfinance sector and require 
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special mention. In the latter half of 2010, nearly one-fifth of the country’s landmass was 
submerged, killing more than 1800 people and affecting nearly 21 million, across 84 of 
the country’s 12018 districts (Arshad and Shafi, 2010; Humanitarian Response Index 
(HRI); 2011). The damage caused to the social, physical and governance infrastructures, 
the economy, and the environment was estimated to be in excess of US$10 billion 
(Arshad and Shafi, 2010). The economic damage was estimated at 6 percent of GDP. The 
figure below provides a breakdown of flood-related economic losses: 
 
Figure 12 Breakdown of Economic Losses by Sector from the 2010 Floods 
 
* Source: Arshad and Shafi. (2010) Government of Pakistan 
 
Clearly, agriculture was the most flood-affected sector, accounting for 72 percent of total 
losses. Province-wise, Sindh was the hardest hit with 46 percent of total damages, 
followed by Punjab with 36 percent of total damages to crops, livestock and fisheries 
(Arshad and Shafi, 2010). In 2011, while recovery efforts were still underway, heavy 
rains hit areas in Sindh and Punjab once again. This not only brought relief efforts to a 
                                                
18 This includes 113 districts in the 4 main provinces and an additional 7 in the de-facto province 
of Gilgit-Baltistan. 
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standstill, but ended up affecting an additional 5.8 million people, with 1.8 million people 
categorized by the UN as “living in extremely vulnerable conditions of displacement” 
(Singh, 2012; HRI, 2011). 
Post-flood analysis has blamed breaches in Sindh’s Left Bank Out Drain (LBOD) – a 
drainage system designed to channel excess water into the sea - for the devastation that 
occurred in Sindh (Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO), 2011; Junejo, 2011; 
Ahmed, 2011). This drainage system was designed and funded by the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank in the midst of widespread public protests in the eighties 
and nineties. The initial design also called for water to drain in Shakoor Lake, which 
borders India. Fearing a backlash both within and beyond the border, the Government 
changed the initial design to appease some of the landlords and prevent a border-crisis 
from occurring, by ensuring that excess water would fall into the Arabian Sea rather than 
the Lake. Many have blamed the breaches caused by the floods on alterations in the 
original design of the drainage system (SPO, 2011). 
The floods have been especially devastating for the microfinance sector, as described in 
the following chapter. Relegated to the bottom of the economic pyramid, rural 
microfinance clients are especially vulnerable to natural disasters, rising food prices, and 
cuts in development budgets. This has implications for the institutions that offer them 
financial services, since repayment abilities come into question, as do the possibilities for 
future growth. Before moving on to the next chapter to discuss these implications in 
detail, we take a brief look at the political economy of Pakistan’s largest and most 
complex city, Karachi.  
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D. Karachi – Mini Pakistan:  
“How innocent are the people of your city 
They murder and then ask whose funeral is that?”  
–Translated from Urdu, painted at the back of a public bus in Karachi (2012) 
 
Karachi is one of the world’s 21 “mega cities” (Todaro and Smith, 2012) with a 
population approaching 15 million, according to official estimates, and 21 million, 
according to unofficial estimates (Khan, 2012). Its ethnic and religious diversity has 
earned it the title “mini Pakistan” (Budhani, et. al. 2010).  
Karachi is also economically and socially more advanced than the rest of the country. For 
instance, Pakistan’s overall literacy rate was estimated to be 58 percent in 2011 (Ministry 
of Finance, 2011), but Karachi’s literacy rate according to 2007 official estimates was 79 
percent (Inskeep, 2011). Karachi is also a major contributor to the national economy. Its 
contributions constitute 94 percent of Sindh’s tax revenues, which in turn is responsible 
for 70 percent of the country’s total income tax collections (Hasan and Mohib, 2003).  
As the country’s largest metropolis, and its commercial and financial center, Karachi is 
home to migrants from all over Pakistan, making it the most ethnically diverse city in the 
country. According to the 1998 census19, Muhajirs, the children of migrants from India, 
make up 48.52 percent of Karachi’s population; Punjabis from the province of Punjab 
represent 13.94 percent of the city; Pathans, from the northern province of KPK, 11.42 
percent of the city; while Sindhis and Balochis, the original inhabitants of the city, are 
                                                
19 The latest census was conducted in 2011 but city-wise demographic details are not scheduled to 
be released until mid-2014 according to the Census Bureau of Pakistan. 
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now only 7.22 percent and 4.34 percent of the total population respectively (Hasan and 
Mohib, 2003; Gazdar, 2011).  
This diversity is one reason why Karachi has become one of the world’s most violent 
cities (Gayer, 2013). Over the years, tension has grown between the different ethnicities 
that jostle for power and control over the city’s economic and financial resources, 
resulting in continued violence and general lawlessness. This “chronic state of 
emergency”, which includes political conflict and criminal violence, began in the mid-
1980s but has escalated since 2007 (Gayer, 2013).  
Political parties claiming to represent the Muhajirs, Pathans, and Sindhis are mainly to 
blame for the perpetuation of this state of affairs. What keeps violence central in the lives 
of Karachites is that no ethnic party enjoys a monopoly in terms of popularity and the 
city’s heterogeneity is not just along ethnic lines, but also in terms of class and socio-
economic status, keeping the various groups in a constant state of war. A complex web of 
patronage and struggle for power is behind most of Karachi’s turf wars, which inevitably 
ends in ethnic violence.  
Violence in the city is characterized by “target killings” of members of warring ethnic 
groups that take hundreds of lives each year and “ethnic riots” that shut down the city on 
a regular basis (Gayer, 2012). In 2012 alone, 2,500 people died as a result of violent 
crime in the city. What is even more alarming is that this figure is 50 percent higher than 
that of the year before. While sectarianism remains the main cause of murder in the city, 
violence by extremist groups has recently been added to the mix, with the murders of 
over 200 Shias, a minority Muslim sect, occurring in 2012 alone (Temple-Raston, 2013).  
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Karachi’s other major problem is extortion, which affects small business owners more 
than anything else. The extortionists, locally called the “bhatta mafia”, have the support 
of the major political parties in the city and are quick to kidnap or murder when 
threatened with non-payment (Ebrahim, 2012). In the Orangi Town neighborhood of 
Karachi, suspected extortionists recently threw hand grenades in a private school over 
non-payment of extortion money, injuring several children in the process (Dawn, May 
2013).  
Some argue that Karachi’s disorder has a state of order and violence is now 
“manageable” for its population, so that after each wave of killing, “normalcy” returns to 
the city within four days (Gayer, 2013). At the same time, these observers admit that 
“normalcy” has increasingly included kidnappings, torture, murder and extortion 
(Gazdar, 2011).  
The city’s largest political party is the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which 
claims to represent the Muhajirs, the largest ethnic group in the city (Gazdar, 2011; 
Gayer,  2012). It considers itself a secular and progressive movement, representing the 
lower middle class (MQM, 2013). The MQM’s popularity is driven in part by the fact 
that more than half of Karachi’s population lives in poor, unplanned and unregularized 
migrant settlements, that are often the hub of political activity by disenfranchised youth 
(Gazdar, 2011; Hasan and Mohib, 2003).  
As a migrant city, Karachi is pockmarked with low-income and largely unplanned slums, 
known as katchi abadis. The unplanned nature of these settlements, lack of access to 
basic services and a painfully slow process of regularization, heightens political and 
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ethnic conflict. Census data provides an interesting view of the socio-economic 
heterogeneity in the city, even within what are generally lumped together as lower-
middle class neighborhoods. 
The last national census was conducted in 2011, but the data from this will not be 
available until June 2014, therefore, for city-level census data we are dependent on the 
1998 census, keeping in mind that significant changes have occurred since then in the 
city’s demographics.  
Before examining city-level census data, it is important to note that Karachi is divided 
into five districts and 18 towns, and further subdivided into 180 Union Councils, with an 
average of seven charge circles within each Union Council, as reported in the 1998 
census (Gazdar, 2011).  
At the district level there is a high level of variance in socio-economic indicators such as 
the literacy rate. For instance, the literacy rate in District Central is 75 percent, but only 
50 percent in Malir District (Gazdar, 2011). But if we slice the data further and examine 
it at the charge circle level, the variation becomes starker.  
Table 16 below provides different socio-economic indicators for five census charge 
circles, each of which represent a neighborhood included in this study’s client sample. 
These circles were selected from the 12 neighborhoods covered in the study, representing 
seven different towns of Karachi.  
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 Table 16 Socio-economic Indicators Across a Sample of Karachi's Charge Circles 
Charge 
Circle Town District 
Literacy 
ratio 
(10+) 
Pacca 20 
House 
Potable 
water 
Toilet 
Facilities 
 
Electricity 
Liaquatabad 
- Dak Khana Liaqatabad Central 86.70% 99.75% 97.17% 59.34% 
 
99.51% 
Manzoor 
Colony 
Block D Jamshed South 74.20% 99.62% 25.31% 68.94% 
 
99.52% 
Kashmir 
Colony Jamshed South 59.10% 93.51% 26.86% 51.51% 
97.91% 
Shah Rasool 
Colony Saddar South 40.50% 100.00% 37.79% 43.09% 
100.84% 
Pahar Ganj 
and Bhangi 
Para 
North 
Nazimabad Central 35% 99.27% 77.61% 21.25% 
 
98.53% 
* Source: Karachi Census Report 1998 
The circles in the table represent neither the extremely poor nor the particularly well-off 
neighborhoods of Karachi, instead they represent lower-middle and upper-poor 
communities, since this is where the majority of microfinance clients reside. The table 
shows that the ratio of pacca houses (permanent, as opposed to impermanent housing), as 
well as the percentage of electrified households is largely homogenous among all five 
communities. On the other hand, there is wide variation in literacy rates, availability of 
potable water and toilet facilities across the five circles. For instance, the literacy rate in 
Liaquatabad is highest at 87 percent and lowest in Pahar Ganj at only 35 percent. 
Similarly, potable water availability is highest in Liaquatabad at 92 percent and lowest in 
Manzoor Colony at only 25 percent. Finally, availability of toilets is highest in Manzoor 
Colony at 67 percent and lowest in Pahar Ganj at only 21 percent.  
                                                
20 Permanent structure, as opposed to kaccha house, which is an impermanent structure. 
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This demonstrates the wide variation in access to basic services among the different 
middle-class and poor neighborhoods of Karachi, which as noted above is an important 
reason for creating an unstable political climate.  
Although a deeper analysis of Karachi’s political economy is beyond the scope of this 
essay, it is important to make a few points regarding the city’s dominant political party, 
the MQM. Its critics characterize it by the extortion rackets that it is said to run 
throughout the city and the terrorist tactics it employs to maintain its dominance. But its 
supporters point to the fact that, more than any other political party in recent history, it is 
the MQM that has been instrumental in providing previously impoverished areas in 
Karachi with basic social services such as sewerage lines, water sanitation plants, and 
schools. The city’s landscape also changed dramatically between 2005 and 2008, a time 
during which the MQM controlled Karachi’s municipal functions (Lieven, 2011; Gazdar, 
2011) and was influential in constructing major flyovers and express roads that connected 
the different parts of this mega city. 
Other parties engaged in turf wars with MQM, especially the ethnic Pakthun, Awami 
National Party (ANP), and the Sindhi nationalist Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP) have in 
contrast not been able to keep up the parts of the city that come under their control 
(Lieven, 2011), leading to the disenfranchisement of their constituencies.  
Nevertheless, as violence, lawlessness and extortion rates rise in the city, it takes a heavy 
toll on the city’s economy. The impact this has on microfinance activity in the city will 
be reviewed in the following chapter. 
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III. Conclusion 
 
This essay has reviewed how shifts in the global development discourse and policy 
helped the microfinance movement achieve prominence and in the process changed the 
nature of the intervention itself. The following chapter will describe how the evolving 
nature of microfinance has played out in practice in Pakistan.  
While it is sometimes assumed that microfinance, as a market-based activity, is less 
vulnerable to local political economy constraints, the essay that follows details the extent 
to which local context matters. The aspects of Pakistan’s political economy that are most 
salient to microfinance operations were reviewed in this essay, including the country’s 
current security situation, weak governance, patterns of patronage and power, its faltering 
economy and increasing susceptibility to natural disasters. The essay also included a brief 
description of Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi’s current socio-political climate.  
This essay is intended to provide a frame for the following chapter, which reviews 
research findings on microfinance’s outreach and impact in Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MICROFINANCE - EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
As a participatory, capability enhancing and financially sustainable development tool, 
microfinance has been the intervention of choice for international development 
institutions and policymakers since the 1990s. The United Nations marked 2005 the 
“Year of Microcredit” and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), housed at 
the World Bank, has referred to microfinance as a powerful instrument against poverty 
(2004). 
In Pakistan too microfinance has figured prominently in both poverty reduction strategy 
papers (PRSPs) that its policymakers have developed in consultation with the 
international financial institutions (IFIs).  
The previous chapter outlined the trajectory of microfinance’s rise to prominence in 
global development. This chapter will focus on microfinance’s evolution in Pakistan. 
From a modest intervention that sought to alleviate poverty and empower women to one 
that has become an important part of the country’s financial landscape, microfinance has 
come of age in Pakistan as a financially sustainable social business. At the same time, its 
impact as a development intervention is challenged first by the very nature of its own 
evolution and second by the constraints placed on it by Pakistan’s political economy. 
In the previous chapter we learnt that the successful development intervention of today 
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should have the following ingredients: the ability to bypass the state machinery; be able 
to enable, empower and engage its constituents, ideally by employing the community’s 
social capital; and be self-sustaining. This essay will explore the question of whether or 
not in its modern form microfinance fits these criteria. Secondly, it will analyze the 
impact of Pakistan’s political economy on the practice, outreach and outcomes of the 
local microfinance sector from the point of view of its institutions as well as its clients. 
The analysis is based on the qualitative data described in chapter 3 but also includes trend 
analysis of the quarterly microfinance outreach data described in chapter 2.  
The essay begins with a contextual analysis of access to formal financial services in 
Pakistan. The history of the Pakistani microfinance sector was covered in chapter 1. 
Section II will detail findings related to the political economy of microfinance in 
Pakistan, and Section III will conclude with a discussion related to the findings. 
I. Financial Access in Pakistan 
In Pakistan, access to formal sources of finance is severely restricted due to both supply 
and demand side factors. Supply side factors include the unwillingness of commercial 
banks to lend to the less wealthy, a weak legal and institutional infrastructure and a slow 
pace of technological advancement, though with the rapid proliferation of mobile banking 
this last factor is now being addressed. Demand side factors include poor socioeconomic 
conditions, gender inequalities, low educational levels and the general lack of financial 
literacy (Nenova, Niang, and Ahmad, 2009). 
In terms of access to formal credit, the low and middle-income country average is 95 
commercial bank borrowers per 1000 adults. Within South Asia there are wide regional 
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disparities, with India at 133.5 commercial bank borrowers per 1000 adults and 
Afghanistan at only 3.1 borrowers. In Pakistan’s case, there are only 26.6 commercial 
bank borrowers per 1000 adults (World Bank, 2013). 
In terms of deposit account penetration, South Asia has 256.63 commercial bank 
depositors per 1000 adults. Again there is a wide variation in the region, with only 199 
depositors in Afghanistan and as many as 726 in India, per 1000 adults. In Pakistan, there 
are 256.63 commercial bank depositors per 1000 adults (World Bank, 2013) 
The average Pakistani household remains excluded from the formal financial system, 
keeping savings at home and borrowing from family and friends when in need. Only 10 
percent of Pakistanis have a formal bank account, and only 1.56 percent received a bank 
loan in the past one year (World Bank, 2012).  
Only 14 percent of Pakistanis have access to a full range of formal financial services, 
including savings, credit, insurance, and remittance services. In comparison, 32 percent 
of the population in Bangladesh has access to these services, 48 percent in India and 59 
percent in Sri Lanka (Nenova, Niang, and Ahmad, 2009). 
Once informal financial services are included, access to finance increases to 50.5 percent 
in the country. Informal access includes the informal organized sector such as Rotating 
Saving and Credit Schemes referred to locally as “committees”, moneylenders, store 
credit and hawala21 money transfers, while the unorganized sector includes borrowing 
from family and friends. Figure 1 presents the state of financial inclusion in the country 
with the latest available figures. 
                                                
21 An informal money transfer mechanism in which a financial obligation between two parties is 
transferred to a third party. These transactions are not formally recorded. 
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Figure 13 Financial Access in Pakistan 
            Voluntarily 
    Financially served        excluded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         14.3%  45.5%  50.5%   81.4%   100% 
 
 *Source: Nenova, Niang, and Ahmad. (2009). World Bank 
 
The 19 percent “voluntarily excluded” represent those that refuse to use these services 
due to a lack of need, poverty or religious beliefs (Nenova, Niang, and Ahmad, 2009). 
Financial access, especially access to formal finance, is lowest among the poorest, 
women, small entrepreneurs and those living in rural areas. For instance, in 2008 only 
30.9 percent of the total 8,343 bank branches were located in rural areas (Nenova, Niang, 
and Ahmad, 2009), despite the fact that Pakistan’s rural population constitutes 67.5 
percent of the total population (Population Census Organization, Government of 
Pakistan, 1998).  
Women’s access to banking services is only 5.5 percent versus 21.1 percent for men. But 
while women’s access to borrowing is 24.7 percent versus 46.4 percent for men, their 
access to savings services is 52.6 percent versus 58.5 percent for men. If informal savings 
are included, the figure for women would dwarf the one for men, since women are 
significantly more likely to save as compared to men (Nenova, Niang, and Ahmad, 
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2009). 
The microfinance sector, which mainly targets the poor, particularly the women among 
them, so far represents only 0.2 percent of total financial assets and reaches only 9 
percent of its target market in Pakistan (MicroWatch, 2013), as opposed to more than a 
quarter of the population in other South Asian countries such as Bangladesh and India 
(Nenova, Niang, and Ahmad, 2009). 
Similarly, small and microenterprises, together with medium-sized firms make up 90 
percent of the industrial sector, employing nearly 78 percent of the non-agricultural labor 
force and contributing to 30 percent of the total GDP. But lending to small and medium 
enterprises (SME), accounts for only 16 percent of total commercial lending volume and 
only 4 percent of the total customer base. Consequently, small and micro-enterprises 
generate 90 percent of their own working capital and 81 percent of new investment 
capital (Nenova, Niang, and Ahmad, 2009). 
An important source of financial services in underserved areas is the Pakistan Post 
Office, which has a network of 13,419 branches throughout the country and offers 
savings, insurance, and remittance services through its 7,276 bank branches. It is 
regulated by the Ministry of Finance and not by the State Bank of Pakistan. It is often the 
only formal banking service available in remote areas (Nenova, Niang, and Ahmad, 
2009). However, the post office is not a full service bank and does not extend credit. In 
2010, the First Microfinance Bank, a microfinance bank signed an agreement with the 
Pakistan Post Office that would allow it to use the latter’s network to expand its outreach 
of microfinance services in rural and remote areas of the country. However, with the 
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recent proliferation of mobile banking in the country, as discussed in chapter 1, the post 
office’s financial services are likely to lose their significance over time.  
II. Empirical Findings 
The main questions this essay will address include the following: 
1. How has microfinance’s evolution in Pakistan from a small-scale development 
scheme to a commercialized financial sector activity affected the social 
mobilization aspect of its operations?  
2. What are the political economy constraints on microfinance’s outreach, practice 
and outcomes in Pakistan, from an institutional perspective? 
3. What are the political economy constraints on microfinance’s clients in Pakistan? 
This section systematically answers each of the above questions. The first part of this 
section discusses the evolution of microfinance as a new-age development tool in 
Pakistan, the second describes the impact of the local political economy on microfinance 
institutions, in terms of outreach and operations, while the third details the extent to 
which the political economy constrains the sector’s borrowers. 
 
A. Microfinance: A New-Age Development Tool? 
As described in the previous chapter, the narrative on development has converged on the 
idea that the process of development should have little government involvement, be 
highly participatory and financially sustainable. In this section I analyze whether 
microfinance, at least as it is practiced in Pakistan, fits these criteria.  
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A. (i) Microfinance and State Involvement 
In its early days in Pakistan, microfinance activity was exclusively an NGO led effort, as 
described in chapter 1. The PPAF was established in 1999 as a public-private partnership, 
to lend to and assist these NGOs. As mentioned before, the PPAF is a World Bank 
funded social fund that runs without any government involvement.  
The Government of Pakistan’s poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) also made it 
clear that the government would only provide a supporting role in the microfinance, as 
described in chapter 1. Indeed, the only state actor that actively participates in the 
microfinance sector is the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). After the passage of the 
Microfinance Bank Ordinance in 2000, the SBP established a regulatory framework for 
the sector and began issuing licenses for the setting up of MFBs. As a regulator it has 
actively supported the expansion and commercialization of the sector. For instance, since 
2008 when it issued the Branchless Banking regulations, the SBP has promoted mobile 
banking by easing account opening restrictions for mobile wallets, which are bank 
accounts linked to mobile phones, and issuing microfinance bank licenses to at least three 
investor consortiums in 2012 that have expressed interest in expanding the mobile 
banking network in the country, including a telecommunications operator. While mobile 
banking rapidly expands access to financial services in the country, it is also a low risk-
high return venture.  
Similarly, in 2010 the SBP amended prudential regulations for microfinance banks to 
allow collateralized lending against gold jewelry, calling it a “zero-risk” lending product. 
Officers from Tameer Bank say that these amendments were made at the request and 
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initiation of their Bank. Another amendment to the prudential regulations recently 
increased the ceiling on loan sizes and relaxed borrower income limits, in order to 
encourage MFBs sector to lend to higher net-worth clients and medium-sized enterprises, 
as opposed to micro-entrepreneurs, the traditional target market for microcredit. 
Apart from this, as described in chapter 1 the SBP offers several facilities to MFBs, 
including development grants and loan guarantees. Global financial institutions such as 
the UK’s DFID, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank provide funding for 
most of these facilities.  
The only quasi-public institution in the sector until 2012 was Khushhali Bank, the first 
MFB set up in Pakistan with funding from the Asian Development Bank. Despite the fact 
that Khushhali Bank had the largest district-level presence among all MFBs in Pakistan, 
the SBP has been disappointed by its failure to achieve financial sustainability (interview: 
Microfinance Director SBP, December 2010). In 2012, Khushhali Bank was sold to a 
consortium of national and international investors, ending its quasi-public status. 
In Bangladesh and India the state has played almost no role in the microfinance sector, 
even as a regulator, that is, until the borrower suicide scandal broke out in the Indian state 
of Andhra Pradesh. Since then Indian regulators have been trying to get a microfinance 
bill to pass through the legislator, which will allow it to beef up its microfinance 
regulatory regime. The SBP on the other hand, as the sole public actor in the 
microfinance sector, has played a significant role in helping microfinance banks reduce 
their risk, increase their scale and improving their prospects for financial sustainability. 
For this it has earned international recognition as described in chapter 1. But what are the 
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implications of these developments for the sector’s social mission?  
 
A. (ii) Microfinance and Social Mobilization  
As mentioned in chapter 3, when the PPAF entered the market as a wholesaler of funds to 
microfinance institutions in Pakistan, it did so by emphasizing that subsidized lending to 
MFIs would be subject to their meeting the social mobilization criteria (interview: 
founder and ex-CEO, PPAF, Jan. 2011; World Bank, 2013), that is, instead of following a 
passive process of loan disbursement and collection, MFIs would have to engage the 
communities they served for broader social change. 
This did not pose a problem for older MFIs, as social mobilization has been a strong 
component of NGO activity in Pakistan since the late eighties. This entails partnering 
with community members, to form village organizations (VOs) in rural areas and union 
councils (UCs) in the cities. Each group elects a community leader to address community 
level issues and collaboratively works to solve problems such as such as lack of 
sanitation, health or education facilities. The NGOs at the social mobilization forefront 
include the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) and most rural support programs, especially the 
Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) and the National Rural Support 
Programme (NRSP)22 – all of which are also important players in the microfinance 
sector.  
However, in contrast to their early years of operation, during which social mobilization 
was considered an integral part of microfinance activity, most NGO-MFIs have separated 
their social mobilization activities from their microfinance programs. For instance, the 
                                                
22 NRSP’s sister institution the Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme (UPAP) has never had a 
social mobilization component. UPAP is included in the institutional sample. 
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AKRSP has spun off its microfinance portfolio into a standalone MFB, the First 
Microfinance Bank (FMFB). Similarly, the OPP has set up an independent microcredit 
institution, called the Orangi Charitable Trust (Hasan and Raza, 2012). Finally, the NRSP 
announced in 2006 that it was separating its social mobilization program from its 
microfinance activities and in 2010 set up a separate MFB, called the NRSP 
Microfinance Bank (NRSP, 2010). This indicates that even institutions that see social 
mobilization as an important part of their mission and work, no longer find it consistent 
with their microfinance operations. 
It is noteworthy that most of these changes occurred in the post-2000 era, after the 
passage of the Microfinance Bank Ordinance, which spurred commercialization by 
opening up the field to microfinance banks. As far as the SBP and most MFBs are 
concerned, the main criteria for success is financial sustainability and increased outreach 
– the sector has been under pressure by the SBP to achieve the 3 million borrower mark 
and it is now expected that this will be achieved within the next five years (Ahmed and 
Basharat, 2013:10). 
While the MFIs are not under the direct purview of the SBP, international donors and the 
PPAF emphasize that MFIs should reduce their reliance on subsidies, become 
operationally more efficient and revise their pricing structure upwards (Stephens, et. al. 
2006; Ministry of Finance, Pakistan, 2006).  
One institution that remains unaffected by these developments is the zero-interest MFI, 
Akhuwat, whose institutional philosophy is based on the Islamic principle of brotherly 
engagement, as described in chapter 3. All senior, middle and lower managers 
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interviewed at Akhuwat headquarters and Lahore branch described their commitment to 
social change, though it should be noted that this research does not include interviews 
with officers working in Akhuwat branches in other cities, where the distance from the 
headquarter may have affected commitment to the institution’s mission and philosophy.  
Akhuwat seeks social change by engaging borrowers in discussions pre-disbursement and 
encourages their participation in fundraising. In 2010, former borrowers provided Rs.15 
million (US$159,575) in donations (Candland, 2011). Akhuwat does not receive or seek 
support from either the PPAF or the SBP. This no doubt allows it much more liberty and 
flexibility than other institutions in the sector. At the same time, social mobilization is 
envisioned a bit differently at Akhuwat, for it does not involve community participation 
around local issues. Rather, the engagement is with the most and least prosperous 
members of the community “in a spirit of brotherly love” to meet the community’s 
financial needs (Munir, 2012). 
These findings are consistent with the existing literature (Kabeer, 2010; Miraftab, 2004; 
Fine, 2009), which tells us that the nature of the NGO determines actual outcomes on the 
ground. This is especially true where the state’s capacity as a monitor of the people’s 
interests has been deemphasized. At the same time, this research is limited by the fact 
that it has not been able to determine the extent to which the social mobilization and 
community development schemes employed by major MFIs such as NRSP in the past 
have improved the capabilities of the poor in Pakistan. 
Social mobilization in microfinance has traditionally been linked to the group lending 
arrangement, first popularized by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh in the eighties. This 
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calls for the use of the community’s social capital as described in the previous chapter. 
The section below reviews Pakistan’s experience with group lending. 
 
A. (iii) Microfinance and Social Capital 
Social capital was the basic building block of the original microcredit model. Group 
lending relies on the community’s existing social network, replacing financial collateral 
with a social contract in which everyone is at the same time responsible for everyone 
else’s loan. Early microcredit arrangements in Pakistan followed a similar pattern until a 
repayment crisis brought the entire group-lending model to its knees.  
 
The Repayment Crisis:  
In 2008, the microfinance industry was hit with a highly publicized repayment scandal 
that initially affected the MFI Kashf Foundation, and later spilled over to other 
institutions. Kashf is Pakistan’s first specialized microfinance institution. It lends 
exclusively to women and was set up in 1996 with technical assistance from the Grameen 
Bank. 
The crisis at Kashf began in a peri-urban area surrounding Lahore, the city where it is 
headquartered, and quickly spread from there. The problem was so serious that in April 
2009 it was estimated that roughly 80 percent of Kashf’s clients had refused to repay 
(Burki, 2009).  
A post-crisis analysis conducted by the Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN) suggests 
that Kashf and other institutions in the province of Punjab had bribed local community 
leaders to help them identify prospective clients. Practitioners were aware that these 
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leaders were also charging commission from prospective clients. This was a result of 
pressure from the management on local officers to expand outreach, which meant that 
Kashf and other institutions operating in Punjab were competing for the same clients. 
Multiple borrowings increased as a result of growing concentration in and around Lahore, 
the capital of the province of Punjab. Research indicates that during this period 40 to 70 
percent of borrowers in the crisis-ridden parts of Punjab had taken out multiple loans 
(Burki, 2009; interviews: Program Coordinator NRSP, 2012; Head Operations Tameer 
Bank, 2011).  
During interviews, every client of Kashf Lahore made reference to these events even 
though they had occurred nearly three years ago. One client described how in the 
confusion that ensued during the crisis, group members would go to non-paying clients’ 
homes and confiscate household items such as television sets and only return them once 
the loan was paid off.  
There are conflicting reports regarding the tipping point of the crisis. One factor that 
many point to is political interference, which is reminiscent of the microfinance crisis in 
the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh (Ross, 2010). In Kashf’s case a member of the 
National Assembly is said to have told a few borrowers that they did not need to repay 
their loans and the news spread rapidly through the social network resulting in an en 
masse default (Chen et al, 2010).  
Tameer Bank had a similar experience during the mid-2000s for it too tried to expand 
outreach by relying on local agents. Defaults and operational losses soared and it was 
only when Telenor, a multinational telecom operator with stakes in other microfinance 
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institutions, such as the Grameen Bank stepped in, and bought a 51 percent majority stake 
in the MFB, that the institution was able to regain lost ground (Singhal, Svenkerud and 
Flydal, 2002). 
These crises are reminiscent of “unzipped” group lending arrangements that occurred in 
India, Bangladesh and Uganda (Gine et al, 2011; Wright and Rippey, 2003), as described 
in the previous chapter. Post-crisis these institutions contend that the original group-
lending model needs reconsideration.  
Kashf’s officers say that this crisis wiped out the community’s social capital, and 
admitted that trust among community members suffered such a deep blow that even the 
informal savings circles community members had always maintained were dismantled in 
the areas affected by these events. Post crisis, Kashf and several other MFIs changed their 
lending agreements. Now even though disbursements continue to be made in groups, 
most loans have individual rather than joint liability and there are no group meetings or 
group leaders. Kashf’s new policy requires post-dated checks from borrowers at the time 
of disbursement. 
It is clear from this experience that the race to scale led to broken bonds of trust. The 
branch manager of one of the affected areas recalled how group meetings would often 
end up in arguments between neighbors, or even between spouses.  
This comment was corroborated by an incident that occurred during field research in 
Karachi when an MFB’s loan officer and I knocked on a borrower’s door in the 
neighborhood of Korangi. The borrower’s husband answered the door, reluctantly let us 
in and answered each question with silence, finally he said that taking the loan was his 
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wife’s decision and he did not support it. If microfinance is said to enhance a 
community’s social capital as suggested by the World Bank and others (see the previous 
chapter), these findings do not give credence to this claim.  
According to the MFBs Tameer Bank and Kashf Microfinance Bank, another reason for 
the rapid move towards individual lending is that it is more consistent with higher 
denomination loans and better off clients, which means that it is individual rather than 
group lending that is more consistent with the concern for financial sustainability. This is 
corroborated by research from other countries (Roodman, 2012).  
 
A. (iv) Commercialization and Financial Sustainability  
A senior official at the MFB, the First Microfinance Bank (FMFB), described her 
frustration with rural clients: “their level of literacy is low, which makes them apathetic, 
and it hampers their capacity to absorb and understand…but donors want quick results 
without appreciating the reality on the ground.”  
She felt this pressure ended up pushing institutions to mold their agenda in accordance 
with the donor’s wishes. While some would say this is evidence that donor dependence 
reduces an institution’s flexibility, the official went on to comment that the pressure to 
achieve financial sustainability had made the situation even more problematic since it 
often results in conflict at the top, making it difficult for mid and lower level officers to 
figure out how to balance concern for the bottom-line with the institution’s social service 
mission.  
But the situation at FMFB is quite different from that of other MFBs, such as Tameer 
Bank where there is no such conflict, because Tameer’s senior management is very clear 
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that the financial bottom-line takes precedence over other considerations. As their 
Director Operations put it: “microfinance is hard commercial business”.  
Newer MFBs such as Kashf Bank closely follow Tameer’s example, for Tameer Bank is 
considered an industry leader. It was the first MFB to achieve financial sustainability and 
maintains the highest growth in the industry in terms of gross loan portfolio.  
While sustainability is an important criteria in development and is often lumped with 
institution building (World Bank, 2013), more socially oriented MFIs say that in a 
sustainability-driven environment they find it difficult to meet their social goals. 
The director of the NGO Resource Center in Karachi described how her institution had 
struggled to provide microcredit in rural Sindh. She admitted that they failed to maintain 
the zero-default criteria commonly expected from microcredit operations. Her 
explanation was that the institution was too close to its clients, after having worked with 
them for decades on other issues such as education and health: “we understood their 
problems well and could not insist on repayment at all costs.” Consequently, a few years 
ago her NGO decided to give up on microcredit and continue with its core operations. 
In the same vein, the head of Thardeep Rural Support Programme’s microfinance unit 
stated that her client’s lives were too precarious and default was often driven by real 
crises rather than willful nonpayment. The distinguishing aspect of both institutions is 
that they serve the poorest population in Tharparker, one of the most deprived regions of 
rural Sindh. Microcredit experts argue that it is not an intervention meant for the 
extremely poor (DFID, 2010). But the PPAF has recently taken steps to support the 
expansion of microfinance to the most remote areas in Pakistan. For instance, last year it 
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reversed its policy of extending credit subsidies based on institution size. Lending rates 
are now subsidized according to a pre-set four point scale that ranks each institution’s 
area of operations using the human development index (HDI) and the food security index.  
The PPAF has also recently developed a Disaster Management Strategy and Investment 
Program aimed at developing a comprehensive plan “to mitigate, prevent, protect against, 
respond to and recover from the effects of disaster” (PPAF, 2012). The plan includes an 
investment of over US$200 million in various interventions, over a period spanning 2012 
to 2015 (PPAF, 2012). While this is not the first disaster management program developed 
in the country, it is the first of its kind that directly affects microfinance practitioners and 
the communities they serve. As part of this strategy, the PPAF announced in January 
2013 that it was introducing an indexed weather-based micro-insurance product to 
facilitate and compensate small farmers in Pakistan (Millan, 2013). It remains to be seen 
how much of an impact these initiatives will have in the face of a strong sector-wise 
thrust towards commercialization. 
The most important learning in this section, though, is that institutions find it hard to 
balance financial sustainability pressures with their development objectives. The end 
result is that one objective nearly always wins over the other, as confirmed by the 
literature reviewed in the previous chapter (e.g. Morduch, 2000). 
But these findings have to be contextualized against specific political economy 
conditions that can constrain actual practice on the ground, especially outreach, practice 
and client experiences. The previous chapter included a detailed review of Pakistan’s 
political economy, including the current security crisis, weak governance, the existing 
   
 
227 
pattern of power and patronage, the faltering economy and the increasing incidence of 
natural disasters. The section below reviews the impact of these factors on microfinance 
institutions. 
 
B. Political Economy and the Institutional Perspective 
Until the late 1990s Pakistan’s microfinance sector was run by local NGOs, restricted to 
microcredit and offered as part of a host of other services such as access to education, 
healthcare, sanitation, and housing. By the turn of the century, microfinance was ready to 
enter its second phase of development with the setting up of specialized MFIs such as 
Kashf Foundation, the establishment of the PPAF and the licensing of MFBs through the 
passage of the Microfinance Bank Ordinance in 2000. This new phase was characterized 
by rapid growth. Between 2004 and 2008, the sector’s annual compound growth rate was 
no less than 67 percent (Chen et al, 2010).  
However, beyond 2008 this growth could not sustain itself. There are several reasons for 
this, the most important of which is the deepening security crisis in the country. 
 
B. (i) Expansion in the Face of War and Threats to Security 
Nearly 13 years have passed since the year 2000 when the country is said to have begun 
its growth as an organized microfinance sector in earnest (interview: SBP Director 
Microfinance, 2010), but the penetration rate remains quite modest at only 8.6 percent of 
the potential market (Microwatch, Quarter 4-2012). Moreover, existing outreach is 
unevenly distributed as shown in Figure 2 below:  
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Figure 14 Microfinance Outreach by Province - Number of Active Borrowers 
 
*Data Source: Pakistan Microfinance Network, 2013 
 
The figure indicates that outreach in Punjab, measured here in terms of number of active 
borrowers has far outpaced that of other provinces. Overall, province-wise outreach 
rankings match province-wise development rankings in the country. Figure 2 in the 
previous chapter showed that according to a measure of multidimensional poverty, 
Punjab is by the far the least deprived province in the country, followed by Sindh, KPK 
and Balochistan. This is the same order as the representation in Figure 1 above. Given 
that microfinance is a poverty reduction and financial access tool, we would expect the 
pattern to be reversed. 
In terms of pattern of growth it is clear, especially from Punjab’s trend-line, that until the 
latter half of 2008 outreach was rising sharply, but growth fell thereafter and has not been 
able to recover. The figure indicates that growth in KPK (which includes the northern 
province of Gilgit-Baltistan in this figure) has been affected more than in any other 
province.  
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The decline in microfinance activity in KPK and Gilgit-Baltistan can be directly 
attributed to the war on terror. Since these areas border Afghanistan, they have suffered 
the most from both Taliban and drone attacks. The area has seen the highest percentage 
of human as well as infrastructure losses, as described in the previous chapter.   
The MFI, the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) reported during interviews that 
KPK was one of its fastest growing regions, in terms of microfinance outreach, before the 
war escalated in KPK. Post escalation it lost some of its branch network to bomb attacks, 
suffered attrition as several loan officers were kidnapped and had to write-off a 
significant portion of its portfolio (interview with Development Director NRSP, July 
2012). As a result, not only did NRSP rapidly scale back its presence in the province, 
other MFIs also decided to stay away. Consequently, at this time only Punjab and Sindh 
continue to see any growth in outreach.  
Expansion in Balochistan, as evidenced by the figure above, has always been slow. 
Outreach is mainly limited to Quetta, Balochistan’s capital city for several reasons. First 
of all, even though according to landmass Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province, 
population-wise it ranks last. The terrain is dry, mountainous and difficult, as a result the 
province is sparsely populated which results in especially high operational costs for 
expanding outreach. Secondly, Balochistan is Pakistan’s least-developed province, with 
very high poverty levels, which provides little opportunity for commercially based 
microfinance to thrive. Thirdly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, due to security 
threats it remains a dangerous place to operate in. Finally, since the primary target market 
for microfinance institutions, especially MFIs are women, the closed, patriarchal Balochi 
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tribal culture makes outreach particularly problematic.  
Overall growth in the sector has been inconsistent. Even in Sindh and Punjab, where 
outreach is much higher relative to the other two provinces, growth has been uneven. 
Figure 3 describes the pattern of growth in Karachi and Lahore, the two cities with the 
highest outreach in the country. Karachi is Pakistan’s largest city, its economic and 
financial center and the capital of the province of Sindh, while Lahore is the capital of 
Punjab, by far the most economically developed province.  
 
Figure 15 Growth Trends in Microfinance Outreach in Lahore and Karachi 
 
*Source: Pakistan Microfinance Network Database, 2013  
 
Since the latter half of 2008, growth rates, measured in terms of the number of active 
borrowers per quarter, appear to have averaged close to zero for both cities. With nearly 
200,000 active clients, Lahore remains in the lead, in terms of the number of active 
borrowers, but the figure shows that for most of 2011 and part of 2012, the city 
experienced negative growth. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that the 
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penetration rate in Lahore has risen to 22 percent (MicroWatch, 2012) and in many areas 
of the city the sector has crossed its saturation point. For instance, clients in the areas of 
Lahore covered in this research reported six to seven different institutions competing with 
each for their business. At the same time, there has been a sector-wide move to reduce the 
incidence of multiple borrowing. Secondly, economic activity in Lahore has sagged 
recently due to the chronic power shortage, which also makes increased exposure to this 
city risky from an institutional perspective. 
The figure shows that for Karachi growth rates have also hovered close to zero. First of 
all, despite the fact that the power crisis in Karachi has not been as catastrophic as in 
Lahore, economic activity everywhere has been affected by it. One estimates puts the 
drop in overall investment as a result of the power shortage at 37 percent (Siddiqui et al, 
2011).  
But the most important reason for the falling growth rate in Karachi is the city’s 
continuing ethnic violence for the past five years as detailed in the pervious chapter. 
During the summer of 2012 when this research was conducted, at least eight people were 
killed on a daily basis as a result of these clashes. In addition, protests related to these 
murders often erupted into ethnic riots and calls for city-wide strikes paralyzing major 
parts of the city occurred at least once a week.  
During interviews, practitioners in Karachi complained that their work was disrupted due 
to tensions in the city, which meant that they could not come to work and even if they did 
they could not go into the field to reach their clients. Clients would also have difficulty 
coming to the branch office to make their repayments.  
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The regional manager of Kashf Foundation described how plans for expanding the MFI’s 
presence in the city have been put on the backburner since the escalation of violence in 
the city in the past five years. FMFB’s regional manager for Sindh described what 
appeared to be a policy of retrenchment in the city. The institution had just closed down a 
branch in Liaquatabad, a particularly tense part of the city controlled by the MQM. Since 
FMFB is associated with the Aga Khan Foundation, which historically has had a strong 
presence in the northern areas of Pakistan, its presence in an MQM controlled area was 
understandably problematic. When I went door knocking with an FMFB loan officer in 
Korangi, another neighborhood of Karachi, I observed the care the officer who was from 
Gilgit, the area bordering KPK, had to put in appearing particularly unobtrusive because 
of MQM presence in the area. At one point he said defensively, “even though we are not 
Pathans we get mistaken for them all the time” in reference to MQM hostility towards 
Pathan migrants in Karachi. 
The literature on microfinance in conflict-affected areas cautions that successful 
implementation of microfinance programs requires a minimum level of political stability 
(Bruett et al, 2004). This is confirmed by my findings, which indicate that growth in the 
microfinance sector has been seriously affected by the security crises. 
Problems of corruption and patronage, on the other hand, affect day-to-day operations 
more than strategic decisions related to outreach that affect growth. 
 
B. (Ii) Corruption, Power and Patronage 
During interviews nearly all microfinance practitioners stated that problems of non-
repayment were not significant, since loan sizes were small and the target market 
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included people with little political clout. By contrast, commercial banks in Pakistan are 
weighed down by non-performing loans. The World Bank estimates that as of 2011, the 
Pakistani banking sector’s nonperforming loans were 16.2 percent of total gross loans. 
This is often attributed to corruption within the banking sector, especially public sector 
banks, the political clout of feudal landowners and industrialists, and the chronically slow 
and corrupt judicial process (Husain, 2003; Haneef et al, 2012).  
At the same time, as described above, the microfinance sector has had to deal with a 
major repayment crisis that was the result of corruption within the sector, misplaced 
judgement on the part of local loan officers as well as some political interference. As a 
direct result of this crisis, Kashf Foundation replaced the joint liability clause in its loan 
agreement with taking post-dated checks as guarantees at the time of disbursement. 
What is significant is that even though the borrowers on the books are women the post-
dated checks are drawn on their male relatives’ bank accounts. When asked about this 
practice, a senior Kashf official explained that in case a check bounces it is difficult to 
imprison a woman:  
 “We don’t have women’s prisons where they can stay overnight – we only have male 
prisons – so women can’t stay overnight in the prison. Therefore, until the court passes 
the verdict she is free. With men, it’s different. You can put them in jail directly. Then 
the women come and give us full payment. We’ve only had to do this once. We got the 
police to handcuff the husband and make two rounds of the neighborhood in the police 
van. By the evening, his wife had come and paid us the full amount. Now everybody 
knows not to mess with us.” 
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While Kashf was able to solve its repayment issue quite effectively, at least from the 
institution’s point of view, FMFB described a situation, which clearly got out of the 
institution’s hand. This pertained to a group of defaulting women borrowers in rural 
Sindh who openly defied their loan contracts and refused to repay, even when threatened 
with legal action and their case was reported to the local media. While the local 
newspaper did publish the story, the judge decreed that an arrest warrant could not be 
issued because the defaulters were women. I asked a senior officer at FMFB to explain 
this and she said her understanding was that women could not be imprisoned in Pakistan 
for petty loan defaults. No one in the industry was able to cite any particular legislation in 
this regard but there is consensus that women’s imprisonment is a culturally sensitive 
matter.  
In any case, the legal system often takes years to resolve issues of default and most 
institutions said they prefer out of court settlements with defaulting clients. In addition, 
when a group is being formed for the first time, institutions such as FMFB make it a point 
to relate stories of police and legal action taken against willful defaulters. FMFB 
continues to have joint liability loans and finds that in most cases the threat of being cut-
off from future loans is enough to keep most borrowers from defaulting or even to allow 
their group members to default.  
While most practitioners insist that repayment issues arise for less than two percent of 
their portfolio, they say that when default occurs the main cause for it is the preexisting 
debt culture, especially in rural areas. In the words of a senior manager at FMFB: “What 
do you expect from these small borrowers, when they see their feudal masters not 
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repaying much larger debts to (commercial) banks?” This is an important reason why 
microfinance outreach has remained mostly limited to urban and peri-urban areas in 
Pakistan.  
Several practitioners complained that corruption was a regular problem within their own 
ranks, especially at the loan officer level. A senior officer at FMFB said that it was 
relatively common to find loan officers pocketing the money coming in as repayments. In 
addition, if an employee was terminated, he or she was likely to disrupt operations by 
attempting to break up the borrower groups he/she had been working with. 
An FMFB officer also described group leader corruption as being especially common in 
rural Sindh: “sometimes this corruption is willful, while at other times it is due to a 
genuine need. For instance, it could be that the group leader has collected money from all 
other group members and instead of depositing it with the Bank he will make an excuse 
such as “I got robbed on the way to the Bank” which is several miles away from the 
village. On the other hand it could be that after the money was collected by the leader 
there was a home emergency and he used up the money for that, in that case we term it as 
circumstantial default.”  
Many practitioners described another kind of corrupt practice, referring to it as “putting 
up a front”. In this case an individual indicates that he represents a large group of 
borrowers, but uses all the proceeds of the loans to line his or her own pocket. 
Practitioners note that these cases usually occur in collusion with loan officers. From the 
institution’s point of view, such instances of corruption reduce margins, increase the ratio 
of overdue loans in their loan portfolios and in general, make it hard to operate on a daily 
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basis. Unfortunately, the recent literature on microfinance suggests that corruption is 
often systematic rather than sporadic in many countries across Latin America, sub-
Saharan Africa and Asia, thanks to the influence of the larger political economy and the 
increase in competitive pressures (Sinclair, 2012).  
But institutions such as FMFB and Khushhali Bank, that are especially active in rural 
areas, insist that all other problems appear minor in comparison to the devastation 
wreaked by the recent and recurrent floods in the country.  
 
B. (iii) Floods and the Rural Portfolio  
The estimated physical damage to the microfinance infrastructure from the 2010 floods is 
estimated at PKR23 34 million (US$ 361,702), including damage to 86 branches, 70 
percent of which were located in Sindh and the rest in Southern Punjab. In addition, in 
flood-affected areas, the value of non-performing microcredit loans reached US$27.6 
million. The gross loan portfolio which had been rising by 6.5 percent per quarter, grew 
by only 2.5 percent in the four quarters following the floods, and the number of active 
borrowers, which had been rising by an average of five percent per quarter before the 
flood, rose by only 0.3 percent post floods for the next four quarters (Khalid and Arshad, 
2012).  
A senior official from Khushhali Bank described a grim state of affairs: “Most of our 
rural portfolio in Sindh and the majority of our rural portfolio in Southern Punjab was 
wiped out by the floods”. During the interview conducted in July 2012 he said that 56 
percent of the portfolio from Sindh and 86 percent from Punjab had been recovered to 
                                                
23 PKR stands for Pakistani Rupees 
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date. However, the term “recovered” here mostly indicates paying back the older loan by 
taking out a fresh loan. 
FMFB, which maintains a heavy presence in rural Sindh, also suffered serious losses. An 
FMFB branch manager in Hyderabad, a city in southern Sindh, described the MFB’s 
situation: “Before the floods less than two percent of my portfolio was in default, but 
after the floods 100 percent of my portfolio has been affected”. FMFB officials reported 
75 percent loan recovery from areas affected by the 2010 floods. Unfortunately, when the 
floods returned in 2011, the MFB suffered heavy losses in the rural sector all over again.  
The branch manager in Hyderabad described the havoc caused by the floods in August, 
2011: “First the rains washed over cotton fields ready for picking for 6-7 days 
continuously in lower Sindh. And then rain fell on parts of the whole country for three 
days without let-up. With standing water levels as high as 6-7 feet in the fields, nothing 
could be recovered. Sugarcane can usually withstand rain more than cotton, but in this 
case even this crop was damaged”.  
As of June 2012, FMFB had recovered only 50 percent of its loans in flood-affected 
areas. FMFB officials say for the time being they have curtailed new lending in the 
region and are now working on developing new loan products and thinking of ways to 
diversify their existing rural portfolio, for instance by designing rural loan products that 
serve non-farm activities. 
When asked why affected borrowers were not provided loan relief, the MFBs reasoned 
that the government did not announce any relief measures for the microfinance sector in 
the wake of the worst floods in the country’s history since 1929, which made it hard for 
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them in turn to offer relief to their clients. 
The rural portfolio comprises agricultural and livestock loans, which are designed 
differently from a regular microenterprise loan, in that they require a bullet or a one-time 
repayment, while regular microloans involve weekly or monthly repayments. This is 
necessitated by the fact that small farmers and owners of livestock don’t have the means 
to repay before the sale of their harvest or livestock. But such loans are also harder to 
repay when the entire harvest upon which the interest and principal repayment is due has 
been lost due to floods or drought.  
At the same time, FMFB contends that farmers have been coming into their branches to 
repay overdue loans on a daily basis. The institution reasons that farmers make these 
repayments because they know that they cannot get a new loan unless they repay the 
older one and as the planting season approaches they will be in dire need of credit again. 
Without farm or weather insurance farmers have little choice but to take on fresh credit 
each planting season, even when they realize that they are likely to lose all their crops 
and thus their income the following year as well.  
Another issue practitioners face, particularly in rural areas, is the cultural segregation of 
the sexes. While chapter 6 will detail microfinance’s impact on women’s empowerment 
in Pakistan, access to women is an issue that needs special consideration in a political 
economy context and is discussed briefly in the section below. 
 
B. (iv) Microfinance and Purdah24 
                                                
24 Purdah literally means veil, but the broader interpretation refers to segregation between the 
sexes, which is both a cultural and religious phenomenon.  
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In order to expand outreach to rural women, FMFB’s Product and Market Development 
Officer says that female credit officers are needed for there is a strict culture of 
segregation in the villages. This, however, turns out to be quite expensive for the 
institution, since female officers require more security in hard to access areas, adding to 
the already high cost of operations in these regions. This is one reason why FMFB says it 
does not set aggressive gender-targets for its portfolio.  
But FMFB officers describe distinct cultural differences between the provinces. For 
instance, even though literacy levels are low across both rural Sindh and Punjab, they say 
rural women in Sindh are relatively more willing to learn and are more open to new ideas, 
such as how to improve their livestock’s health or milk production, as compared to the 
rural women in Punjab. One of the officers I spoke to at FMFB felt this was because 
Punjabis were relatively better off and more repressive of their women than Sindhis. Of 
course, even if this is true it is very relative. An FMFB branch manager that handled a 
sizeable portfolio in rural Sindh described the dominant Sindhi culture: “men have their 
hukah (pipe) while women do all the work”, and reminded me that honor killings of 
women are commonplace in Sindh. Nevertheless, FMFB staff contended that in rural 
Sindh they had been able to form several mixed-gender borrower groups and some of 
these even had female group leaders. The staff says that they have observed a process of 
gradual change as villages become electrified and access to television slowly dispels 
traditional norms.  
Moving to the province of Balochistan, the Chief Financial Officer of Kashf Foundation, 
an MFI that only lends to women, talked about how Kashf has been trying to explore its 
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options there. He described that during their initial visits to Balochistan they realized just 
how restricted women’s economic activity was in Balochistan. Several of the women 
Kashf’s research team met had rarely ventured out of their homes because of the strict 
observance of purdah, and they realized that introducing gender-targeted microfinance 
would first require a major cultural shift. Kashf’s officer quoted a Baloch saying: 
“Women’s earnings are haram (sinful)”.  
Purdah is similarly strongly enforced in the province of KPK, but outreach there is 
severely restricted due to the constant threat of Taliban attacks, making the issue of little 
consequence for the moment.  
The situation was quite different in Karachi and Lahore, where I accompanied several 
male loan officers to the homes of female borrowers, during a time of the day when the 
men in the household were out for work. Of course, being a female I could have had 
something to do with their getting access to these homes. At the same time, in the words 
of a male loan officer: “When it comes to money, purdah is no longer an issue”. Several 
female officers disputed this and felt that women were more relaxed with female officers 
and that they had greater access to them as compared to their male counterparts.  
But the familiarity with which the women we visited greeted the male officers does give 
credence to their claim. This is also corroborated by Lieven’s (2011) description of 
women in Karachi often being more outspoken than their menfolk, especially in Muhajir 
communities. This is not necessarily the case with more recent migrants, especially those 
from KPK who live in relatively closed communities in the SITE neighborhood of 
Karachi. Microfinance officers say that access to women in these neighborhoods remains 
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limited. 
Thus, in the overall context of Pakistan’s crisis-ridden political economy, microfinance 
outreach and operations do appear to have been affected. The escalating war along the 
Afghan border and the ethnic violence in Karachi have led to a sharp slowdown in 
growth; the recurring floods of 2010 and 2011, particularly in rural Sindh and Southern 
Punjab, have wiped out entire rural portfolios; the high incidence of corruption in 
Pakistani society make day-to-day operations a challenge and issues of purdah limit 
access to women in large swathes of the country. We turn now to a description of how the 
political economy has affected the clients of microfinance in Pakistan. 
 
C. Political Economy Constraints on Microfinance Clients: 
“Most of our clients are running losses because of power outages. They are running 
losses even though they pay us on time. And because of rising inflation their asset values 
have eroded, so we can’t say that the impact we have made on their lives is real 
anymore.” 
- Urban Poverty Alleviation Programme (UPAP) Lahore Area Manager 
 
The economic crisis has affected clients profoundly, severely restricting the benefits 
access to credit could have otherwise brought them. Kashf Foundation says its clients’ are 
especially vulnerable to food price inflation, since staples such as rice, wheat flour and 
lentils figure prominently in the household budgets of poor families. During interviews 
these official describe how due to rising inflation, many clients have had to pull their 
children out of school. Of course, these are urban clients. In rural areas, branch managers 
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at FMFB and Khushhali Bank say that clients tell them they cannot afford to put their 
children in school at all, for children provide much needed labor on farms. 
When clients were asked about what aspect of the political economy affected them the 
most, they mentioned several factors at once. The table below presents their responses. 
Please note that except for the two clients of Tando Allahyar, all others were urban 
clients. Lahore and Rawalpindi clients have been grouped together since their responses 
were broadly similar. 
 
Table 17 Microfinance Clients and Political Economy Impacts 
 Karachi Lahore and 
Rawalpindi 
Tando Allahyar 
Total interviewed 36 14 2 
Political economy constraints on clients’ businesses and overall income: 
Inflation 7 8  
Daily power outages 6 9  
Security situation 6 0  
Un- or under-employment 4 2  
Floods 0 0 2 
 
The table indicates that for Karachi-based clients inflation was the single biggest concern, 
followed by the power shortage and the city’s security situation. For clients based in 
Lahore or Rawalpindi, the power crisis was the biggest concern, followed by inflation. 
The clients of Tando Allahyar were rural and only mentioned the floods as a major 
concern. It should be noted that these concerns were mentioned not just in the context of 
their businesses and other economic activity, but with regard to their general wellbeing. 
 
The Power Crisis:  
The table indicates that inflation and power outages were a major concern for urban 
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clients across the three cities in the sample. A group of shoemakers in Rawalpindi 
reported that power outages would often last for up to 16 hours a day, and they would 
have to work by hand at a much slower pace than when working with their machines. A 
client in Lahore reported three-hour outages three times a day, while a client in Karachi 
said outages of up to eight hours a day were common. 
Several clients stated that while they experienced power outages, it had no bearing on 
their productivity because their work did not require electricity – most of these were 
women, engaged either in producing crafts such as jewelry or masehri (wedding 
decorations). Those that were involved in sewing and tailoring work, reported that they 
would simply switch to working their sewing machines by hand during an outage and 
because their clients lived close by, sales weren’t affected very much even when the city 
was paralyzed by a strike. Of course, this would affect productivity, but at least the work 
could be continued, albeit at a slower pace. 
In contrast, a couple of clients from Lahore that were involved in welding work would 
have to stop working simply because their work was completely dependent on their 
machines. A cold drink wholesaler in Karachi similarly expressed frustration with the 
high frequency of power outages, since he needed power to keep his refrigerators running 
so that his drinks could stay cool in the scorching July heat. 
Managers from institutions, such as the MFB FMFB, said they regularly felt obligated to 
provide grace periods to clients that could not repay on time because of the chronic 
power shortage especially in Lahore and Rawalpindi, or due to the increased frequency of 
city-wide strikes in Karachi.  
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Inflationary Pressures:  
Clients also reported being weighed down by inflation. Two clients mentioned that taking 
a loan had become a necessity, due to the high price of supplies and food. A client from 
Lahore said that she used to be able to save, but thanks to inflation, savings had become a 
thing of the past.   
 
The Security Crisis: 
Relatively speaking, the power crisis and inflation were more prominent concerns for 
clients in Lahore and Rawalpindi, as compared to clients in Karachi. The security crisis 
was a significant issue for clients in Karachi was the security situation. Borrowers that 
depended on middlemen complained that due to the security situation in Karachi, they 
would often get delayed or partial payment for their work. At the same time, given the 
severity of the security crisis in Karachi, the number of clients affected by it was 
surprisingly low.  
There are two main reasons for this. First of all, 70 percent of the clients in the sample 
were home-based workers and felt relatively sheltered, at least as far as their businesses 
were concerned, from the goings on in the city. They reported being affected only to the 
extent that a strike or a riot disrupted their trip to the wholesaler in the commercial 
district. One client who ran a corner store in her own community actually reported an 
increase in business during such times. She said that when people in the community 
could not go out of their neighborhood to the larger stores because of a strike, they would 
have no choice but to come to her store for all their needs. 
Another possible reason why the security issue was not mentioned as much during client 
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interviews is that Karachi has been violent for so long that for most residents the situation 
is now business as usual, as suggested by Gazdar (2011) and Gayer (2013). They have 
learnt to manage their business and personal lives around the violence and disruption 
caused by the citywide strikes. This is what Sen calls “entrenched deprivation” describing 
it as a state of such long-standing deprivation or hardship that it is accepted with non-
grumbling resignation (Sen, 1992: 55). 
 
Employment Woes: 
Finally, a few clients reported that the male members in their household were either able 
to find work only sporadically or the factories where they had previously worked had laid 
them off completely. They blamed the current economic and political climate, as well as 
the high frequency of power outages for this. These clients said that while this situation 
made it very important for them to keep their businesses running, lack of a steady wage 
also made it hard to make timely repayments. This was especially so because inflation 
had squeezed their margins to a point where making loan repayments from business 
revenues had become nearly impossible. One client said that due to inflation and because 
her husband could only find work sporadically, there was no longer enough to eat and her 
kids often had to be kept away from school. Regularly having to go without food was a 
common theme across respondents and across cities.  
 
Rural Constraints: 
For the rural clients in Tando Allahyar, the most severe constraint was the recurrence of 
heavy rains and floods. One of them said: “Even though we repaid our loans on time, we 
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did not make a profit this year or the last because our crops failed and the price of our 
livestock fell.” 
When asked them about the reaction of the waderas (feudal landlords) to their 
relationship with the microfinance institutions the borrowers said the wadera did not 
mind, in fact he encouraged it. 
This was corroborated in interviews with three MFB managers, who managed rural 
portfolios in Sindh. Waderas in Pakistan employ sharecroppers on their land and if these 
sharecroppers receive credit it is used to buy fertilizer or seeds, which improves 
agricultural yield on the wadera’s land.  
The advantage to the sharecropper, on the other hand, is that he no longer has to buy 
inputs on credit. In rural areas, the supplier is able to exploit the sharecropper or hari by 
selling on credit. FMFB officials describe the conditions the supplier places on the 
farmer. The supplier sells seeds and fertilizer on credit on the condition that the hari will 
sell the harvest back to him. Since the supplier has a monopoly in the village, he is able to 
control seed and fertilizer quality. The hari has no option but to buy low quality inputs 
because he is buying on credit. When it is time to sell the harvest, the supplier employs 
“kaccha taul”. Taul refers to the balance used to measure the seed, fertilizer and crops. 
Kaccha taul means incorrect weight, while pacca taul means correct weight. The hari 
understands he is being paid less than what he is due but is powerless to object.  
FMFB says its officers have worked hard to break the suppliers’ hegemony, not just by 
providing haris with credit, but also by helping them extend the solidarity lending model 
to buying and selling in groups, rather than on an individual basis. Together they wield 
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more power than when they deal with suppliers individually. At the same time, 
practitioners say there are limits to what they have been able to achieve. For instance, 
they explain that the supplier has political connections with ginning mills in the cotton 
belt of Sindh where FMFB operates. The ginning mills prefer to deal with the supplier 
than with individual haris.  
This suggests that the political economy constraints on rural clients are such that even 
with the best of intentions, microfinance practitioners are able to achieve only so much. It 
is not surprising then that barring a few exceptions, most institutions have preferred to 
stay away from rural areas, where the incidence of poverty is much higher than in urban 
areas.  
The following section reviews the relationship between urban poverty and microfinance 
by taking a closer look at the experience of Karachi-based clients. 
 
C. (ii) Differentiation in the Karachi Sample:  
Outreach in Karachi is second only to Lahore, with 135,426 active clients as of the fourth 
quarter of 2012. This is not surprising since it is Pakistan’s largest city and its financial 
and economic hub. However, it remains a difficult city to operate in thank to its complex 
political economy, as detailed in the previous chapter.  
First of all, violence and the increasing frequency of citywide strikes disrupt economic 
activity for both practitioners and clients. Secondly, while bhatta (extortion money) is not 
a big issue for clients, as will be detailed below, it can sometimes become a problem for 
the institutions. Even though no practitioner in Karachi admitted to giving bhatta, some 
of their counterparts in other cities said they shuddered at the thought of having to work 
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in Karachi because of having to deal with the extortion mafia and the daily incidence of 
violence. It was also recently reported that Tameer Bank’s mobile banking product Easy 
Paisa has been used by extortionists to transfer money (Ali, 2012). 
Most clients insisted that they did not have to pay bhatta, especially because of the home-
based nature of their work. A client from Manzoor colony, an MQM stronghold, who ran 
a barber shop said that he was bothered only once by bhatta seekers, but when he told 
them that business was slow they only asked for free haircuts and left. Another client who 
was hopeful of setting up a small shop at a local hospital said he was not worried about 
having to pay bhatta since he had political connections. But on the whole, these 
businesses are relatively small and do not fall under the radar of extortionists.  
The 32 Karachi-based clients belonged to 12 neighborhoods from seven of the 18 towns 
across the city. Table 16 in the previous chapter describes the socio-economic indicators 
of five of these neighborhoods. These were not the poorest neighborhoods in the city, 
judging by the fact that nearly 100 percent of the homes in these neighborhoods were 
pacca homes. At the same time, they were not high-income neighborhoods either. In the 
words of Kashf Foundation’s regional manager: “You will not find a single microfinance 
branch in a comfortable part of town”. 
The most impoverished neighborhoods covered in the sample were Pahar Ganj and 
Bhangi Para, from Karachi’s District Central and Ibrahim Haidery, a poor fishing 
community, from District South. The least impoverished neighborhoods were 
Liaquatabad and Manzoor Colony.  
Both Liaquatabad and Manzoor Colony are MQM strongholds, while Ibrahim Haidery, a 
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Sindhi majority area, has been loyal to the party that just completed its time in office, the 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).  
While heaps of garbage filled the narrow alleys in Ibrahim Haidery, which was lined on 
each side by crude “one-storey buildings of mud-brick or concrete” (Lieven, 2011: 317), 
Liaquatabad and Manzoor Colony were characterized by “tall, narrow and more-solid” 
(Lieven, 2011:318) apartment blocks. Liaqatuabad also had broad, freshly painted streets 
in contrast to the Awami National Party (ANP) controlled areas we had to pass in order to 
reach Liaquatabad. This contrast between MQM strongholds and parts of the city 
dominated by other ethnic political parties is consistent with findings reported by Lieven 
(2011) and others, as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Generally speaking, MFBs are located in less impoverished areas, as compared to MFIs, 
since MFBs target the lower middle classes and MFIs those at or below the poverty line, 
as detailed in Chapter 1. Tameer Bank for instance operates in Liaquatabad and Manzoor 
Colony, but does not maintain branches in Ibrahim Haidery, an area where several MFIs 
operate. Tameer Bank also does not in general draw clients from low-income settlements, 
such as Pahar Ganj and Bhangi Para, but MFIs such as Kashf Foundation and the 
Association for Social Advancement (ASA) do.  
At the same time, most clients across the various neighborhoods covered in the sample 
had similar schooling and housing indicators (for details on socioeconomic outcomes 
across the client sample see chapter 3. For instance, clients from Ibrahim Haidery were as 
likely as clients from Liaquatabad to send their boys and girls to school and spend extra 
on after-school private tuition and homework help.  
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In terms of type of businesses too there does not seem to a be a systematic pattern, clients 
in one area are just as likely as those from another area to be owners of beauty parlors, 
sewing and tailoring shops. There were two exceptions: one was Shireen Jinnah colony 
where all the interviewed clients were involved in the same craft, that is, producing 
seashell jewelry. They had been engaged in this craft for generations and had taken a 
group loan from ASA. The other was the fishing community, Ibrahim Haidery, where all 
the women, except for the group leader, had taken loans for their families’ fishing 
businesses. However, while these were two of the most impoverished communities 
included in the sample, Pahar Ganj was another area that was just as impoverished, but 
clients here were involved in different businesses, such as auto-mechanic workshops, 
embroidery and scrap dealerships.  
There are several possibilities why a systematic pattern with regard to these indicators 
could not be established for this study. First of all, the sample only included 36 clients, 
which is a small number for an in-depth study, and a larger sample is required to confirm 
these initial results. Another reason could be selection bias, that is, borrowing households 
even in impoverished neighborhoods are likely to be more economically active and to 
have higher aspirations than non-borrower households, which would skew results. This 
can only be addressed by including non-borrowers in the sample in the next phase of the 
research. 
But it is also true that surviving in the financial and economic capital of the country calls 
for a different dynamic and families here are more likely to have a higher standard of 
living, to emphasize schooling and to be more economically active, than those living in 
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smaller towns and villages.  
III. Conclusion 
The findings from this study suggest that the trends in Pakistan’s microfinance sector are 
broadly similar to what is occurring globally in microfinance. In Pakistan, as in 
elsewhere, microfinance is a market-based intervention, with little direct government 
involvement, except for the role played by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The SBP 
has faithfully served the pro-market agenda, by playing an important role in moving the 
sector towards the financial mainstream. 
Unfortunately, in its zeal to commercialize, microfinance has evolved away from what 
was originally envisioned as a participatory, poverty reducing and empowering 
intervention. In addition, there is evidence that not only is microfinance not employing 
the community’s social capital effectively, it may even have damaged existing bonds of 
trust and engagement. The one exception to this is the MFI Akhuwat, which charges no 
interest on its loans and emphasizes to its officers the importance of social transformation 
quite persuasively. These findings corroborate existing studies conducted in other 
countries and regions that were reviewed in the previous chapter. 
The study also suggests that seeking commercial success in microfinance is inconsistent 
with the participatory and capability enhancing mission of development. At the same 
time, one of the limitations of this study is that it is unable to comment on exactly what 
social mobilization and participation has been able to achieve in the past when it was an 
important component of microfinance operations. This area will be incorporated in the 
next phase of this research. 
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At the policy level there is inconsistency with regard to microfinance’s mission. The 
PRSPs and the SBP make it clear that success in microfinance can only come through 
commercialization and rapid expansion, while the PPAF has introduced social 
accountability reforms, such as supporting outreach to the most deprived districts in the 
country. At the same time, the PPAF also lends support to the SBP’s call for achieving 
financial sustainability. The most important reason for this is that there is no systematic 
analysis of the tradeoffs between commercialization and poverty reduction in the country.  
In terms of the impact of the political economy on the sector’s outreach, the most adverse 
factor has been the conflict in KPK, Balochistan and Karachi. The recurring floods since 
2010 have also significantly damaged the rural microcredit portfolio. Importantly, no real 
relief has been provided so far to the clients, either by the institutions themselves or by 
the SBP and the PPAF.  
Day-to-day operations are affected by problems of corruption and patronage. Institutions 
have tried to address this issue by redesigning their products and lending methodologies, 
but on the whole, the sector continues to be relatively sheltered from the type of loan 
defaults that are common in the commercial banking sector.  
Finally, while purdah or the segregation of the sexes poses some problems for outreach in 
villages and remote regions of Balochistan and KPK, it is less of an issue in cities such as 
Karachi and Lahore, where the bulk of microfinance activity is concentrated. 
From the clients’ perspective, the deteriorating security situation, power outages, rising 
inflation, unemployment and underemployment, and the recurrence of heavy flooding, 
have all contributed to squeezing profit margins and limiting benefits from access to 
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formal credit. This may change in the future as micro-insurance products are developed, 
such as the weather-indexed microinsurance just introduced by the PPAF. At the same 
time, globally microinsurance take-up rates, especially in rural communities, have been 
notoriously low (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011) and if this is to be used as a predictor of the 
success of the Pakistani scheme then the results are likely to be disappointing. 
Karachi, the city from which 67 percent of the client sample was drawn, has been the 
subject of special focus in this essay. Most Karachi-based clients in the sample 
complained of violence disrupting their lives, but appear to have found either a way to 
cope with the situation or are experiencing what Sen calls “entrenched deprivation”. 
Karachi is the country’s most well-developed city and the study finds that differences in 
the level of impoverishment of the lower-middle income or upper-poor neighborhoods 
from which most clients come from, do not result in significant differences between the 
educational outcomes of clients’ children, their homeownership status (see chapter 3 for 
details) or the type of businesses that they are engaged in.  
Since census data shows that the various neighborhoods covered in the sample are not the 
poorest neighborhoods in the city, it provides further evidence of the fact that 
microfinance does not target the poorest, and MFBs less so than MFIs. The data also 
suggests that there remain vast differences in terms of access to basic services, such as 
education and sanitation, between the different lower-middle class neighborhoods in 
Karachi. One possible reason for this are differences in ethnic composition, resulting in 
turf wars over the city’s limited resources. This provides one explanation for the 
continued violence in the city. Thus, Karachi’s inhabitants are not likely to experience 
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relief in the near term from the security situation they are faced with and microfinance 
practitioners and clients have to take this as a given, unless a major political action is 
taken in this regard.  
The obvious conclusion here is that the political economy has a significant impact on 
microfinance institutions’ outreach, the strength of their portfolio, their day-to-day 
operations, and the wellbeing of their clients as well as the gains that can realistically be 
achieved with access to formal credit. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GENDER, DEVELOPMENT AND MICROFINANCE 
 
Development until recently has been understood in terms of an increase in a country’s 
pace of economic growth and from the perspective of a Southern country, of catching up 
to the advanced countries of Western Europe and North America (Rist, 2006). But ever 
since the 1990s, thanks to the work of economists Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq and 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum our understanding, hopes and expectations regarding 
development have broadened considerably. We now see it as constituting a set of 
practices that increase the capacity of people to control their own lives (Murphy, 
2006:30). This implies that the current definition of development is about individual 
wellbeing, which cannot be achieved through an increase in income alone.  
Such a conceptualization points to the necessity of change, choice and power (Kulkarni, 
2011), that is, a successful intervention is one that changes the status quo by increasing 
people’s choices and giving them more power.  
By this logic, underdevelopment is a state that requires change because it lacks in choice 
and power, at least for certain groups. One major source of underdevelopment is the 
persistence of inequalities between men and women. The United Nations (2009) 
estimates that despite the advances of the past 50 years or so, women still constitute 70 
percent of the world’s poor. Perhaps the most startling reminder of gender-based 
inequalities is what Amartya Sen (1990) has referred to as the “missing women” 
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phenomenon. According to a World Bank (2011) estimate nearly 4 million “missing 
women” are added to the ranks each year as a result of excessive female mortality from 
self-selective abortions, early deaths of female infants, maternal mortality and women’s 
lack of access to adequate nutrition and healthcare (Duflo, 2012). 
Correcting these inequalities is now widely accepted to be a major goal of development. 
This is not just because empowering those without choice and power is good for its own 
sake, but also because research shows that empowering women positively impacts other 
development indicators such as the health and educational outcomes of a population, 
which also leads to higher rates of economic growth (Duflo, 2012). Thus, it is not 
surprisingly that women’s empowerment has become an important policy goal (Ashraf et 
al, 2010). 
As a development intervention microfinance appears to fit the bill quite neatly as it 
involves the extension of small sums of money to those that traditionally have not had 
access to formal financial services, especially poor women. Since more than 75 percent 
of the sector’s clients worldwide are women, this intervention specifically seeks to 
address gender based inequalities.  
This chapter specifically analyzes the effectiveness of microfinance as a tool for women’s 
empowerment. The issue under question is the extent to which microfinance provides 
poor women in Pakistan with the capacity for change, choice and power. The data for this 
analysis will come mainly from the qualitative research detailed in chapter 3, but will 
also include the quarterly microfinance outreach data from the Pakistan Microfinance 
Network (PMN), described in chapter 2. The analysis will follow the pattern in chapters 
2, 3 and 5 and will be comparative in nature. The discussion from the previous chapters 
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should lead us to expect that microfinance institutions (MFIs) are more likely to focus on 
gender-based inequalities than MFBs, since the former are mainly registered NGOs and 
on average have a strong social mission while the latter are banking institutions under 
pressure to breakeven and produce profits. 
At the same time, microfinance’s growing popularity in the past two decades has led to 
increased commercialization, which has put pressure not just on MFBs but also on MFIs 
to consider microfinance a commercial rather than a charitable business, to reduce 
reliance on subsidies, become operationally more efficient and, at least in Pakistan, to 
revise their pricing structure upwards (Stephens et al 2006; Ministry of Finance Pakistan 
2006). Nevertheless the comparative analysis can inform us of the extent to which 
institutional structure affects the way microfinance institutions focus on gender-based 
inequalities, in a country such as Pakistan. But we begin first with a general discussion on 
the state of gender inequality in Pakistan, which will then serve as a frame for the more 
specific analysis that is to follow. 
 
Gender Inequality in Pakistan 
The UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index (GII) captures the multi-dimensional aspect of 
gender disparities across countries with rankings based on a 0 to 1 scale, higher values 
indicating higher levels of inequality. The index is based on reproductive health, 
educational attainment, parliamentary representation and labor force participation. 
Pakistan is a poor performer with a GII of 0.5733. While this is comparable to the GII’s 
of other South Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, the only other 
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region with GIIs that are worse than these countries’ is sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 
Human Development Report, 2011). 
Educational achievement is an important component of gender-based inequality. In 
Pakistan the national literacy rate is 58 percent, but the female literacy rate is just 46 
percent and in rural areas it is even lower at just 35 percent (Ministry of Finance, 
Pakistan, 2011). A national survey also indicates that two-thirds of ever-married women 
between the ages of 15-49 have never been to school at all. In rural areas, the proportion 
of women with no education rises to 76 percent (Pakistan Demographic and Health 
Survey (PDHS) 2006-07, 2007).  
Another important component of gender inequality is maternal health. The same survey 
indicates that 65 percent of women deliver their babies at home and less than half receive 
postnatal care. As a result maternal mortality ratio is 276 per 100,000 live births, while 
regional levels can be much higher. For instance, the maternal mortality ratio for 
Balochistan is 786 per 100,000 live births. Pregnancy and childbirth result in 20.3 percent 
of female deaths in the country (PDHS 2006-07, 2007).  
Gender inequalities also severely restrict women’s access to productive resources and 
employment opportunities. For instance, women's participation in the labor market in 
Pakistan is just 22 percent. Of the women that do work, 42 percent are engaged in 
“marginal” activities and 31 percent in un-remunerated family businesses (Zuberi, 2011). 
But one of the most disturbing features of female disempowerment is the public and 
private violence against them. Pakistan, along with its neighbors Afghanistan and India, 
has the dubious honor of being one of the five most dangerous countries in the world for 
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women and the United Nations estimates that every three minutes an act of violence is 
committed against a woman in South Asia (Bhalla, 2011).  
Private violence includes the killing, burning and maiming of women by household 
members, while public violence includes rape ordered by tribal leaders, public shaming, 
acid-attacks, stoning and burying alive (Shah, 2011; Dawn, 2011). In 2011 alone 8539 
cases of violence against women were reported, but the great majority of incidents are 
left unreported for violence against women is considered a “private matter”. Women are 
also hesitant to speak out for fear of humiliation and further violence (Azhar and Hadi, 
2012). 
The most obviously pertinent aspects of the pervasive gender inequality in Pakistan for 
microcredit is unequal access to productive assets and low rates of economic 
participation. Access to credit is expected to expand women’s economic opportunities as 
well as their access to entrepreneurial assets (Wright et al, 1999).  
But is microfinance really an effective pathway out of poverty and disempowerment for 
women? The evidence on this is increasingly mixed (e.g. Karim, 2011; Kabeer, 2005; 
Guerin and Palier, 2005). This paper analyzes Pakistan’s experience with microfinance in 
relation to women’s empowerment, with special reference to differences in institutional 
structure within the sector. Section I below reviews existing research on the relationship 
between gender, development and microfinance. Section II presents the quantitative and 
qualitative findings of the study, and Section III concludes with an analysis of these 
findings. 
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I. Literature Review 
The two main aspects of the empowerment literature related to women and microfinance 
are reviewed in this section. The first sub-section delves into the scholarship that links 
development and empowerment, while the second discusses the specific relationship 
between microfinance and empowerment. 
 
I.A. Development and Empowerment 
The 2012 World Development Report, published by the World Bank, begins with the 
statement: “Gender equality is a core development objective in its own right. It is also 
smart economics.” The improvement of gender-based imbalances is expected to increase 
economic productivity and help achieve better nutritional, health and educational 
outcomes at the household level, which is why an increased focus on gender is now 
considered “smart economics” by the IFIs. 
The capability approach (1999), reviewed in chapters 1 and 3, views development as a 
process of expansion of individual freedom, and this has been instrumental in moving the 
debate on gender and development forward (Fukuda-Parr, 2003). Global development 
institutions, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, now agree that giving 
women equal access to the benefits and opportunities that development has to offer is part 
of their core mission (World Bank, 2011; United Nations, 2009). Broadly translated, this 
means that removing existing gender inequalities has to be a deliberate part of the process 
of inclusive development (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2013). 
But this global emphasis on gender is a fairly new phenomenon. Women have been 
largely absent from mainstream development discourse until quite recently (Murphy, 
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2006: 201). In fact, it was not until the 1980s that women became the “visible” clients of 
development (Moser, 1993). 
Historically, the Danish economist, Ester Boserup’s study Women’s Role in Economic 
Development (1970) was one of the early works that brought to light the central role 
women play in the economy. Her study was influential in moving the United Nations 
(UN) to declare 1975-85 as the first UN Decade for Women (Kanji, 2003). Following 
this, the UN became the first global institution to pay close attention to women’s 
productive labor and their integration into the economy as a means of improving their 
status (Kanji, 2003).  
It was also the UN that persuaded all 189 of its member countries to agree to focus on 
eight global development goals in the year 2000, referred to as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs require a serious effort to improve gender-
based inequalities on multiple fronts, including health and education (Murphy, 2006: 
201). In fact, Kofi Annan, a past Secretary General of the UN, argues that achieving 
gender equality is a prerequisite for meeting all other MDGs (United Nations, 2005). 
A few years after the UN’s recognition of women’s role in development, the World Bank 
responded to the call by women’s movements to recognize their continued economic, 
social and political exclusion. The marker for this was a 1997 speech titled “The 
Challenge of Inclusion” by World Bank president James Wolfensohn, in which he 
specifically recognized the importance of including women in development (Bergeson, 
2003).  
Following this, the World Bank published a report titled “Engendering Development” in 
2001. The report echoed the UN’s stance on gender and development using a rights-based 
   
 
265 
approach (Murphy, 2006) and called for policies that would redress the imbalance in 
“rights, resources and voice” (Duflo, 2012; World Bank, 2001). The report is significant 
for it talks about addressing gender imbalance both as a social justice issue and as a 
means of accelerating overall development.  
Whether the World Bank has followed this narrative up with the same emphasis in actual 
practice is subject to a heated debate (Bergeson, 2003). But what we turn to now is a 
deeper analysis of the relationship between gender and development. Does empowerment 
follow development or is it development that follows empowerment? Scholars usually 
argue for one of these two positions (Duflo, 2012).  
 
I.A (i) Gender and Development – Where Does Causality Lie? 
Research suggests that overall economic development plays a major role in reducing 
gender inequality (World Bank, 2011). On the flip side, interventions that specifically 
aim to empower women by improving their access to the constituents of development 
such as health, education and labor market opportunities, have also shown impact on 
overall economic development (Duflo, 2012).  
The traditional view in development has been that reductions in overall poverty result in 
lowering gender-based inequalities. This is also the view most often associated with 
institutions such as the World Bank. For instance, the 2012 World Development Report 
states that gender gaps in primary education have closed, women’s life expectancy has 
outpaced men’s, and over half a billion women have joined the global labor force. The 
Bank contends that this is a direct result of the economic growth experienced across the 
global South in the past 30 years. The report goes on to stipulate that economic growth 
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will only reduce inequalities where markets and institutions are well functioning and the 
winds of change brought on by globalization are allowed to penetrate through 
traditionally subversive cultural norms (2011), which is a controversial claim as pointed 
out by several prominent scholars (Bergeson, 2003; Nussbaum, 2003).  
On the other hand, it is hard to dispute that where the incidence of poverty is higher, 
gender inequality is more pronounced and poor women experience more 
disempowerment than non-poor women (Moghadem, 2005; Kabeer, 2005). For instance, 
female children in Southern countries experience discrimination within the household, 
but this is usually more pointed when households are poor (Duflo, 2012). Khanna et al 
(2003) also find that girls are twice as likely to die as boys of diarrhea in the poor 
neighborhoods of New Delhi, India. Similarly, the condition of public schools for girls in 
the remote areas of Balochistan, Pakistan’s poorest province is so decrepit that many 
parents have stopped sending their daughters to school altogether (Murtaza, 2012).  
In India and Pakistan, gender inequalities are made worse by income inequalities, so that 
while school participation rates for boys and girls are roughly the same for the top 
income quintile, the gender gap rises to nearly 5 years for the lowest income quintile 
(World Bank, 2011). It follows from this discussion that as the incidence of poverty goes 
down, gender inequality too is likely to improve. 
This was exactly the experience in India as the country began to experience a boom 
brought on by information technology jobs outsourced from the West. This boom led to a 
rise in demand for educated girls, which in turn increased not only the demand for girls’ 
education as parents suddenly saw real benefit from educating their girls, but also 
reduced the proportion of underweight girls in the area (Bannerjee and Duflo, 2011). 
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Similarly, there is evidence that fertility rates decline when the opportunity cost to 
women’s time increases, through the expansion of their economic opportunities (Goldin, 
2006; Jensen, 2010). 
But research does suggest that the impact of economic growth on gender inequality tends 
to vary considerably depending on the type of intervention as well as the measure of 
inequality used in the analysis. For instance, economic growth resulting from the 
privatization of public services or export led growth can increase rather than decrease 
gender inequality (Berik and Rogers, 2008). Similarly, there is no apparent relationship 
between growth and empowerment, when empowerment is measured in terms of life 
expectancy, maternal mortality or participation in economic and political decision-
making (United Nations, 2009).  
In addition, despite the rapid economic growth experienced by India and China the 
problem of missing girls remains acute. In fact, in China the situation has deteriorated 
overtime, with the female sex ratio worsening from 53 percent of boys to 57 percent of 
boys among all reported births during the 1990s (World Bank, 2011).  
In the same vein, it is argued that growth-promoting policies can sometimes have a 
negative impact on women’s empowerment because the forces that give rise to affluence 
are not necessarily gender neutral (Kabeer, 2012). The World Economic Forum’s 2011 
Global Gender Gap Report states that Saudi Arabia with a per-capita income of $16,423 
ranks 131th out of 135 countries, while Ghana with a per capita income of only $1,319 
ranks 70th. 
But turning to the reverse relationship between women’s empowerment and 
development, a growing body of evidence based on field experiments, household surveys, 
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national and cross-national data, indicates that the relationship between empowerment 
and development is much more robust than the relationship between development and 
empowerment (United Nations, 2009; Mehra, 1997). 
For instance, studies find that educational expansion for women and girls is directly 
related to higher rates of economic growth, particularly in countries of the South (Klasen, 
2002; Benavot, 1989). Breierova and Duflo (2004) find that in Indonesian households 
where women are more highly educated there are likely to be fewer children. They also 
find that child mortality is positively correlated to the mother’s level of education. 
In addition, there is a large empirical literature on the differential impacts of income in 
the hands of women versus men. Broadly speaking these studies show that income and 
other productive assets controlled by women are associated with larger improvements in 
child health outcomes, household nutrition and housing (Duflo, 2003; Thomas, 1990; 
Thomas, 1993).  
All this means that there are multiple pathways through which rising gender equality 
improves the human capital potential of an economy. This is exactly why microcredit has 
been considered such an important tool for empowering women. Providing women with 
access to formal credit is expected to increase their economic opportunities and this, as 
the World Bank puts it, is “smart economics”, that is, not only does it reduce gender-
based inequalities it also results in higher levels of economic development. The section 
below briefly reviews the gendered literature on microfinance. 
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I.B Conceptualizing Empowerment in Relation to Microfinance 
The earliest scholarship on the subject of microcredit undisputedly established it as a 
pathway out of poverty not just for women but also for the entire household because 
women as opposed to men are more likely to share their increase in fortune with others 
(Ackerly, 1995). By increasing their economic opportunities, microcredit was also 
expected to enhance women’s agency both within the household and in the wider 
community (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002). But early research on the subject assumed that 
outreach and empowerment was automatically related. 
However, by the turn of the century the relationship between microfinance and 
empowerment began to receive increased scrutiny (Garikipati, 2011; Mayoux and Harti, 
2009). We are at a point now where there is no consensus among scholars regarding the 
actual impact of microfinance on women’s empowerment. Kulkarni (2011) contends that 
the major points of debate are more or less related to the definition and measurement of 
women’s empowerment. 
Broadly speaking, in recent years most definitions of empowerment have converged on 
the idea of change, choice and power. For instance, both the World Bank (2001) and the 
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) (2000) define empowerment 
as a process that enhances choices for women. So where does the disagreement lie?  
It has been argued that the existing scholarship on the subject is divided between those 
that look at empowerment as a process and those that view it as an outcome (Garikipati, 
2011; Kabeer 2001). Garikipati (2011) contends that there has been a traditional 
emphasis on outcome-related indicators, without a commensurate understanding of the 
processes that lead to the stated outcomes.  
   
 
270 
Outcome-related indicators would include measures such as the repayment rate, the 
percentage of women served and whether or not women are able to take control of their 
own loans. Kabeer (2001) and Garikipati (2011) argue that it is the processes surrounding 
these outcomes that should be considered when determining whether or not 
empowerment has occurred. The discussion below is based on a review of the literature 
on microfinance and empowerment, broadly segmented into what Kabeer and Garikipati 
would say are outcome-based studies and process-based studies. 
 
I.B. (i) Empowerment as an Outcome 
The most popular measure of success in microcredit has traditionally been the repayment 
rate. Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank, one of the most prominent 
microcredit institutions in South Asia and arguably the world, reported repayment rates 
as high as 95 percent when he began lending to women in Bangladesh in the late 
seventies (Yunus and Jolis, 1998). Other studies corroborated his findings (e.g. Aghion 
and Morduch, 2000; Lapenu and Zeller, 2001). High repayment rates have been used as a 
proxy for client satisfaction and empowerment, since it is assumed that on-time 
repayments are a result of effective financial management and successful business 
practice (Khandker, et al, 1995).  
Recent studies, however, paint a more complex picture. For instance, Armendariz and 
Morduch (2010) provide three explanations for the high repayment rates for female 
borrowers: women have a higher incentive to repay since they have less access to credit 
and the labor market than men; women are poorer than men which means that their return 
on capital is higher so the loan is invested more efficiently; and women are less mobile 
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and easier to monitor than men and tend to place more importance on the social sanctions 
brought on by defaulting on a loan. 
These results are corroborated by others who find that high repayment rates by female 
borrowers are not as much a result of their economic independence and success as they 
are a consequence of their lack of choices (Kabeer, 2000) and the threat of “losing face” 
in the community (Karim, 2011).  
A more recent indicator, used specifically in studies of microcredit in South Asia, is 
related to control of the loan. There is evidence that a good proportion of women lack 
control or even knowledge of how the loans taken out in their names are used 
(Chowdhury, 2009; Goetz and Gupta, 1994). For instance, Haq and Safavian (2012) find 
that beween 50 to 70 percent of female borrowers in Pakistan hand their loans over to 
male relatives. They also find that when existing male borrowers are unable to take out 
additional loans they force their wives to borrow on their behalf. Bernasek (2003) in her 
study of Grameen Bank borrowers finds that even when women initially have control 
over their loans, overtime they may lose that privilege. This implies that when men are 
intentionally excluded from the benefits of an intervention, especially one where an 
important resource such as access to finance is concerned, the results will not be as 
empowering to women as hoped for. 
A complicating factor is that women are not a homogenous group (Kabeer, 2000). They 
play more than one role and enjoy different statuses at different points in their lives 
(Rogaly, 1996). For instance, if empowerment is measured as female control over the 
loan, it may appear positive when the mother-in-law of the female borrower assumes 
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control over the loan even though from the point of view of the beneficiary there has been 
no improvement in status.  
On the other hand, Kabeer (2001) argues that the fact that women are more likely to share 
their loans with the men in their family strengthens the argument for lending to women as 
the entire family benefits from such a lending arrangement.  In contrast, when men are 
the direct recipients of loans, they can be expected to prevent their wives from having any 
share in the income generating activities of the household. 
But microcredit has also been shown to cause overwork, fatigue, stress and even 
malnutrition, especially when women’s market access does not expand in line with their 
access to microcredit. This is often because their other household responsibilities do not 
lessen when they become employed in businesses within and outside their homes 
(Ackerly, 1995). 
Some studies have also looked at patterns of domestic violence in relation to microcredit.  
Goez and Gupta (1994) find that violence against women can escalate when women 
either delay or fail to access credit. Other studies from Bangladesh have corroborated this 
by indicating that there is an associated increase in the incidence of domestic violence 
among beneficiary households (Ahmed, 2005; Rahman, 2001). But a South African study 
finds that intimate partner violence reduces by more than half after a two-year 
microfinance intervention (Kim, et al, 2007). 
Using a separate set of outcome-related indicators Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2006) 
find that microcredit programs in Bangladesh provide women with a greater role in 
household decision-making, increased access to financial resources, expanded social 
networks, more bargaining power vis-à-vis the husband and greater freedom of mobility. 
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Hashemi, Schuler and Riley (1996) come to a similar conclusion when they compare 
empowerment-related outcomes from participating and non-participating villages. Ashraf 
et al (2010) also find that as a result of access to an individually held savings product 
women’s decision-making power increases within the household. 
Using a broad range of indicators including income, ownership of assets, education and 
health related outcomes as well as agency within the household, Zaidi et. al.’s survey 
(2007) finds that access to microcredit decreases rather than increases women’s 
empowerment in comparison to non-borrowers in Pakistan.  
There is, therefore, no consistent message at least from the studies that employ outcome-
related indicators, regarding microfinance’s impact on women’s empowerment. 
 
I.B. (ii) Empowerment as a Process 
Kabeer (2001) and Garikipati (2011) are right that a study of outcomes without 
considering the processes that lead to these is meaningless, but their definition of 
empowerment does not include the lending arrangement itself. Empowerment is usually 
measured after loan disbursal, but the lending arrangement itself has the potential to 
affect the processes and outcomes of women’s experience with microfinance.  
For instance, Agier and Szafarz (2013) in a study on Brazilian microfinance find that 
while there is no gender-bias in loan denial, women do experience disparate treatment 
with regard to credit conditions. They find that women’s loans are subject to a “glass 
ceiling” effect and that the gender gap in loan size increases disproportionately with 
respect to the scale of the borrower’s business. 
   
 
274 
The original lending arrangement promoted by the Grameen Bank and adopted the world 
over, as a best practices model is group lending. Group lending involves the simultaneous 
disbursement and collection of loans from a group of borrowers, usually women, who 
belong to the same community. Since the loan is un-collateralized, the community’s 
social capital is used to ensure timely repayments. Social capital is a community’s 
network of relationships and bonds of trust upon which all non-economic and informal 
economic activity is based. In this particular arrangement, members guarantee each 
other’s loans and in case of delinquency, other members of the group contribute towards 
the missing payment. Groups are based on trust and members strive to maintain “group 
solidarity” since continued eligibility for future loans depends on the group’s repayment 
performance (Khandker, 2012).  
Loans can also be sequenced so that a few group members receive their loans first and 
complete repayment before others within the group become eligible for their loans 
(Bernasek, 2003). In both versions there is strong social pressure on individuals to follow 
the repayment schedule (Stiglitz, 1990; Wydick, 1999).  Thus, it is said that this 
arrangement replaces financial collateral with social collateral (Ito, 2003). 
Early research on the subject provides a rich narrative on how group lending empowers 
women by creating a support network and peer mentoring among members, especially as 
the transactions are usually conducted without the intermediation of men (Hashemi, 
Schuler and Riley, 1996; Bernasek and Stanfield, 1997, Bernasek, 2003) which is 
especially significant in South Asia where women are seen as the life long dependents of 
men (Kabeer, Huda, and Kaur, 2012).   
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Also, as group lending requires attendance at regular meetings, women who might 
otherwise be socially isolated, are able to defend their attendance as a social and 
household level obligation. Thus, attendance at such meetings is said to have an intrinsic 
value of its own (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997) and Osmani (2007) refers to this as 
empowerment through mingling.  
On the other hand, in her ethnographic account of women debtors in Bangladesh Karim 
(2011) provides a detailed account of community-level violence against women debtors. 
She describes how loan officers threaten delinquents with public humiliation, flogging, 
breaking into their homes with other community members to confiscate beds, pots, pans 
and other household items.  
The Andhra Pradesh suicides in late 2010 exposed the practices of Indian microfinance 
institutions to the world. Overindebteded borrowers were driven to take their own lives 
by drinking pesticides, jumping in a pool or by other means when told by loan officers 
that only in death would debts be forgiven (Kinetz, 2012). Several officers were 
implicated for the aggressive and threatening ways in which they tried to exact repayment 
(Biswas, 2010). Considering the evidence against group lending, Roodman (2012: 178) 
contends that individual lending is more empowering than group lending. 
Moving on to actual loan use, Mahmud (2003) finds that while microcredit has a limited 
impact on women’s access to choice-enhancing resources it does have a powerful effect 
on women’s ability to influence household decisions. But others are more critical. For 
instance, one study finds that becoming the primary beneficiaries of a microcredit 
program does little to increase women’s inclusion within the household’s cash 
management (Montgomery, Bhattacharya, and Hulme, 1996). Garikipati (2011) in her 
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review of Indian microfinance finds that when women’s loans are used for productive 
assets the process is disempowering to them, since they lack co-ownership of the 
household’s productive assets.  
At the same time, women’s autonomy varies, often between regions in the same country 
(Lieven, 2011; Rahman and Rao, 2005; Basu, 1992) or by households within the same 
community (Gine et al, 2012) and where autonomy is higher at the baseline we can 
expect better empowerment related outcomes from the intervention. 
It is important to note though that even when women are able to set up small businesses 
through microfinance, these businesses are usually part of the informal home-based 
sector (Bernasek, 2003). Research suggests that poor women in developing countries, 
especially in South and East Asia, are mostly engaged in informal home-based work 
(Doanne, 2007). The following section reviews the nature of women’s businesses. 
 
Informal Home-Based Work 
The informal sector is characterized by low productivity mainly because of low capital-
to-labor ratios, unstable business conditions, lack of social security benefits and no 
possibility of unionizing for better wage and working conditions (Todaro and Smith, 
2012: 333; Bernasek, 2003).  
Similarly, home-based work is considered a peripheral economic activity (Zuberi, 2011). 
It is largely unaccounted for by economic data but a rough estimate puts the number of 
home-based workers at 50 million in South Asia alone, over 80 percent of whom are 
women (HomeNet South Asia, 2006). The compensation is piece-rate and the work is 
often subcontracted through a middleman. Doanne (2007) describes home-based women 
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workers as being at the bottom of the value-chain. Their income is considered 
supplemental for the household but more often than not they are unpaid workers in the 
family business.  
At the same time, home-based work offers an opportunity to escape the harsh urban 
realities of many Southern countries, particularly South Asia. Women in contemporary 
Pakistani cities such as Karachi and Lahore, especially “working-class” women, face 
everyday social and physical violence. Public spaces such as the factories where they are 
employed, the public transport they use to get to work, the narrow alleys they negotiate 
when they leave their homes, expose them to constant sexual and social threats (Ali, 
2012; Lieven, 2011).  
Home-based work is also an important income diversification strategy. There is a 
growing literature on how poor households diversify their income. While most of it is 
focused on rural households and diversification into non-farm activities (e.g. Minot et. al, 
2006; Karugia et. al, 2006), there are broad lessons that can be taken from this 
scholarship. For instance, studies have found that households with multiple sources of 
income are less likely to suffer from hunger (DeRose, 1998). But research also suggests 
that the greater the level of household poverty the higher the level of income 
diversification (Malunda, 2011).  
Most importantly, income diversification can have both positive and negative effects. The 
positives are related to a reduced level of income risk from diversification. It appears that 
income diversification smoothens both income and consumption patterns in poor 
households (Dunford, 2012). At the same time, it is often found that when households 
diversify into too many low-return activities in order to mitigate income risk the result is 
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not necessarily poverty reducing (Malunda, 2011). This is especially true when you 
consider the low remuneration capacity of informal home-based work. 
Thus, empowerment is a complex topic for there is no real agreement on its exact 
relationship with overall economic development or even how it should be defined and 
measured. Further, there are several pros and cons associated with increasing women’s 
economic participation through microcredit schemes. These conclusions set the context 
for the findings from this study. The section below presents key results from the 
qualitative and quantitative data analysis related to microfinance and women’s 
empowerment in Pakistan. 
II. Research Questions and Empirical Findings 
The main questions with regard to microfinance and women’s empowerment in Pakistan 
that this study addresses are: (a) To what extent does microfinance offer women in 
Pakistan the possibility of change, increased choice and power?, and (b) Does one 
institutional model in Pakistan’s microfinance sector have a more empowering impact on 
women than the other? 
The following analysis is based on the qualitative data described in chapter 3, as well as 
the quantitative data on microfinance outreach described in chapter 2. Empowerment is 
measured using a mix of outcome and process indicators. Outcome indicators include the 
following quantitative indicators: number of microborrowers by gender, gross loan 
portfolio by gender, average loan size by gender, number of savers by gender, and total 
savings by gender.  
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Other outcome indicators include control and use of women’s loans, incidence of home-
based work and extent of income diversification. Process indicators include an analysis of 
the dominant lending arrangements in Pakistan’s urban microfinance sector and the 
potential impact of recent innovations in the microfinance product portfolio, particularly 
the gold backed loan.  
The trend analysis presented below is part of the outcome-related discussion, while the 
qualitative findings in the next sub-section include both outcome and process-level 
indicators of empowerment. Both set of indicators are analyzed using the framework of 
change, choice and power proposed by Kulkarni (2011).  
 
II.A. Comparative Analysis of Institutional Data  
This section compares the gender profiles of MFI and MFB borrowers. Microcredit 
portfolio trends are presented first, followed by the trends in savings.  
 
II.A. (i) Microcredit  
While 75 percent of global microborrowers happen to be women (Reed, 2011), in 
Pakistan women represent only 57 percent of the total number of microborrowers and 
account for only 43 percent of the total gross loan portfolio (MicroWatch, 2013). In 
addition, while 80 percent of MFI borrowers are women, only 25 percent of the MFB 
borrower group is female. Thus, the gender targets of both groups are quite different from 
each other.  
Chapters 1 and 3 describe the phenomenon of MFI transformations into standalone 
MFBs. In the Pakistani microfinance sector there are currently three MFBs that were 
once part of a traditional MFI, namely the Aga Khan Rural Support Network (AKRSP), 
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the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) and Kashf Foundation. Of these the two 
most recent spinoffs, that is, NRSP Bank and Kashf Bank, have originated from MFIs 
that lend primarily to women, but after the spinoff these newly created MFBs have 
reversed their gender-based lending targets. More than 90 percent of the borrowers at 
both MFBs are male as of the last quarter of 2012 (PMN dataset).  
Figure 1 describes the borrower by gender trend since 2006. It is clear that overtime the 
female borrowers of MFIs have risen to account for the largest proportion of total 
borrowers, while the female borrowers of MFBs account for the lowest share of the 
market. Moreover, the rate of increase in female borrowers at MFIs has been much higher 
than the rate of increase in female borrowers at MFBs, which has resulted in an 
increasing divergence between the two groups. 
 
Figure 16 Total Number of Borrowers by Gender and Institution 
 
 
Figure 2 describes trends in the gross microcredit loan portfolio by gender from the 
second quarter of 2009 to third quarter of 2012. The trend indicates that over time the 
portfolio accounted for by the male borrowers of MFBs has overtaken the portfolio 
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accounted for by the female borrowers of MFIs as the biggest component of the sector’s 
total loan portfolio. Once again the lowest share of the portfolio is accounted for by the 
female borrowers of MFBs, followed by the male borrowers of MFIs.  
 
Figure 17 Gross Loan Portfolio by Gender and Institution - Millions of US$25 
 
 
Figure 3 presents the trend in average loan size, which is simply the gross loan portfolio 
divided by the total number of borrowers in each category. In 2009 when the data on loan 
portfolios first became available, both MFIs and MFBs offered loans of nearly equal size 
to each gender. At this time, the average loan for men was approximately US$40 higher 
than for women for the sector as a whole. As mentioned in the literature review, Agier 
and Szafarz (2013) found a similar gender gap between the average loan sizes of men and 
women in Brazil.  
However, in the case of the Pakistani microfinance sector the trend in the average loan 
size by gender takes an interesting turn by the end of the data series in 2012. Figure 3 
indicates that while the intra-institution gender gap remains significant overtime, the 
                                                
25 US$1=Pakistani Rupees (Rs.) 98.19 as of March 1, 2013 
   
 
282 
inter-institution gender gap closes almost completely in the case of the female borrowers 
of MFBs and the male borrowers of MFIs. On the other hand, the gap between male 
borrowers of MFBs and female borrowers of MFIs has grown rapidly over time, as MFB 
loan sizes have rapidly increased and MFI loan sizes have continued to remain low. 
 
Figure 18 Average Loan Size by Gender and Institution - US$26 
 
What could account for the narrowing of the gap between MFB female borrowers and 
MFI male borrowers? One factor is the difference in the overall socioeconomic status of 
MFI and MFB borrowers. MFBs in Pakistan tend to target higher income borrowers, that 
is, usually those living above the poverty line, while MFIs on average target those below 
the poverty line. This is a policy driven segmentation (see chapter 3 for details). The 
implication of the trend observed in Figure 3, however, is that higher income women are 
comparable, at least in terms of loan size, to lower income men.  
One reason for this is that MFBs have stepped up individual lending, as shown in Figure 
9 in the section on lending arrangements. Studies indicate that individual loan sizes are 
                                                
26 US$1=Rs98.19 as of March 1, 2013 
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higher than group loans (Lehner, 2009). This is true in Pakistan, where the average group 
loan for the fourth quarter of 2012 was US$ 135.0827 while the average individual loan 
for the same period was US$340.57, which means that the average individual loan is 
more than twice the average group loan. The trends in Figure 3 make sense for a higher 
proportion of MFB clients have individual loans, relative to MFI clients. In fact, had 
there been no gender dynamics at play we would expect both male and female MFB 
clients to have higher average loans than MFI clients. 
Interestingly, comparing Figures 1 and 3 we can see that the highest number of borrowers 
in the sector belongs to the MFI female borrower group, but the lowest loan sizes are also 
associated with the same group. This has several implications. One is that the female 
borrowers of MFIs belong to the lowest socioeconomic category since loan sizes are 
directly proportional to income, as described by MFI and MFB practitioners during 
interviews, observed during the loan verification process prior to disbursal and detailed in 
the literature review in chapter 2.  
But loan size is also dependent on institutional policy and the particular lending 
arrangement. Research indicates that group loans are on average lower than individual 
loans and group lending lends itself particularly well to female rather than male 
borrowers (Isserles, 2003). 
Apart from microcredit, which constitutes the largest component of the microfinance 
product line in Pakistan, the sector also offer savings products to clients and the wider 
public. The section below reviews the trends in the savings data.  
 
                                                
27 Rs.100=US$1 as of June 1, 2013 
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II.A. (ii) Savings 
The term microsavings refers to the small denomination savings of poor households. 
However, the savings data in the PMN database, from which the trend analysis in Figure 
4 is extracted, is not exclusively microsavings data. This is because MFBs mobilize 
deposits not just from their clients but also from the public at large. MFBs compete with 
local commercial banks for attracting deposits and MFBs such as Tameer Bank offer 
returns on deposits higher than what most commercial banks offer in order to compete in 
a market traditionally served by commercial banks (interview Development Director 
Tameer Bank, 2012). While these savings products are also offered to microfinance 
clients, they cannot be called “microsavings”, because they are neither necessarily small 
in denomination nor are the borrowers necessarily poor or even near poor. 
MFIs, on the other hand, cannot use savings as a funding source and only collect small 
denomination savings from their own clients or the communities they serve in. Thus, 
their savings data is truly microsavings data. At the same time, microsavings collected by 
the MFIs are not necessarily voluntary savings as described in chapter 1, since MFIs such 
as NRSP ask borrowers to place 10 percent of the loan proceeds in a savings account as a 
precaution against default. This also means that to a great extent borrowers and savers are 
the same individuals in the MFI group. 
Figure 4 below indicates that savings in the microfinance sector were until recently 
mainly the domain of the MFIs. However, in the past two years the number of male 
savers at MFBs has increased dramatically, thanks mainly to the deposit mobilization 
initiatives introduced by the SBP (State Bank of Pakistan, 2011). By the third quarter of 
2012, the number of MFB male savers had overtaken the number of both male and 
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female MFI savers. The number of female savers at MFBs though rising remains 
significantly low, compared to the other three groups. 
 
Figure 19 Number of Savers by Gender and Institution 
 
Figure 5 provides the trend in total savings in millions of US$. The picture here is very 
different. It is clear that since the beginning of the series, that is, the second quarter of 
2009, total savings by the male clients of MFBs have been significantly higher than those 
of all other categories of savers. The value of female savers at MFBs is also higher than 
those of MFI savers. This clearly shows that while MFI savings are the microsavings of 
poor households, MFB savings are much higher in value and cannot be considered 
microsavings. Since we assume that savings are directly proportional to income, this also 
implies that the socioeconomic backgrounds of MFI and MFB savers are quite different. 
Here again, we see that in terms of total savings, the female savers of MFBs account for a 
higher value of savings than the male savers of MFIs. But as we saw with the microcredit 
data, comparing the gender profiles of MFB and MFI savers is like comparing bats and 
bees as the socioeconomic status of the two groups differ significantly.  
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Figure 20 Amount of Savings by Gender and Institution – In US$ Millions28 
 
Overall, the quantitative empowerment related outcome indicators suggest that while 
MFIs target female borrowers and savers, MFBs do not. However, this type of 
quantitative data paints only a partial picture and at this point we cannot effectively 
predict the impact of microfinance on women employing the framework of change, 
choice and power. This is because the literature reviewed in Section I presents an 
inconsistent message regarding access to microfinance and women’s empowerment. 
We, therefore, need to supplement analysis of the quantitative data with the study’s 
qualitative findings, in order to develop a more nuanced understanding of what this 
implies for women’s empowerment. 
 
II.B. Gender and the Mechanics of Microfinance 
The study’s qualitative research findings are presented in the following categories: 
control and use of loans, lending arrangements, and lending against gold. As discussed in 
Section I, control and use of loans is often considered an outcome indicator. Additionally, 
                                                
28 US$1=Rs98.19 as of March 1, 2013 
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I analyze the lending arrangement, as a process-related indicator. I also consider 
interview data on the impact microfinance has had on women’s agency both within and 
outside the household. Finally, I analyze the rising popularity of gold-backed loans in the 
microfinance sector. 
 
II.B. (i) Control and Use of Women’s Loans  
Analysis of PMN data suggests that as of the fourth quarter of 2012, the ratio of female 
borrowers to total borrowers did not exceed 33 percent at any MFB, except for Apna 
Microfinance Bank, which is a small MFB with a branch network limited to the city of 
Karachi. On the other hand, during the same period, the average MFI ratio of female to 
total borrowers exceeded 75 percent. In fact, most prominent MFIs such as Kashf 
Foundation, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Association for Social 
Advancement (ASA) and NRSP lend primarily to women. But the literature reviewed in 
Section I indicates that when it comes to women, access does not automatically mean 
control. 
During interviewees, practitioners from all 8 MFIs in the sample admitted that male 
relatives used the majority of the loans provided to women. The loan verification form 
used by these institutions includes a section on loan usage and the borrower is asked to 
put down the name of the household member who will eventually assume control over 
the loan, even though the loan remain on the female’s name in the loan book. Thus, the 
institution is a complicit part of this type of loan usage arrangement. 
The head of microfinance at the MFI, Orix Leasing, justifies this in the following words: 
“women are very disadvantaged in our country. They are often seen as worse than cows 
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and buffalos in many villages…we can’t change the mindset so quickly. When we 
disburse the loan we make the men of the family realize that they are getting the loan 
because of the women. We tell them to honor her because of their ability to get the loan 
through her.” 
On the other hand, the head of microcredit at the MFI, Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) argues 
that this model of loan usage leads to the exploitation and misuse of women for they do 
not get to use either the loan or to the income generated from it, at the same time, they 
remain responsible for repayment.  
Most female interviewees in the sample, however, did not indicate that this arrangement 
posed any problem for them. Instead they contended that if the loan was being used to 
help the household it didn’t matter who controlled it. As some women put it “we live in 
one house, we are all in it together”.  
But there were also women who didn’t know where and how the money from the loan 
was used. A female borrower in Lahore replied when asked about how the loan was put 
to use “we don’t know, our husbands are the ones who use it”. Figure 6 below shows loan 
use patterns for the 41 female borrowers in the sample: 
 
Figure 21 Self-Reported Loan Usage Pattern Among Female Borrowers 
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This pattern corroborates with Haq and Safavian’s (2012) study described in Section I of 
Pakistani female borrowers, between 50 to 70 percent of whom report handing their loans 
over to male relatives. But Figure 6 differentiates loan use by self, husband and family. 
“Family” here is a reference to home-based businesses that employ more than one 
household member. This will be discussed in greater detail later in this section. 
Recall, however, that Kabeer (2001) describes such a pattern of loan use as reason 
enough to continue lending to women, since women are more likely to share their loans 
with the household as compared to men. This corroborates with the account of a male 
borrower in Rawalpindi in the sample, who said that his wife did not even know that he 
had taken out a loan. Nevertheless, the loan was used to pay for his sister’s wedding.   
In Karachi, I accompanied a loan officer from a local MFB to a female borrower’s home 
but her husband refused to talk to us saying she was away and he did not approve of his 
wife taking the loan. Interestingly, the loan was being used for his sewing and 
embroidery business. Both incidents suggest that microcredit does not necessarily 
empower, when the definition of empowerment includes cooperation and reduction of 
conflict within the household (Sen, 1987).  
Interpreting loan use, however, is more complicated than it appears at first because of (a) 
the incidence of home-based work and (b) the multiple income streams of poor 
households. The chart below shows the distribution of borrowers in the sample according 
to the type of work arrangement. 
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Figure 22 Work Arrangements in Borrowing Households 
 
Given that the sample is primarily urban, only 4 percent of the work was agricultural, 
including livestock and farming. Of the urban sample, 70 percent of the households 
reported relying either exclusively or partially on home-based work. Of the 27 percent 
that were not involved in home-based work, most were male. These findings are 
consistent with the research on home-based work reviewed in Section I.  
The question is how do these findings relate to women’s empowerment in relation to 
microcredit? Deeper analysis of the interview data provides several answers. For 
instance, two female borrowers in Lahore reported handing their loans to their husbands 
and denied any knowledge of how the loan was being used. These women were also 
engaged in preparing glucose packets for sale to a middleman, in order to supplement the 
families’ incomes. It is important to note that the loans were not employed in the 
women’s home-based businesses but instead were used to fund their husbands’ work 
outside the home. This is not just because women’s work has less value within the 
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household, it is also because women’s work brings in less money as compared to men’s, 
at least in the case of these two women.  
Nevertheless, Figure 6 indicates that there were a good number of women who reported 
using the loan for their own or their families’ home-based businesses in which they were 
important contributors. Recall also from Section I that women are not a homogenous 
category and play different roles within the same household (Rogaly, 1996). The 
importance of this fact was brought to light during a visit to a borrower’s home in a slum 
in the Korangi neighborhood of Karachi. In this household, the borrower was the mother-
in-law while her two daughter-in-laws served as the unpaid employees of the family’s 
home-based business, which consisted of preparing steel clips for commercial use. 
During the day these young women worked with the material to prepare the clips and at 
the same time tended to the children, prepared food and received visitors. The mother-in-
law was absent during the interview, but this was because she worked as a housemaid 
elsewhere and was most likely supplementing the household’s income with her wages. 
This also brings up the fact that poor households often depend on multiple income 
streams. The chart below shows the distribution of income streams across the client 
sample.  
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Figure 23 Number of Income Streams 
 
The chart indicates that the largest proportion of households had two income streams but 
there were also several families with three or more sources of income. The majority of 
households with multiple income sources had both husband and wife engaged in 
productive work, as well as any adult children that lived with them, such as the owners of 
a grocery and dairy shop in a local slum just outside Lahore. The mother and the older 
son in the family worked at the shop, the husband was employed in a government office 
while two teenaged girls were engaged in masehri29 work.  
There were also several households in which a single adult was engaged in multiple 
activities. For instance, in one house the only earner was the husband who worked as a 
medical assistant at a local hospital and also managed a wholesale cold drink business on 
the side. In another household, the husband worked as a commercial driver while the wife 
was involved in three different types of home-based work. In others, the wife helped the 
                                                
29 Strings of colorful paper flowers used as wedding decorations 
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husband with the main family business, but was also involved in sewing or masehri work 
on the side.   
Clearly impoverished households struggle to make ends meet and one income is 
insufficient to meet basic household needs. Also, as described in Section I, by 
supplementing the principal earners’ income through home-based work, women are able 
to diversify income risk in a time of economic uncertainty, rising inflation and 
unemployment. More than one woman talked about how her son or husband had been 
laid off from the factories they had worked in, putting severe strain on the household’s 
already meager finances. 
But going back to loan use, how exactly is the incidence of home-based work and income 
diversification related to the question of empowerment? First of all, when the household 
is engaged in multiple income generating activities, including but not limited to home-
based work, it is often the females that are responsible for the lower-paying activity. It is 
then a rational choice, rather than evidence of a lack of agency, that the loan is used on 
the activity that generates the most income. But even if the income potential from 
women’s businesses were higher than that of their male relatives’ it would not matter, for 
in Pakistan as in other traditional cultures women are the last to eat, rest, attend school or 
visit a healthcare facility, so it is natural that even in their economic activities they would 
put their own requirements behind those of the men in their family. 
And if the loan is accessible only to females, which is the case with most MFIs, it will be 
the wife or mother in whose name the loan will be taken out even though she is not the 
end user of the loan.  
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In rural areas, the women are responsible for the household’s livestock. Institutions that 
wish to ensure loan use by women, issue loans against livestock. Farm households keep 
livestock either for fattening the animal or for dairy production. In both cases it is the 
women that work with the animals. However, even here loan use can be a complicated 
measure of autonomy and empowerment. The two rural clients from Tando Allahyar in 
the sample were both male and had taken out livestock loans. While both confirmed that 
it was their wives that tended to the cows and goats that they had bought with the loans, 
the process of purchase and sale of the animals was described as a male-centered activity 
for it required visiting the local market outside the village. Thus, ensuring that 
microcredit supports women’s work does not necessarily empower them. This is aptly 
captured by the words of an MFB branch manager in Hyderabad, a city in Southern 
Sindh, who managed an area in rural Sindh: “men have the hookah30 while women do all 
the work”. 
It is, therefore, not easy to determine empowerment through outcome indicators such as 
access and use of loans alone. This is because access and use is dependent upon the 
lending arrangements described below, cultural and economic considerations, the nature 
of home-based work and multiple income streams. It is also important to realize that 
providing women with economic opportunities has to be weighed against their other 
household responsibilities. 
But what about process level indicators such as agency within the household and 
participation in the wider community? When female interviewees were asked about 
decision-making related to children’s schooling and the household’s cash management 
                                                
30Hookah is a long tobacco pipe used by men in rural areas. 
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there were varied responses. Some women reported that they alone made schooling 
choices, while others said it was a joint decision between husband and wife. Similarly, 
when asked about managing finances, some stated they were handled all the money, 
while others said it was joint management and a third group said finances were handled 
by the husband alone.  
The relevant question though is whether these women experienced a change in the level 
of agency within the household after becoming clients of microfinance institutions. None 
of the female interviewees agreed that such a change had occurred. When asked whether 
they felt that their respect in the wider community had risen as a direct result of the loan, 
none of the female interviewees responded in the affirmative either, in fact their response 
most often was an incredulous smile. I had asked this question specifically because two 
MFI senior managers had mentioned that access to microcredit was directly related to a 
rise in respect of borrowers in the rural communities they served. It is possible that the 
conflicting evidence was a result of rural-urban differences, since all female interviewees 
were city-based. 
Thus, loan use, whether analyzed as an outcome or a process level measure, does not 
indicate that female borrowers experienced any level of empowerment. The discussion 
that follows is related to the lending process and how that can be viewed as an 
empowering or disempowering process for women. 
 
II.B. (ii) Lending Arrangements 
Since its origins in the late 1970s, microcredit has been associated with the Grameen 
Bank, which as described in Section I, popularized the group lending model. Most 
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microcredit institutions across the global South applied this model with only minor 
changes, if at all. Pakistan was no exception. In fact, Kashf Foundation, the first 
institution established in Pakistan in 1996 as a microcredit institution received technical 
assistance directly from the Grameen Bank. Today, however, the original group lending 
arrangement is on its way out, at least in Pakistan. 
There are several reasons for this. First of all, as microfinance has become 
commercialized, loan sizes have increased, and MFBs have targeted more men than 
women and moved to relatively higher income clients. Group lending is generally 
considered more conducive to small loan sizes, female creditors and the very poor 
(Khandker, 2012). With the change in clientele and innovation in the microfinance 
product line, described below, individual lending is catching up to group lending and in 
the next few years is likely to outpace it in Pakistan. This trend is described in Figure 9 
below, which compares the group versus individual gross loan portfolios of MFIs and 
MFBs. 
Figure 24 Gross Loan Portfolio by Lending Methodology and Institution - In US$ 
Millions31 
 
 
                                                
31 US$1=Rs98.19 as of March 1, 2013 
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In Pakistan, Tameer Bank was the first MFB to introduce individual lending and it 
continues to have the largest individual lending portfolio in the sector. Data extracted 
from the PMN dataset indicates that as of the fourth quarter of 2012, Tameer’s individual 
gross loan portfolio was nearly US$64 million, which is approximately 60 percent of the 
entire sector’s individual gross loan portfolio. Newer MFBs such as Kashf Bank, a 
spinoff from the MFI Kashf Foundation, have followed Tameer’s lead and chosen to 
focus on individual lending as well.  
Another reason for moving away from the Grameen model is the double-edged sword of 
social capital. In 2008-09, the MFI Kashf Foundation faced a major microfinance 
delinquency crisis in the province of Punjab, which quickly spread to other institutions 
(details are provided in chapter 5). But such crises are not unique to Pakistan, Bolivia and 
Bangladesh had a similar experience in the late 1990s, while the Indian state of Andhra 
Pradesh experienced it in 2006 and then again in 2010 (Roodman, 2010).  
The loan application process has been overhauled since the default crisis hit the 
microfinance sector. Every MFI in the sample asks its female borrowers to provide at 
least one male relative’s national identity card and photograph at the time of application. 
This male is also required to accompany the female at the time of loan disbursal. When 
questioned about this practice, branch managers and loan officers said that this was 
important in case of legal action for nonpayment. Officers also stated that it was 
culturally more acceptable to threaten men with police action in case of delinquency than 
women.  
Group meetings have also been deemphasized over time by several institutions. 
Institutions such as the UPAP now ask borrowers to come for disbursal and collection on 
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an individual basis to the regional branch office. Borrowers complain that coming to the 
regional office often requires half a day of travel for them, but from the empowerment 
point of view this also has other implications. Recall from Section I that there is literature 
to suggest that group meetings facilitate peer mentoring and the development of a support 
network among female borrowers.  
At the same time, an ex-senior official of Kashf Foundation counters this by saying: “The 
group lending model can be problematic. The requirement for the group to meet every 
week or every two weeks is not helpful especially when the meetings are transactional. 
Its only about exchanging money, it is not an empowering platform, it is not producing 
social capital”. 
This was corroborated by female clients in the sample, who expressed frustration with the 
rigidity of having to meet at a regular time every month or week, as in the case of BRAC. 
Observations of group meetings also confirmed this. In every meeting I attended the same 
pattern was observed – A few women would have collected at the designated house 
before the loan officer would arrive. After waiting for several minutes for those that had 
not yet come someone would send a child to the neighboring house reminding the women 
about the meeting. The loan officer would begin the meeting by taking attendance and 
every client would take a turn to sit next to the loan officer to pay her dues. The meeting 
would then end with a reminder about the date and time for the next meeting. Only the 
BRAC meeting included a social mobilization component. The meeting I observed 
included an oath-taking at the end. The oaths included a commitment to never tell a lie, to 
educate their female children, to pay close attention to the health and hygiene of the 
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family and to keep their contract with the organization. The entire episode, however, 
appeared mostly ritualistic.  
During interviews most women that had individual loans expressed relief for not being 
forced into a group loan. They criticized group lending for making people responsible not 
just for their own but also their neighbor’s loan. Clients of Kashf talked about the nature 
of the group lending arrangement before the crisis hit the MFI. Some mentioned that the 
group leader would elicit under-the-table payments from them in order to include them in 
a group, while others reported that when certain borrowers were unable to pay their loans, 
group members would come and confiscate household items such as television sets.  
Thus, in terms of change, choice and power, the move to individual lending seems to 
have had an empowering effect on borrowers since it has increased flexibility and 
reduced the rigidity of the lending arrangement. At the same time, the dynamics of the 
sector have changed, as more men and the better off are being targeted and the poorest 
women are being crowded out. 
Moreover, the increased commercialization in the sector has reduced the importance of 
social mobilization, which has long been considered an important vehicle for women’s 
empowerment (UNDP, 2004). Social mobilization has been a strong component of NGO 
activity in Pakistan since the late 1980s. These NGOs have included the Orangi Pilot 
Project and most of the rural support programs (RSPs), including the AKRSP and the 
NRSP – all of which later became important players in the microfinance sector as well. In 
sharp contrast to the early years, during which social mobilization was considered an 
integral part of the microfinance intervention, most of these NGOs have since separated 
their social mobilization activities from their microfinance programs. Cases in point 
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include the creation of the standalone First Microfinance Bank by the AKRSP; the setting 
up of an independent body called the Orangi Charitable Trust by the Orangi Pilot Project 
(OPP) (Hasan and Raza, 2012); and the separation of NRSP’s social mobilization work 
from its microfinance activities in 2006 and the subsequent setting up of NRSP 
Microfinance Bank (NRSP, 2010). This seems to suggest that even institutions that see 
social mobilization as an important part of their development work, no longer see the 
value of extending it to their microcredit clients. At the same time new research on social 
mobilization and community development has found evidence that men and the better off 
are more likely to benefit from it than women and the poorest (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). 
Another phenomenon in Pakistan’s microfinance sector is the rapidity with which new 
products and new channels of scaling microfinance services, such as mobile banking, are 
being introduced. One product that has clear implications for women’s empowerment is 
the gold backed loan. 
 
II.B. (iii) Financing Against Gold 
As mentioned earlier, Pakistan’s microfinance sector has been referred to as a “laboratory 
for innovation” (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), 2011). Financing against 
gold, pioneered by Tameer Bank in 2010 and by the end of 2012 adopted by all active 
MFBs (Aslam and Azmat, 2012), is held up by the State Bank officials interviewed for 
this study as one of the most promising examples of product innovation, which rapidly 
expands the frontiers of financial inclusion. However, gold financing is highly 
contentious as it can deepen and institutionalize existing gender disparities. 
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The institutions that offer gold backed loans admit that the primary target market for it 
are men but that the jewelry used as collateral belongs to the women in the household. 
Proponents of this type of individual lending contend that it is risk-free for the institution 
and also greatly reduces processing time. Tameer Bank, which has shifted 80 percent of 
its portfolio into gold-backed loans, reports that these loans can be disbursed within 3 
days while ordinary microcredit takes 21 days from application to disbursal due to the 
time intensive loan verification process. 
From an economic point of view, supporters contend that this product allows gold 
jewelry to be used as an economic asset in a country where gold is usually the savings 
product of choice for most people (Aslam and Azmat 2012; Chen and Rasmussen 2011). 
But such a narrative is highly problematic from a gendered perspective for gold jewelry is 
usually the only asset a South Asian woman, particularly from the lower socioeconomic 
classes, can call her own. It is an important part of her dowry, is passed down from 
generation to generation, and in low socio-economic households is often a woman’s only 
financial security (Ashford and Huet-Vaughn 2000).  
It is too soon to know the actual impact of gold-backed loans on women in borrower 
households since the product is relatively new, but there is danger that hastily taken out 
loans could end up liquidating jewelry with important economic and emotional value, in 
households with already limited savings and assets. This can have potentially disastrous 
intergenerational outcomes for women as predicted by an MFB practitioner, who 
contends that her institution was reluctant to introduce this product but felt it had no 
choice given that all others in the sector had already done so. The gold backed loan is 
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perhaps the clearest case of commercial interests overtaking the poverty and 
empowerment mission of microfinance. 
III. Conclusion 
This study analyzes the contentious issue of empowerment in relation to microfinance, in 
the context of urban Pakistan. Empowerment is a difficult concept to measure. Keeping 
this in mind, I use multiple indicators, both quantitative and qualitative, as well as 
process and outcome indicators of empowerment, to explore how microfinance affects 
women’s lives in Pakistan. 
The findings presented and discussed in Section III, lead to the clear conclusion that 
microfinance has not empowered women in any meaningful way in Pakistan. In fact, 
there is real danger that if the sector continues to evolve the way it has recently, 
microfinance will disempower rather than empower Pakistani women.  
This assessment is based on several findings. First of all, while women’s access to loans 
may have increased thanks mainly to MFIs, their use and control over these loans has not 
increased proportionately. This implies that blocking men from benefiting directly from 
an important resource, such as access to formal credit, is not an effective way of 
empowering women. 
The study also finds that the size of women’s loans, and in the case of MFBs, the ratio of 
women’s loans to total loans continues to be much less than men’s. If empowerment 
requires a reduction in gender-based inequalities, then clearly this has not occurred. 
   
 
303 
In addition, the women included in the client sample do not believe that a significant 
change in their relative economic or social position within or outside the household has 
occurred in relation to their microfinance experience.  
In terms of the institutional structure, MFBs on average are more concerned about profit 
making than their NGO counterparts, the MFIs. This means that MFBs tend to target men 
and the better off. However, as mentioned above, in the case of women access is not the 
same thing as use and control over credit. MFI women’s loan sizes are also the lowest in 
the sector. Due to differences in socioeconomic backgrounds, MFB loan sizes for women 
are comparable to MFI loan sizes for men, but this has to be viewed in light of the fact 
that MFB’s lend mainly to men while MFIs on average lend primarily to women. 
In terms of the lending process, it appears that individual lending arrangements are more 
flexible and borrowers prefer them to group lending. At the same time, individual loans 
are geared towards wealthier borrowers, who are also more likely to be men rather than 
women. 
Moreover, divorcing social mobilization from microfinance activity at the largest MFIs is 
a clear sign that commercialization is fast replacing the original intent of microfinance as 
a poverty reducing and gender empowering intervention, though recent research has 
indicated that civil society led social mobilization activities are not as empowering for 
women as they are for men.  
But perhaps the most alarming development to date is the rapid rise in popularity of the 
gold backed loan in the MFB sector. This product has the potential to threaten women’s 
meager savings and assets, as well as their agency and position in already vulnerable 
households. In spite of this, gold backed loans have become a significant growth driver in 
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the sector’s loan portfolio, with full backing from the State Bank of Pakistan. By the end 
of 2012, every active MFB in the sector had introduced this loan and is currently banking 
on it to reduce its exposure to risk in an uncertain political economy.  
Thus, donors, policymakers and practitioners need to critically assess the impact of the 
microfinance sector on women’s position within the household and the larger community. 
There is a need to systematically compare the benefits of growth inducing and risk 
reducing strategies in the sector against the dangers they pose to women’s already 
vulnerable status in a country like Pakistan.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
This research was set out to study the effectiveness of microfinance as a tool for financial 
inclusion, poverty reduction and women’s empowerment. The study emphasizes that 
context matters, which in this case includes the global development discourse, Pakistan’s 
official development paradigm, and its current political and economic conditions.  
The study also sought to analyze how microfinance’s evolution from a modest NGO-led 
development program to a commercialized financial venture worth more than $70 billion 
globally (Sinclair, 2012) has influenced its social mission, practice and outreach, and how 
policy and institution level changes have in turn affected the experiences of the clients of 
this intervention. 
The literature on microfinance is fraught with controversy and empirical studies often 
present conflicting evidence. More importantly, the concern for poverty and 
empowerment has been pushed to the side in recent scholarship in favor of research on 
the most effective and innovative ways to expand outreach rapidly (e.g. Banerjee et al, 
2012; Miles and Nugroho, 2013). When it comes to conceptualizing poverty, the new 
emphasis is on the variability rather than the inadequacy of income, which, it is claimed 
can be overcome through access to short-term and renewable formal credit contracts. For 
instance, Karlan (2007) argues: “Being poor is not just about having too little income. It 
is about having insecure income.” Thus the legitimacy of microfinance is sought in the 
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variable income streams of the poor, which access to formal financial services is expected 
to smooth out. This is a major shift in the microfinance narrative. From an intervention 
that was until recently believed to solve the twin problems of poverty and women’s 
disenfranchisement (Khandker, 2003), microfinance now claims to provide only a 
temporary Band-Aid to the poor. 
And yet the interest and investment in microfinance continues to rise. From the World 
Bank, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) to private social investment funds, the microfinance sectors across the global 
South have an impressive and varied list of “partners”. In 2012, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s lending arm, had commitments of nearly $2 billion 
across 75 countries in microcredit projects alone (World Bank, 2013). 
The scholarship on microfinance has played a major role in this, for it promotes the 
continued growth of the industry without paying enough attention to the actual value it 
provides to its clients and their communities. This study has sought to refocus attention 
on the original objectives of the microfinance mission, for providing the poor with access 
to finance is a worthy goal of development only if it substantially enhances the 
capabilities of the poor.  
This research provides empirical evidence on each of the three stated objectives of 
microfinance, that is, financial access, poverty reduction and women’s empowerment 
using the capabilities framework. What follows is a synthesis of the findings presented in 
previous chapters. The theoretical and policy implications of these findings are presented 
in the sections that follow the next section. 
   
 
315 
I. Synthesis of Empirical Findings 
The most important empirical findings of the study were summarized in chapters 2, 3, 5 
and 6. This section synthesizes these findings to provide answers to the study’s main 
research questions. The first question this work addresses is whether microfinance, 
especially in its commercialized form, serves as an effective tool of financial access, 
poverty reduction and women’s empowerment. The second question is whether 
microfinance is indeed the ideal development intervention, as often claimed by its 
proponents (Rankin, 2002; Elyachar, 2002). 
 
Microfinance and Financial Access  
The microfinance literature refers to the poor as the “unbanked” and describes their 
precarious lives as being made more precarious by a lack of access to formal sources of 
finance (Collins et al, 2009). But the scholarship on informal finance documents a vast 
network of credit, savings, insurance and money transfer services available to the poor 
(Udry, 1994; Bouman, 1995; Suleri and Savage, 2006). This was confirmed during 
interviews as clients reported that it was routine to borrow from neighbors, friends, and 
family when the need arose. In addition, purchases for household use were often made on 
store credit, while business inventory was regularly bought on merchandise credit. Client 
interviews, in fact, suggest that microcredit clients may experience a rise in informal 
borrowing, for many reported being unable to make repayments on time unless they 
borrowed from friends, family or even their own clients. For savings, the poor as well as 
the non-poor in Pakistan regularly contribute to rotating savings and credit associations 
(roscas) that are locally called “committees”. While the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and 
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the Pakistan Microfinance Network (PMN) have tried to make the lending process in the 
microfinance sector as transparent as possible and it is true that formal arrangements tend 
to be more reliable than informal arrangements, microfinance is not as flexible as 
informal financial services. And flexibility is an important criterion for poor households, 
for emergencies, such as a sudden illness or death, can plunge them deeper into poverty. 
When it comes to formal financial services, microfinance does fill a need for those that 
fall outside the traditional purview of commercial banks, but the current microfinance 
penetration rate in Pakistan is only 9.24 percent (MicroWatch, 2013). Between 2004 and 
2008, the sector’s annual compound growth rate was no less than 67 percent (Chen et al, 
2010), but growth fell thereafter unable to pick up pace again. Reasons for faltering 
growth and in places the complete wipeout of existing microfinance portfolios include 
violent conflict, major natural disasters, an economic downturn, and in certain regions a 
culture of extreme gender disparity. But just as economic growth in Pakistan has nearly 
always been exclusive rather than inclusive, growth in the microfinance sector has also 
been unequal thanks mainly to the rapid rise in commercialization. 
Commercialization has a complex relationship with the access to finance agenda. The 
literature on commercialization predicts that commercially run microfinance institutions 
will be able to expand outreach faster than traditional NGOs (Schmidt, 2010). Pakistan’s 
development policy also states that the goal of commercialization is to expand the 
outreach of microfinance institutions and reach those without access to formal sources of 
finance. The country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) describes the 
microfinance banks (MFBs) in Pakistan as vehicles of commercialization and urges the 
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SBP to encourage microfinance institutions (MFIs) to shed their NGO status and 
transform into MFBs.  
The econometric analysis in chapter 2, however, demonstrates that commercialization in 
Pakistan has not resulted in expanding outreach to the poorest districts, in fact the MFIs, 
which are mainly NGOs, are much more likely as a group to operate in rural and remote 
regions. At the same time, MFBs and MFIs are certainly not a homogeneous group.  
MFBs such as Khushhali Bank and the First Microfinance Bank (FMFB) have a heavy 
rural presence, while others such as Tameer Bank, Kashf Microfinance Bank and Apna 
Microfinance Bank are mainly restricted to urban areas. Not surprisingly Khushhali and 
FMFB are much more focused on their social mission than the others. But Tameer is the 
growth driver in the sector and is widely considered the industry’s best practices model. 
Tameer’s outreach strategy, which has been adopted by newer MFBs, has resulted in 
crowding out the poorest, women borrowers, and those living in rural areas.  
MFIs are also a heterogeneous group, with Akhuwat Foundation’s zero-interest model at 
one end of the spectrum and Kashf Foundation and the Bangladeshi MFI, Association for 
Social Advancement (ASA) at the other end. While Akhuwat is only concerned with 
poverty alleviation and social change, Kashf and ASA pay at least as much attention to 
their finances as they do to their social mission.  
Econometric analysis reveals a great deal of heterogeneity in MFI outreach. Clients of the 
rural support programs (RSPs) constitute 50 percent of the MFI sector’s active clientele. 
There are currently 11 RSPs in the country, spread throughout the rural areas of Pakistan. 
When the MFIs are taken together as a group their pattern of outreach indicates a strong 
tendency to locate in the most vulnerable districts of Pakistan. But when the RSPs are 
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removed from the analysis, the results indicate that MFIs are no longer sensitive to 
socioeconomic disparities between districts.  
In addition, loan sizes in the MFI sector are often too small to make much of a difference 
in the lives of their clients, especially when it comes to meeting the capital requirements 
of their businesses. For instance, clients with welding shops complain that they cannot 
buy lathes and other welding equipment from their loans. Similarly, even the RSPs agree 
that their rural clients are unable to purchase livestock from the livestock loans they 
provide them unless they can borrow additional amounts informally.  
The next argument made by microfinance’s proponents is that access to formal services 
allows the poor to overcome poverty, or at least takes the edge off of it (Khandker, 2003). 
The following section discusses the empirical findings related to this contention. 
 
Microfinance and Poverty 
Empirical studies on microcredit have demonstrated that the pressure to earn profits has 
moved the sector towards a wealthier target market. The present study confirms this, but 
also finds that the upstream move is primarily policy driven, at least in the case of 
Pakistan where the SBP has played and continues to play a major role in guiding the 
microfinance sector’s evolution from traditional NGOs to commercialized entities. The 
SBP’s policy focus has in turn been influenced by the changing emphasis in global 
microfinance, particularly as envisioned by the World Bank.  
The findings suggest that the poorest, women and those living in remote rural areas have 
been crowded out by the better off, men and city dwellers, especially those from the 
largest cities in Pakistan such as Lahore and Karachi. This is especially true for MFBs 
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and less so for MFIs. But the sector is in a rapid transformation phase, as more MFBs are 
established each year and the largest MFIs are transform into MFBs to take advantage of 
the incentives provided by the SBP, such as a five-year tax holiday and access to 
specialized institutional grants. This means that MFIs themselves are being crowded out 
of the microfinance sector. 
While most MFBs argue that they are commercial entities and their greatest concern is 
the financial bottom-line, MFIs point to their non-profit status and indicate that client 
wellbeing rather than earning profits is their main concern. Nevertheless, not every MFI 
is able to translate its social objectives into actual practice. For instance, the National 
Rural Support Programme, one of the largest MFIs in the country with a strong focus on 
poverty alleviation, asks its borrowers to pay a few days before the due date so that it 
does not have to deal with pass due accounts, without considering how such a practice 
would affects its clients.  
The majority of the clients do not agree that microcredit has made a significant impact in 
their lives, though there are some true success stories where families have been able to 
recover from major crises through their continued association with microfinance 
institutions. On the other hand, clients also report being humiliated when unable to make 
payments on time by loan officers knocking on their doors until the neighbors come out, 
having to go without meals in the days leading up to repayment, and asking friends and 
family to help them with loan repayments.  
The current political economy has placed an additional strain on borrowers, particularly 
the ongoing conflict in various parts of the country, the economic meltdown, the chronic 
power shortage, and the recurrence of major natural disasters. This has meant that the 
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majority of the poor are unable to save or make ends meet. Interviews with clients, and 
branch and loan officers confirm that most clients are worse off now than they were a few 
years ago and that these conditions are largely to blame for this. But even more 
discouraging are the findings related to microfinance and women’s empowerment in 
Pakistan. 
 
Microfinance and Gender 
Despite the fact that microcredit has always been associated with the expansion of 
women’s opportunities, the empowerment rhetoric is surprisingly low key in Pakistan’s 
microfinance sector. This is most likely related to the pervasive gender disparities present 
in the country, discussed in detail in chapter 6. In terms of microcredit, women constitute 
just half of total active microcredit clients in Pakistan (MircoWatch, 2013), as opposed to 
the 75 percent global average (Reed, 2011). Within this sector, only 25 percent of MFB 
microcredit clients are female, while 80 percent of MFI microcredit clients are women 
(PMN database, 2013). Moreover, average microloans for women are much smaller than 
for men, especially when offered by MFIs.  
For MFIs, however, the biggest gender related issue is not so much the lending amount as 
it is the use and control of loans. Men control the majority of the loans provided by MFIs 
to poor women, usually with the explicit knowledge of the institutions. The loan 
application form, in fact, asks the female borrower to provide the name of the end user of 
the loan.  
But the analysis of this finding from a gendered perspective is made complicated by the 
reality of informal work arrangements and the multiple income streams of the poor. 
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Impoverished households struggle to make ends meet and one income is usually 
insufficient to meet basic household needs, due to which the household engages in 
multiple income generating activities, including but not limited to home-based work. 
Generally speaking, it is the females in the household that are responsible for the lower-
paying activities and it can be a rational choice, rather than evidence of a lack of agency, 
that the loan gets used on the activity that generates the most income. Moreover, if the 
loan is only accessible to females, which is the case with most MFIs, the loan has to be in 
the name of the wife, mother or sister even though she is not the end user of the loan.  
But even if the income potential from women’s businesses were to be higher than their 
male relatives’ it would not matter, for in Pakistan as in other traditional cultures, women 
are the last to eat, rest, attend school or visit a healthcare facility, so it is natural that even 
in their economic activities they would put their own requirements behind those of the 
men in their family.  
Another factor to consider is that most home-based businesses employ multiple family 
members, but because most MFIs lend primarily to women the loan has to be in the 
woman’s name even though patriarchal family patterns determine that the oldest male in 
the family serves as the business owner.  
It is, therefore, not surprising that none of the women in the sample report any 
improvement in their self-esteem or agency as a result of the microcredit experience, 
either within the household or in the wider community. In fact, most interviewees found 
the very idea of empowerment through microcredit quite incredulous. 
When societies are segregated, expanding outreach is a real issue for microfinance 
institutions. The culture in Pakistan is not homogenous and regional differences can be 
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stark. Broadly speaking, women in Karachi are by far the most outspoken and least 
concerned about purdah or segregation, while the women in the remote and rural regions 
of the country are often required to maintain strict segregation. Therefore, MFIs that lend 
primarily to women find it easiest to operate in the cities. And institutions such as FMFB, 
which have a large rural presence, confirm that for the most part they have abandoned 
their gender targets. 
But perhaps the most alarming aspect of the rapid commercialization in the sector is the 
sudden rise in popularity of gold backed loans, which are collateralized loans offered by 
all active MFBs in the country. Most MFBs in my sample admit that the loans are 
targeted at men, but the collateral asked for is gold jewelry, which is often the only asset 
women in poor households can call their own. The stock of gold jewelry in poor 
households though meager is usually passed down from one generation of women to 
another and is high in both emotive and economic value.  
Given these findings it is clear that microfinance, at least the way it is currently practiced 
in Pakistan, is not an effective tool for financial access, poverty reduction or women’s 
empowerment. But does it fit the general criteria of a successful development 
intervention, that is, is it participatory, market-driven and financially sustainable? 
 
Is Microfinance Participatory, Market-Driven and Financially Sustainable? 
Global institutions, such as the World Bank, contend that development should be viewed 
as a participatory process, one that is led by community development NGOs and private 
rather than state actors (World Bank, 2002). In addition, the intervention should be 
sustainable, that is, it should not need long-term donor support. When microfinance first 
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rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s it appeared to fit the criteria perfectly 
(Khandker, 2003; Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). 
But the empirical findings of this study suggest that the situation is more complex than 
what the mainstream literature had suggested. In Pakistan, microcredit was first 
introduced by community development NGOs such as the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) and 
the Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP), but as the sector commercialized and 
expanded in scale, the community development component was deemphasized. By now 
even the older institutions such as OPP, AKRSP and the National Rural Support Program 
(NRSP) who consider community development a core part of their operations have 
separated their microcredit operations from their other activities.  
At the same time, new research suggests that donor driven participatory development 
projects are never as effective as when participation and collective action occurs 
organically within communities (Mansuri and Rao, 2013). One of the limitations of this 
study is that it has not been able to study the importance of community development in 
communities where MFIs combine their microcredit operations with social mobilization, 
with the exception of the MFI Akhuwat – the zero interest microcredit provider. This 
research finds that Akhuwat continues to encourage its poor borrowers to make regular 
charitable donations as a form of spiritual purification. Client interviews demonstrate that 
Akhuwat has been successful in fostering a spirit of brotherhood among its past, present 
and future clients. But the topic of participatory development is broad and requires a 
more exhaustive and detailed study. 
Finally, field research in Lahore indicates that the repayment crisis of 2008-09 that ripped 
through the microfinance sector in and around that city destroyed the affected 
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communities’ existing social capital, causing deep rifts between neighbors who had 
formed groups to receive loans. This suggests that when things go wrong, microcredit can 
actually destroy rather than build a community’s social capital, as is often claimed 
(Feigenberg, Field and Pande, 2010). 
The second criterion for a successful development intervention, at least as far as the 
World Bank is concerned, is that it should require as little government intervention as 
possible. The microfinance sector in Pakistan is a near perfect example of an industry 
shaped by private institutions for the MFI sector is led by NGOs, while MFBs are 
privately run banking institutions. Khushhali Bank was the only MFB that was set up as a 
quasi-public sector institution, established through the Khushhali Bank Ordinance in the 
year 2000. But in June 2012 it was also sold to a private consortium of local and foreign 
investors. The SBP is the only state actor that plays a major role in the industry, and it too 
restricts itself to promoting the financial sustainability, risk reduction and expansion of 
the sector. 
But the market-driven approach has led to a dilution in the industry’s social mission as 
discussed earlier. The majority of the MFBs are less concerned than public sector entities 
about setting and achieving social and developmental goals, as demonstrated by the 
comparison with Khushhali Bank. Until its sale in 2012, Khushhali had the largest branch 
network in the country, with branches in 72 out of a total of 113 districts, many of which 
were the most poorest in the country, and a mode of outreach that involved partnering 
with local community organizations in each district.  
The final consideration is sustainability. Financial sustainability and expanding outreach 
appear to be the sector’s top priority at the present moment. It is because of this that the 
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SBP modified prudential regulations for the MFBs in 2010 and allowed them to offer 
gold backed loans, which it refers to as a zero-risk product. At the same time, by the time 
the interviews were completed in July 2012 most MFBs had not achieved breakeven, 
with the exception of Tameer Bank. Nevertheless, other MFBs such as Kashf Bank, 
reported that according to their estimates the achievement of sustainability was only one 
or at most two years away.  
MFIs, on the other hand, are considered much less likely to become sustainable 
institutions by the SBP. According to the SBP, MFIs operate inefficiently and their cost 
to revenue ratios are too high, though MFIs argue that their costs are high because they 
operate in rural and remote regions where the cost of operating is higher and the focus on 
their social mission makes it difficult for them to charge high rates of interest. At the 
same time, while MFBs are required by the SBP to maintain extensive records of their 
operations, there is often a lack of transparency in MFI operations, which makes it hard 
to know the truth behind these claims. But it is true that institutions such as Akhuwat 
have made no attempt to become financially sustainable and depend entirely on donations 
and volunteers, rather than generating revenues through interest and hidden fees. On the 
other end of the spectrum are MFIs such as ASA, which claim to have achieved full 
financial sustainability thanks to their signature bare bone, no frill operations and a tight 
control over their finances, but also because they collect sizable interest on their loans. It 
is important to note here that the average interest rate in the sector is 35.9 percent 
(Shorebank International, 2011). 
When it comes to financial sustainability there is no simple definition. While ASA and 
Tameer Bank claim to have achieved breakeven, both institutions receive credit from the 
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PPAF, which bears below credit market interest rates. Tameer, like the other MFBs, also 
has access to institutional strengthening funds as well as other grants and incentives that 
typical MFIs do not, which implies that sustainability is a grey area. These facilities are 
provided by the UK’s DFID, the IFC and the Asian Development Bank and work in a 
manner similar to the donor funding some of the more prominent MFIs such as Kashf 
Foundation receive. 
Thus, broadly speaking microfinance, at least as it is practiced in Pakistan, is not a 
participatory and financially sustainable intervention. It is, however, driven by market-
forces and this may be more problematic than beneficial from the point of view of the 
borrowers, particularly women and those living in rural areas. 
II. Theoretical Implications 
The idea that access to formal credit should be considered a basic right of the poor and 
that only through commercialization and strengthening the global as well as the local 
market for microfinance investments can this end be achieved is basically an extension of 
the “democratization of finance argument” (Aitken, 2013). The latest scholarship on 
microfinance appears to be headed in this direction (e.g. Ogden and Morduch, 2013; 
Ledgerwood, 2013). 
However, the empirical findings of this research suggest that such an argument has more 
to do with furthering the global financialization agenda than concern for the poor, their 
poverty or their marginalization. Financialization is defined as the reduction of major 
aspects of social life into financial asset streams (Aitken, 2013). The use of gold jewelry 
in microcredit transactions is a perfect example of this for it transforms a social object of 
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high emotive value into a financial asset. The stated purpose of which is to expand the 
formalization of the informal economy at the bottom of the pyramid, while fostering 
economic growth. 
The empirical findings of this study make it clear that access to microfinance does not 
reduce informal borrowing or increase the opportunities and capabilities of the poor, 
particularly women and the rural poor. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
conceptualize the real purpose of “financial inclusion” and to justify the continued 
expansion of microfinance.  
Another important conclusion drawn from the present work is that the political economy 
is a potent force that can change the direction of an intervention, even if it is strictly 
market-based, and can significantly reduce or increase its effectiveness. The results 
demonstrate how the spectacular growth of microcredit in the mid-2000s turned into near 
negative growth because the sector has been unable to deal with rising levels of conflict, 
an economic downturn and the recurring incidence of major natural disasters in the 
country. A related point is that while the literature on microcredit and conflict suggests 
that microcredit can jumpstart conflict-ridden societies by spurring entrepreneurship and 
economic rebuilding (Nagarajan and McNulty, 2004; Manalo, 2003; Doyle, 1998), the 
empirical findings suggest quite the opposite. 
Finally, the gender related findings demonstrate that empowerment is hard to measure 
and even harder to analyze. The research on empowerment has suggested that simply 
measuring the outcomes of female-targeted microcredit is insufficient and process level 
indicators should also be employed when measuring empowerment (Kabeer, 2005; 
Garikipati, 2011). However, this literature has not recognized that the lending process 
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itself can be empowering or disempowering to women. The evidence from Pakistan 
suggests that the lending process deemphasizes women’s agency, particularly in gender-
targeted microcredit arrangements. The process serves to maintain rather than oppose the 
pervasive gender disparities in the country, by explicitly allowing women to hand over 
their loans to men, insisting that women be accompanied by men at disbursement, and 
requiring men to be the guarantors of women’s loans.  
III. Policy Implications 
This study has several policy implications but all of them stem from the basic finding that 
microfinance was found to be neither a pathway out of poverty or disempowerment. 
While the SBP and microfinance practitioners in Pakistan are unlikely to be surprised by 
these results, microfinance continues to hold promise for many at the global level. 
International institutions such as the Microcredit Summit Campaign, the Grameen 
Foundation, the Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA) and 
Kiva.org have been fundamental in promoting and maintaining the rhetoric on poverty 
and empowerment in the global arena. FINCA recently announced plans to increase its 
stake in Pakistan, arguing that access to microcredit is “life changing” as it expands the 
economic opportunities of the poor. In the context of Pakistan, FINCA’s CEO predicts 
that microcredit will also serve to bring peace and reduce the current conflict in Pakistan, 
as well as its overspill in the rest of the region and the world (2013). 
Putting aside such grand illusions, there is doubtless a demand for credit among poor 
households in Pakistan. However, microfinance institutions are currently unable to meet 
this demand. First of all, existing arrangements are inflexible and not designed with the 
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poor in mind. The poor continue to turn to informal sources of finance, which meet their 
needs much better, even if they are at times pricier and less reliable.  
But even if microfinance institutions were able to meet the financial needs of the poor, it 
is clear that access to finance is not going to solve the problem of poverty and 
disempowerment. If scarce donor dollars have to be employed in Pakistan, this research 
finds that it would be better to spend them in income generating schemes. Most urban 
borrowers in the sample identified a lack of formal sector jobs as the biggest hurdle to 
their wellbeing. Similarly, in rural areas the recurring floods have put a severe strain on 
household budgets and there is a need to diversify farm incomes. Of course, it is also 
imperative to bolster the sagging rural infrastructure and find ways to mitigate the risk of 
crop and livestock damage, especially in the vulnerable districts of KPK, Sindh and 
Punjab. 
With regard to commercialization, this study finds clear evidence that even the access to 
finance agenda has not been served by commercial entities because a concern for profit-
making has resulted in moving the market upstream, away from the poorest, those living 
in rural and remote areas, and women. Commercialization has in fact weakened the 
microfinance sector’s original emphasis on the poor and women by taking resources and 
focus away from traditional microfinance institutions, that is, the MFIs towards MFBs, 
which openly admit to placing profits before people. This implies that the existing policy 
of promoting commercialization in the sector is misplaced and needs serious 
reexamination.  
For the Pakistani microfinance sector this will be a difficult path to take since the current 
thrust is promoting commercialization in the sector. The PPAF has also recently joined 
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hands with the SBP to provide soft loans to MFBs and the expansion of the branchless 
banking initiative has prompted the entry of several local and foreign private corporations 
into the MFB sector. Nevertheless, there needs to be a systematic assessment of the 
benefits and costs of commercialization. For instance, allowing gold backed loans to take 
over MFB microcredit portfolios is a marked departure from the very idea of microcredit. 
The use of this product has serious implications from both a gendered and non-gendered 
perspective. Increasing the debt levels of already vulnerable households while taking gold 
as collateral, which has a high emotive and financial value in Pakistan, is highly 
problematic as discussed above and the policy needs careful reconsideration. 
The introduction of microsavings, microinsurance and branchless banking has expanded 
the product lines of microfinance institutions considerably. But these products have not 
been designed with the needs of the poor in mind and have been unable to either expand 
the opportunities of the poor or reduce their constraints. For instance, MFBs are allowed 
to take deposits from the public at large, which often means that they prefer to attract a 
higher-end clientele for their deposits, neglecting the needs of the poor in the process. 
MFIs, on the other hand, are unable to use deposits to fund their operations and use client 
savings mainly as a precaution against default, which means that the savings they collect 
are for the most part involuntary.  
Similarly, credit life insurance offered to microcredit borrowers is primarily a risk 
reduction strategy for the institutions. In cases where health insurance is offered 
borrowers are unclear about the conditions of use and at present health insurance does not 
include outpatient services. Weather-indexed insurance in rural areas is still in a pilot 
phase and needs to be expanded after a careful examination of its impact on rural 
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households. But the main policy implication here is that there needs to be a serious 
reassessment of the existing microfinance product line keeping the needs of the 
borrowers as the central focus rather than institutional risk-return profiles. 
Finally, the violent conflict, the economic collapse, frequent power breakdowns, and the 
increased incidence of natural disasters have reduced business margins at the bottom of 
the economic pyramid and in the words of the poor “credit is no longer a choice but a 
necessity”. At the same time, as since economic prospects become worse over time, 
access to credit is no longer an opportunity to build bigger and better businesses but 
rather just a temporary Band-Aid for the poor. 
IV. Future Research 
There are two primary components to expanding this research in the post-dissertation 
stage. The first has to do with addressing the limitations of the present study, while the 
second constitutes developing a larger research agenda.  
In the first stage, the econometric model can be improved with the inclusion of additional 
district-level indicators such as gender, branch distance from the center, and the 
availability of other financial services, formal as well as informal, in each region. In 
addition, a smaller study that may not include every district, but uses more direct 
indicators of borrower poverty and socioeconomic status, can provide a more detailed 
and accurate view of how commercialization has impacted the financial inclusion 
initiative in Pakistan. 
The qualitative study can also be strengthened, specifically by increasing the client 
sample and covering at least some of the areas left out during fieldwork. These areas 
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include Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), southern Punjab, northern Sindh, and 
the northern regions of Gilgit-Baltistan and Kashmir. Moreover, the present study has 
been primarily restricted to urban areas and interviews with practitioners made it clear 
that rural microfinance is very different from urban microfinance, which implies that the 
next stage of this research should cover the rural areas of Pakistan in order to build a 
more complete picture of the microfinance experience in the country. 
In terms of developing a broader research agenda, there are two future studies that would 
be natural extensions of the present one. The first involves an exploration of gold backed 
loans, using the theoretical construct of financialization, but expanding it to incorporate a 
gendered perspective.  
The second study would focus on the impact of civil conflict on microfinance operations 
and how this has affected the clients of microfinance. This study would build on the 
existing literature on conflict and microfinance. In the first stage, the focus can be on 
civil conflict and the fieldwork would focus on Karachi, the country’s largest and most 
diverse city, but one that is currently suffering from intense civil conflict. Karachi has the 
second highest concentration of microcredit clients, but has recently experienced a 
negative rate of growth in microfinance outreach. Chapters 5 and 6 include a mini-case 
study of Karachi’s experience with conflict and microfinance.  
These studies will contribute to a growing body of critical literature on microfinance. To 
date, however, the issues related to collateralized microcredit, and conflict and 
microfinance have been largely unexplored by academic scholarship. While these studies 
would employ a multi-disciplinary conceptual framework, the critical literature on 
financialization will serve as the primary anchor. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
STATA OUTPUT 
 
I. Levin-Lin-Chu Unit Root Test for Stationarity of Economic Perceptions: 
 
 
. xtunitroot llc dpercep 
 
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for dpercep 
---------------------------------------- 
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =    113 
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     21 
 
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0 
Panel means:  Included 
Time trend:   Not included 
 
ADF regressions: 1 lag 
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 8.00 lags average (chosen by LLC) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                    Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Unadjusted t       -56.8256 
 Adjusted t*        -35.4555        0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
II. Principal Component Analysis: 
 a) Health	  status:	  	  	  
factor noisypregtet noisyimmun noisydelloc, pcf mineigen(0.5) 
(obs=2486) 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     2486 
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.16765      1.57390            0.7225       0.7225 
        Factor2  |      0.59374      0.35513            0.1979       0.9205 
        Factor3  |      0.23861            .            0.0795       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 2932.76 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+--------------------+-------------- 
    noisypregtet |   0.9247   -0.0269 |      0.1442   
      noisyimmun |   0.8001    0.5661 |      0.0393   
     noisydelloc |   0.8200   -0.5220 |      0.0551   
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    ------------------------------------------------- 
 
. predict health1 health2 
 
 
Scoring coefficients (method = regression) 
    ---------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2  
    -------------+-------------------- 
    noisypregtet |  0.42659  -0.04530  
      noisyimmun |  0.36911   0.95347  
     noisydelloc |  0.37829  -0.87925  
    ---------------------------------- 
 
b) Educational status: 
 
factor noiseprimenroll noisy_femattend noisylit, pcf mineigen(0.5) 
(obs=2486) 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     2486 
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        1 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        3 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.46061      2.06294            0.8202       0.8202 
        Factor2  |      0.39767      0.25595            0.1326       0.9528 
        Factor3  |      0.14172            .            0.0472       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(3)  = 4907.79 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    --------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+----------+-------------- 
    noiseprime~l |   0.8772 |      0.2305   
    noisy_fema~d |   0.8834 |      0.2195   
        noisylit |   0.9543 |      0.0894   
    --------------------------------------- 
 
. predict education 
(regression scoring assumed) 
 
Scoring coefficients (method = regression) 
 
    ------------------------ 
        Variable |  Factor1  
    -------------+---------- 
    noiseprime~l |  0.35651  
    noisy_fema~d |  0.35903  
        noisylit |  0.38781  
 
 
c) Housing Utilities: 
 
factor noisytoilet noisyelectrify noisycookingoil noisytapwater, pcf 
mineigen(0.5) 
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(obs=2486) 
 
Factor analysis/correlation                        Number of obs    =     2486 
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        3 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =        6 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      2.06025      1.12235            0.5151       0.5151 
        Factor2  |      0.93790      0.40393            0.2345       0.7495 
        Factor3  |      0.53397      0.06609            0.1335       0.8830 
        Factor4  |      0.46788            .            0.1170       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(6)  = 1808.83 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ----------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+------------------------------+-------------- 
     noisytoilet |   0.8128   -0.2071    0.0244 |      0.2959   
    noisyelect~y |   0.7924   -0.1911    0.4802 |      0.1050   
    noisycooki~l |   0.8007   -0.0189   -0.5422 |      0.0645   
    noisytapwa~r |   0.3615    0.9264    0.0935 |      0.0025   
    ----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. predict housing1 housing2 housing3 
(regression scoring assumed) 
 
Scoring coefficients (method = regression) 
 
    -------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3  
    -------------+------------------------------ 
     noisytoilet |  0.39449  -0.22081   0.04576  
    noisyelect~y |  0.38460  -0.20376   0.89935  
    noisycooki~l |  0.38865  -0.02012  -1.01547  
    noisytapwa~r |  0.17546   0.98769   0.17508  
    -------------------------------------------- 
 
 
III. Cragg Double Hurdle Model (including parameter estimation) 
 
**craggit routine for estimating the impact of education** 
 
.  craggit w urbanpop health1 health2 housing1 housing2 housing3 dpercep 
education, second(mfb_avloan urbanpop health1 health2 housing1 housing2 
housing3 dpercep education) het(mfb_avloan) 
 
Estimating Cragg's tobit alternative 
Assumes conditional independence 
 
Number of obs   = 2486 
                                                  Wald chi2(8)    =     254.91 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -18590.57                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Tier1        | 
    urbanpop |   5.807517    .385545    15.06   0.000     5.051862    6.563171 
     health1 |   .0298455   .0535265     0.56   0.577    -.0750645    .1347556 
     health2 |   .0361642   .0427213     0.85   0.397     -.047568    .1198964 
    housing1 |  -.1821038   .0617621    -2.95   0.003    -.3031553   -.0610524 
    housing2 |   .0132549   .0344351     0.38   0.700    -.0542367    .0807464 
    housing3 |   .1603585   .0408912     3.92   0.000     .0802132    .2405038 
     dpercep |  -.2776277   .3921177    -0.71   0.479    -1.046164    .4909089 
   education |   .1711063   .0572307     2.99   0.003     .0589363    .2832763 
       _cons |  -.5409626   .0659512    -8.20   0.000    -.6702246   -.4117006 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Tier2        | 
    urbanpop |   6295.169   1162.473     5.42   0.000     4016.764    8573.574 
     health1 |   3019.854   395.6563     7.63   0.000     2244.381    3795.326 
     health2 |  -1346.815   263.2143    -5.12   0.000    -1862.706    -830.925 
    housing1 |   320.4638    345.611     0.93   0.354    -356.9213    997.8489 
    housing2 |  -1991.854    203.882    -9.77   0.000    -2391.455   -1592.252 
    housing3 |  -340.1535   254.2527    -1.34   0.181    -838.4795    158.1725 
     dpercep |   2366.707   2137.812     1.11   0.268    -1823.329    6556.742 
   education |  -1318.905   427.4035    -3.09   0.002    -2156.601   -481.2099 
       _cons |   10585.35   315.2702    33.58   0.000     9967.429    11203.27 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
sigma        | 
       _cons |    6132.38   254.7204    24.07   0.000     5633.137    6631.622 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  predict x1g, eq(Tier1) 
 
.  predict x2b, eq(Tier2) 
 
.  predict sigma, eq(sigma) 
 
.  gen IMR=normalden(x2b/sigma)/normal(x2b/sigma) 
 
.  ** to calculate the marginal effect of independent variable on dependent 
variables probability** 
 
.  gen prob_education = [Tier1]_b[education]*normalden(x1g) 
 
.  su prob_education 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
prob_educa~n |      2486    .0494089    .0212457   1.45e-07   .0682615 
 
.  ** to calculate the conditional marginal effect of independent variable on 
the value of y**  
 
.   gen dEyyx2_education=[Tier2]_b[education]*(1-IMR*(x2b/sigma+IMR)) 
 
.   su dEyyx2_education 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
dEyyx2_edu~n |      2486   -1142.146    138.6343  -1318.893  -230.9162 
 
 
. ***end craggit routine*** 
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IV. Cragg Double Hurdle Model Bootstrap Routine  
 
. program define APEboot, rclass 
  1. preserve 
  2. craggit w urbanpop health1 health2 housing1 housing2 housing3 dpercep 
education, second(mfb_avloan urbanpop health1 health2 housing1 housing2 
housing3 dpercep education)  
  3. predict bsx1g, eq(Tier1) 
  4. predict bsx2b, eq(Tier2) 
  5. predict bssigma, eq(sigma) 
  6. gen bsIMR = normalden(bsx2b/bssigma)/normal(bsx2b/bssigma) 
  7. gen bsdEy_dxj=[Tier1]_b[dpercep]*normalden(bsx1g)*(bsx2b+bssigma*bsIMR)  
+[Tier2]_b[dpercep]*normal(bsx1g) *(1-bsIMR*(bsx2b/bssigma+bsIMR))  
  8. sum bsdEy_dxj 
  9. return scalar ape_xj=r(mean) 
 10. matrix ape_xj=r(ape_xj) 
 11. restore 
 12. end 
 
. bootstrap ape_xj = r(ape_xj), reps(100): APEboot 
(running APEboot on estimation sample) 
 
Bootstrap replications (100) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
..................................................   100 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =      2486 
                                                Replications       =       100 
 
      command:  APEboot 
       ape_xj:  r(ape_xj) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ape_xj |   2000.659   1925.521     1.04   0.299    -1773.293    5774.611 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. estat bootstrap, all 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =      2486 
                                                Replications       =       100 
command:  APEboot 
       ape_xj:  r(ape_xj) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |    Observed               Bootstrap 
             |       Coef.       Bias    Std. Err.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ape_xj |   2000.6591   128.9787   1925.5212   -1773.293   5774.611   (N) 
             |                                      -1504.945   5868.373   (P) 
             |                                      -1816.892    5642.72  (BC) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(N)    normal confidence interval 
(P)    percentile confidence interval 
(BC)   bias-corrected confidence interval 
 
. di normalden(2000.651/1925.5212) 
.23253428
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW SAMPLE DETAILS 
 
Details of Interview Sample 
Institution Designations Location 
I. Key Informants 
State Bank of Pakistan • Director, Microfinance 
Unit 
• Senior Joint Director 
• Senior Manager with 
field experience in 
managing MFBs 
Karachi 
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation 
Fund 
• General Manager 
• Associate Financial 
Services Group 
• Recently retired Director 
 
Islamabad 
International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) 
Investment Officer Karachi 
Independent Consultant  Engaged by UK’s 
Department for 
International Development  
Over the phone (stationed in 
Geneva) 
Pakistan Microfinance Network • Chief Operating Officer 
• Research Associate 
Islamabad 
National Rural Support 
Programme (NRSP) 
• Program Coordinator 
• Director Finance 
Islamabad 
NGO Resource Center Founder and Director Karachi 
II. MFIs  
Urban Poverty Alleviation 
Programme (subsidiary of 
NRSP, Pakistan) 
• Regional Directors – 
Sindh and Districts of 
Lahore 
• 2 Branch Managers 
• Loan Verification 
Officers 
• 2 Loan Officers 
• “Auditor” – responsible 
for conducting surprise 
branch visits 
Karachi and Lahore 
Kashf Foundation • Regional Director Sindh 
• Director Finance 
• Ex-Director 
• Officer, Gender 
Sensitization Unit 
• Research Manager  
• 2 Branch Managers 
• Accountant 
Karachi and Lahore 
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Details of Interview Sample 
Institution Designations Location 
• 2 Loan Officers 
Association for Social 
Advancement (ASA) (subsidiary 
of ASA Bangladesh 
• Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) 
• Chief Operating Officer 
• Regional Branch 
Manager 
• Auditor 
• Loan Officer 
Karachi 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) (subsidiary 
of BRAC Bangladesh) 
• Regional Manager  
• Area Manager Karachi 
• Branch Manager 
• 2 Loan Officers 
 
 
Karachi and over the phone 
Orangi Pilot Project’s (OPP) 
microfinance operations 
Director Microcredit 
Program 
Over the phone 
Orix Leasing • Regional Head 
• CEO  
• Director Microfinance 
Program 
Karachi and over the phone 
Thardeep Rural Support 
Programme  
• Executive Director 
• Director Microfinance  
Over the phone 
Akhuwat • Founder and Director 
• Manager Program 
Expansion 
• Assistant Manager 
Program 
• Loan Officer 
• 3 officers in training 
Lahore and over the phone 
III. MFBs 
Tameer Bank • Executive Director 
Sales, Distribution & 
Business 
• Group Executive 
Director 
• Head Product 
Development 
• 2 Branch Managers 
• 2 Loan Officers 
Karachi 
First Microfinance Bank (FMFB) • CEO 
• Ex-Chief Financial 
Officer 
• Manager Product 
Development 
• Regional Head Sindh 
Karachi, Islamabad, & 
Hyderabad  
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Details of Interview Sample 
Institution Designations Location 
• 2 Branch Managers 
• 2 Loan Officers 
Khushhali Bank • Head Operations 
• Area Manager - Karachi 
& Hyderabad 
• 2 Branch Managers 
• 5 Loan Officers 
• NGO Liaison  
Hyderabad, Rawalpindi and 
Islamabad 
Kashf Bank Head Business Banking Lahore 
IV. Clients 
Tameer Bank, FMFB, UPAP, 
Kashf Foundation, ASA and 
BRAC 
36 urban, active clients  9 low-income towns inside the 
city of Karachi 
UPAP, Kashf Foundation & 
Akhuwat  
13 urban, active clients Lahore 
Khushhali Bank 1 urban, active client. Rawalpindi 
Khushhali Bank 2 rural, active clients Tando Allahyar 
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APPENDIX C 
MICROFINANCE OUTREACH MAP 
 
Source: Microwatch (2nd Quarter, 2012). Quarterly Bulletin of the PMN 
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